


**EXHIBIT 4-1 METHOD OF HOME PURCHASE, 2001-2015**

(Percentage Distribution)



**EXHIBIT 4-2 METHOD OF HOME PURCHASE, BY REGION**

(Percentage Distribution)

	BUYERS WHO PURCHASED A HOME IN THE				
	All Buyers	Northeast	Midwest	South	West
Through a real estate agent or broker	87%	90%	87%	84%	90%
Directly from builder or builder's agent	8	3	4	11	7
Directly from the previous owner	5	7	8	4	3
Knew previous owner	3	4	4	2	2
Did not know previous owner	2	3	4	2	1

**EXHIBIT 4-3 METHOD OF HOME PURCHASE, NEW AND PREVIOUSLY OWNED HOMES***(Percentage Distribution)*

## BUYERS OF

	All Buyers	New Homes	Previously Owned Homes
Through a real estate agent or broker	87%	54%	93%
Directly from builder or builder's agent	8	44	N/A
Directly from the previous owner	5	2	6
Knew previous owner	3	1	3
Did not know previous owner	2	*	3

N/A- Not Applicable

\*Less than 1 percent

**EXHIBIT 4-4 METHOD OF HOME PURCHASE, BY ADULT COMPOSITION OF HOUSEHOLD***(Percentage Distribution)*

## ADULT COMPOSITION OF HOUSEHOLD

	All Buyers	Married couple	Single female	Single male	Unmarried couple	Other
Through a real estate agent or broker	87%	85%	90%	89%	88%	84%
Directly from builder or builder's agent	8	9	5	4	6	8
Directly from the previous owner	5	5	5	7	6	3
Knew previous owner	3	3	2	4	2	2
Did not know previous owner	2	2	3	2	4	2

**EXHIBIT 4-5 AGENT REPRESENTATION DISCLOSURE, FIRST-TIME AND REPEAT BUYERS***(Percentage Distribution)*

Disclosure Statement Signed?	All Buyers	First-time Buyers	Repeat Buyers
Yes, at first meeting	27%	22%	29%
Yes, when contract was written	22	19	24
Yes, at some other time	12	12	12
No	22	27	19
Don't know	18	20	16

**EXHIBIT 4-6 BUYER REPRESENTATIVE ARRANGEMENT WITH AGENT, FIRST-TIME AND REPEAT BUYERS***(Percentage Distribution)*

	All Buyers	First-time Buyers	Repeat Buyers
Yes, a written arrangement	40%	37%	42%
Yes, an oral arrangement	18	20	18
No	29	26	31
Don't know	13	18	10

**EXHIBIT 4-7 HOW REAL ESTATE AGENT WAS COMPENSATED**


(Percentage Distribution)

	All Types of Representation	TYPE OF AGENT REPRESENTATION	
		Buyer Only	Seller or Seller and Buyer
Paid by seller	56%	59%	53%
Paid by buyer and seller	12	12	12
Paid by buyer only	21	22	21
Percent of sales price	18	18	17
Flat fee	2	2	2
Other	*	*	*
Don't know	2	2	3
Other	2	1	2
Don't know	9	6	12

\*Less than 1 percent

**EXHIBIT 4-8 WHAT BUYERS WANT MOST FROM REAL ESTATE AGENTS**

(Percentage Distribution)



## EXHIBIT 4-9 WHAT BUYERS WANT MOST FROM REAL ESTATE AGENTS, FIRST-TIME AND REPEAT BUYERS, AND BUYERS OF NEW AND PREVIOUSLY OWNED HOMES

(Percentage Distribution)

	BUYERS OF				
	All Buyers	First-time Buyers	Repeat Buyers	New Homes	Previously Owned Homes
Help find the right home to purchase	53%	51%	53%	51%	52%
Help buyer negotiate the terms of sale	12	12	12	12	13
Help with the price negotiations	11	11	11	11	11
Determine what comparable homes were selling for	7	6	8	6	7
Help with paperwork	6	7	6	7	6
Help determining how much home buyer can afford	4	6	3	6	4
Help find and arrange financing	4	5	3	5	4
Help teach buyer more about neighborhood or area (restaurants, parks, public transportation)	1	1	2	1	1
Help find renters for buyer's property	*	*	*	*	*
Other	2	1	2	1	2

\* Less than 1 percent

## EXHIBIT 4-10 WHAT BUYERS WANT MOST FROM REAL ESTATE AGENTS, BY ADULT COMPOSITION OF HOUSEHOLD

(Percentage Distribution)

	ADULT COMPOSITION OF HOUSEHOLD					
	All Buyers	Married couple	Single female	Single male	Unmarried couple	Other
Help find the right home to purchase	53%	52%	55%	57%	46%	51%
Help buyer negotiate the terms of sale	12	13	10	11	13	6
Help with the price negotiations	11	11	12	8	14	9
Determine what comparable homes were selling for	7	8	5	7	9	4
Help with paperwork	6	6	6	6	7	12
Help determining how much home buyer can afford	4	3	7	3	5	6
Help find and arrange financing	4	3	3	6	5	5
Help teach buyer more about neighborhood or area (restaurants, parks, public transportation)	1	2	1	*	1	3
Help find renters for buyer's property	*	*	1	*	*	*
Other	2	2	1	2	1	6

\* Less than 1 percent

**EXHIBIT 4-11 BENEFITS PROVIDED BY REAL ESTATE AGENT DURING HOME PURCHASE PROCESS, FIRST-TIME AND REPEAT BUYERS**

(Percent of Respondents)

	All Buyers	First-time Buyers	Repeat Buyers
Helped buyer understand the process	60%	79%	51%
Pointed out unnoticed features/faults with property	55	61	52
Negotiated better sales contract terms	48	53	45
Provided a better list of service providers (e.g. home inspector)	47	48	47
Improved buyer's knowledge of search areas	45	48	43
Negotiated a better price	37	39	36
Shortened buyer's home search	30	31	30
Provided better list of mortgage lenders	22	25	21
Expanded buyer's search area	20	23	19
Narrowed buyer's search area	17	16	17
None of the above	6	5	6
Other	2	1	2

**EXHIBIT 4-12 HOW BUYER FOUND REAL ESTATE AGENT, FIRST-TIME AND REPEAT BUYERS**

(Percentage Distribution)

	All Buyers	First-time Buyers	Repeat Buyers
Referred by (or is) a friend, neighbor or relative	41%	50%	36%
Used agent previously to buy or sell a home	12	2	17
Internet website (without a specific reference)	10	11	10
Visited an open house and met agent	5	5	5
Saw contact information on For Sale/Open House sign	5	5	5
Referred by another real estate agent/broker	5	6	5
Personal contact by agent (telephone, e-mail, etc.)	4	4	4
Referred through employer or relocation company	3	2	4
Walked into or called office and agent was on duty	2	2	3
Search engine	1	1	1
Mobile or tablet application	1	1	1
Newspaper, Yellow Pages or home book ad	*	*	1
Direct mail (newsletter, flyer, postcard, etc.)	*	*	*
Advertising specialty (calendar, magnet, etc.)	*	*	*
Crowdsourcing through social media/knew the person through social media	*	*	*
Saw the agent's social media page without a connection	*	*	*
Other	10	11	10

\*Less than 1 percent

### EXHIBIT 4-13 HOW BUYER FOUND REAL ESTATE AGENT, BY ADULT COMPOSITION OF HOUSEHOLD

(Percentage Distribution)

	All Buyers	ADULT COMPOSITION OF HOUSEHOLD				
		Married couple	Single female	Single male	Unmarried couple	Other
Referred by (or is) a friend, neighbor or relative	41%	40%	43%	39%	46%	45%
Used agent previously to buy or sell a home	12	13	10	10	6	9
Internet website (without a specific reference)	10	11	9	10	11	12
Referred by another real estate agent/broker	5	5	6	5	4	
Visited an open house and met agent	5	6	3	2	8	4
Saw contact information on For Sale/Open House sign	5	4	5	6	7	8
Personal contact by agent (telephone, e-mail, etc.)	4	4	5	8	1	4
Referred through employer or relocation company	3	4	3	3	2	2
Walked into or called office and agent was on duty	2	2	3	3	3	*
Search engine	1	1	1	2	1	1
Mobile or tablet application	1	1	1	2	1	*
Newspaper, Yellow Pages or home book ad	*	*	1	1	*	*
Advertising specialty (calendar, magnet, etc.)	*	1	*	*	*	*
Direct mail (newsletter, flyer, postcard, etc.)	*	*	*	*	1	*
Crowdsourcing through social media/knew the person through social media	*	*	*	*	*	*
Saw the agent's social media page without a connection	*	*	*	*	*	*
Other	10	9	11	13	9	17

\*Less than 1 percent


### EXHIBIT 4-14 HOW MANY TIMES BUYER CONTACTED AGENT BEFORE RECEIVED RESPONSE AND ORIGINAL FORM OF CONTACT

(Median, Percentage Distribution)

Phone call	44%
Talked to them in person	20
E-mail	17
Contacted friend/family	9
Web form on home listing website	5
Text message	3
Through agent's website	2
Social Media (FaceBook, Twitter, LinkedIn, etc.)	1
Number of Times Contacted (median)	1


**EXHIBIT 4-15 NUMBER OF REAL ESTATE AGENTS INTERVIEWED BY FIRST-TIME AND REPEAT BUYERS**

(Percentage Distribution)




**EXHIBIT 4-16 MOST IMPORTANT FACTORS WHEN CHOOSING AN AGENT**

(Percentage Distribution)



**EXHIBIT 4-17 IMPORTANCE OF REAL ESTATE AGENT SKILLS AND QUALITIES**

(Percentage Distribution)





**EXHIBIT 4-18 AGENT SKILLS AND QUALITIES CONSIDERED "VERY IMPORTANT" BY FIRST-TIME AND REPEAT BUYERS, AND BUYERS OF NEW AND PREVIOUSLY OWNED HOMES**

(Percent of Respondents)

	All Buyers	BUYERS OF			
		First-time Buyers	Repeat Buyers	New Homes	Previously Owned Homes
Honesty and integrity	97%	97%	97%	94%	98%
Responsiveness	93	93	93	90	93
Knowledge of purchase process	92	95	90	89	92
Knowledge of real estate market	90	88	91	88	90
Communication skills	86	88	85	84	86
Negotiation skills	83	83	83	80	83
People skills	79	81	79	75	80
Knowledge of local area	77	73	79	74	77
Skills with technology	46	45	47	51	46

**EXHIBIT 4-19 AGENT SKILLS AND QUALITIES CONSIDERED "VERY IMPORTANT" BY ADULT COMPOSITION OF HOUSEHOLD**


(Percentage of Respondents)

	All Buyers	ADULT COMPOSITION OF HOUSEHOLD				
		Married couple	Single female	Single male	Unmarried couple	Other
Honesty and integrity	97%	97%	99%	94%	99%	93%
Responsiveness	93	94	95	86	94	89
Knowledge of purchase process	92	91	95	89	95	90
Knowledge of real estate market	90	91	92	88	92	82
Communication skills	86	87	88	80	85	76
Negotiation skills	83	82	85	79	86	76
People skills	79	80	83	71	79	71
Knowledge of local area	77	78	77	71	74	75
Skills with technology	46	46	51	42	41	34

**EXHIBIT 4-20 IMPORTANCE OF AGENT COMMUNICATIONS**


(Percent of Respondents)

	All Buyers	First-time Buyers	Repeat Buyers
Calls personally to inform of activities	78%	76%	79%
Sends postings as soon as a property is listed/the price changes/under contract	68	66	69
Sends property info and communicates via text message	55	58	54
Sends emails about specific needs	54	59	51
Can send market reports on recent listings and sales	51	46	54
Has a web page	29	29	29
Has a mobile site to show properties	27	27	27
Is active on Facebook/Twitter	12	11	12
Sends an email newsletter	9	8	9
Advertises in newspapers	5	4	6
Has a blog	2	1	2

**EXHIBIT 4-21 SATISFACTION WITH REAL ESTATE AGENT SKILLS AND QUALITIES***(Percentage Distribution)*

**EXHIBIT 4-22 WOULD BUYER USE REAL ESTATE AGENT AGAIN OR RECOMMEND TO OTHERS**

(Percentage Distribution)



**EXHIBIT 4-23 HOW MANY TIMES BUYER RECOMMENDED TYPICAL AGENT**

(Percentage Distribution)

All Buyers	
None	36%
One time	15
Two times	19
Three times	11
Four or more times	19
Times recommended since buying (median)	1

# CHAPTER 5:

## Financing the Home Purchase

**W**hile many share the desire to own their own home, financing the purchase has a variety of obstacles according to this year's survey responses. Eighty-six percent of all buyers financed their homes last year and, consistent with previous years, younger buyers are more likely to finance their home purchase.

Savings remain a key source of the downpayment for home buyers, both first-time and repeat buyers alike. Sixty percent of recent home buyers used their savings to finance their home purchase, down from 65 percent last year. Overall, this is still above the historical norm of 53 percent in 2000. For all buyers who saved for a downpayment, 46 percent saved in less than six months, which is up from 37 percent last year. Fifty-four percent of buyers did not need to make any sacrifices, consistent with last year. For those who did, the most common sacrifices reported were cutting spending on luxury goods, entertainment, and clothes shopping.

While the share of home buyers reporting that the process of obtaining a mortgage is more difficult than expected remains high, the figure is about the same as in 2013. It is, however, considerably higher than the figures in the 2009 and 2010 reports. Conventional financing was the most common mortgage type, followed by FHA loans, primarily among first-time home buyers again this year.

## Buyers Who Financed Their Home

### ■ Exhibits 5-1 through 5-3

Eighty-six percent of all buyers financed their homes last year, down from 88 percent the year prior. Consistent with previous years, younger buyers are more likely to finance their home purchase. Ninety-seven percent of buyers aged 25 to 44 years old financed, whereas only 63 percent of buyers over the age of 65 years financed their home. Investors and vacation buyers have higher shares of buyers who purchase these types of properties without financing, but these buyers are not tracked in this survey.

As one might expect, first-time home buyers were more likely to finance their home at 95 percent than repeat buyers at 82 percent. Unmarried couples that were first-time home buyers financed their homes the most at 98 percent whereas single females that were repeat buyers only financed 75 percent of the time.

Fourteen percent of buyers, the same as last year, financed 100 percent of the entire purchase price with a mortgage. The median percent financed for first-time buyers was 94 percent compared to 86 percent for repeat buyers, which was consistent with last year.

## Sources of Downpayment

### ■ Exhibits 5-4 through 5-7

Sixty percent of recent home buyers used their savings to finance their home purchase, down from 65 percent last year. Overall, this is still above the historical norm of 47 percent since 2000. For all buyers, the proceeds from the sale of a primary residence was the next most commonly cited way of financing a home purchase at 38 percent, up from 33 percent last year. This was still below the historical average of 51 percent since 2000. For repeat buyers, this was the most common way to finance a home at 53 percent. This number is up from 47 percent last year and more than double the 25 percent used in 2012, likely due to the increase in property values allowing buyers to use equity from their previous home at higher rates. For first-time buyers, they cited using savings (81 percent) and a gift from relative or friend (27 percent), which is roughly the same as last year.

For all buyers who saved for a downpayment, 46 percent saved in less than six months, which is up from 37 percent last year. Fifty-one percent of first time buyers saved for a year or less, which is up from 47 percent last year, and compared to 66 percent of repeat buyers which is flat from the year prior. Ten percent of first-time buyers and 11 percent of repeat buyers saved for a downpayment for more than five years.

Single males had the highest percent of savings used for the downpayment at 74 percent. Married couples were the most likely to use proceeds from the sale of a primary home and were the most likely to save for a downpayment in less than six months.

## Expenses that Delayed Saving for a Downpayment or Home Purchase

### ■ Exhibits 5-8 through 5-10

Nearly a quarter of buyers were delayed in purchasing a home by more than five years if they had debt that delayed them. The median length of time buyers waited to buy a home while saving for the downpayment was four years. Buyers were asked what difficulties they encountered in their home search and home buying process. The share that cited their most difficult step in the home buying process was saving for a downpayment was 13 percent. It was 25 percent for first-time buyers and seven percent for repeat buyers. These buyers were asked what expenses made saving for a downpayment difficult. Fifty-one percent of all buyers reported student loans (up from 46 percent), 47 reported credit card debt (down from 50 percent), and 35 percent car loans (down from 38 percent).

For first-time home buyers, 25 percent said saving for a downpayment was the most difficult step in the process. Of that number, 58 percent said student loan debt delayed them in saving for a home. Among the seven percent of repeat buyers who reported that saving for a downpayment was the most difficult task, 46 percent reported credit card debt delayed them in saving for a home (down from 58 percent). Twenty-three percent of unmarried couples reported saving for a downpayment was the most difficult task in buying a home (up from just 18 percent). Of that 23 percent, 51 percent reported student loans delayed their saving and 40 percent report credit card debt delayed their savings, slightly down from previous years.

## Sacrifices Made to Purchase Home

- Exhibits 5-11 and 5-12

Some buyers chose to make financial sacrifices in order to make a home purchase. Fifty-four percent of buyers did not need to make any sacrifices, consistent with last year. For all buyers, the most common sacrifices reported were a cut in spending on luxury or non-essential items (33 percent), a cut in spending on entertainment (25 percent), and a cut in spending on clothes (20 percent). First-time buyers were more likely to make sacrifices than repeat buyers—64 percent compared to 37 percent made sacrifices respectively. Single females and unmarried couples reported making the most financial sacrifices.

## Difficulty of Mortgage Application and Approval Process and Sold a Distressed Property

- Exhibits 5-13 through 5-16

Sixteen percent of buyers said that the mortgage application process was more difficult than expect and 17 percent said it was easier. The bulk of buyers said that the mortgage application and approval process was no more difficult than expected at 43 percent. Forty-five percent of first-time buyers said that the mortgage application and approval process was somewhat to much more difficult than expected compared to 37 percent of repeat buyers. Single female buyers were more likely to report the process was easier than expected for them.

Twenty-five percent of all buyers reported having student loan debt. That number jumps to 41 percent for first-time buyers and drops to 17 percent for repeat buyers. The median amount of student loan debt for all buyers, including first-time and repeat buyers, was \$25,000.

Nine percent of recent buyers had a distressed property sale in the past—either a short sale or a foreclosure—and the typical year for a distressed sale was in 2010.

## Type of Mortgage Loan

- Exhibits 5-17 and 5-18

Ninety-one percent of all buyers used a fixed rate mortgage. Fifty-nine percent of buyers chose a conventional loan to finance their home, down from 61 percent last year. Twenty-three percent of buyers reported securing a FHA loan and 11 percent chose a VA loan. First-time buyers sought FHA loans more commonly than repeat buyers at 34 percent to 16 percent. Repeat buyers largely used conventional loans at 66 percent.

## Buyers' View of Homes as a Financial Investment

- Exhibits 5-19 and 5-20

Buyers continue to see purchasing a home as a good financial investment. Eighty percent (up from 79 percent last year) reported the view that a home purchase is a good investment and 43 percent said it was better than owning stock. Only six percent reported that it was not a good financial investment, down from seven percent last year. Eighty-four percent of first-time buyers see owning a home as a sound financial endeavor compared to 78 percent of repeat buyers, consistent with last year. Unmarried couples are most likely to feel their home is a good financial investment at 83 percent.

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
*Sixty percent of recent home buyers used their savings to finance their home purchase, down from 65 percent last year. Overall, this is still above the historical norm of 47 percent in 2000.*

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**EXHIBIT 5-1**

**BUYERS WHO FINANCED THEIR HOME PURCHASE, BY AGE**

(Percent of Respondents)



**EXHIBIT 5-2**

**BUYERS WHO FINANCED THEIR HOME PURCHASE, BY ADULT COMPOSITION OF HOUSEHOLD**

(Percent of Respondents)

	ADULT COMPOSITION OF HOUSEHOLD					
	All buyers	Married couple	Single female	Single male	Unmarried couple	Other
All Buyers	86%	87%	83%	86%	92%	81%
First-time Buyers	95	96	94	91	98	91
Repeat Buyers	82	84	75	81	83	75

**EXHIBIT 5-3****PERCENT OF HOME FINANCED BY FIRST-TIME AND REPEAT BUYERS, AND BUYERS OF NEW AND PREVIOUSLY OWNED HOMES***(Percentage Distribution)*

	All Buyers	BUYERS OF			
		First-time Buyers	Repeat Buyers	New Homes	Previously Owned Homes
Less than 50%	9%	7%	11%	11%	9%
50% to 59%	3	1	5	3	4
60% to 69%	4	2	5	6	3
70% to 79%	13	8	15	16	12
80% to 89%	22	17	25	20	23
90% to 94%	15	18	13	13	15
95% to 99%	20	29	15	18	20
100%—Financed the entire purchase price with a mortgage	14	19	12	13	15
Median percent financed	90%	94%	86%	87%	90%

**EXHIBIT 5-4****SOURCES OF DOWNPAYMENT, FIRST-TIME AND REPEAT BUYERS***(Percent of Respondents Among Those Who Made a Downpayment)*

	All Buyers	BUYERS OF	
		First-time Buyers	Repeat Buyers
Savings	60%	81%	51%
Proceeds from sale of primary residence	38	3	53
Gift from relative or friend	13	27	7
401k/pension fund including a loan	8	8	8
Sale of stocks or bonds	8	8	7
Inheritance	5	5	4
Individual Retirement Account (IRA)	4	4	4
Loan from relative or friend	3	5	2
Proceeds from sale of real estate other than primary residence	2	1	3
Equity from primary residence buyer continue to own	2	1	3
Loan or financial assistance from source other than employer	1	2	1
Loan from financial institution other than a mortgage	1	1	1
Other	5	6	4



**EXHIBIT 5-5 SOURCES OF DOWNPAYMENT, BY ADULT COMPOSITION OF HOUSEHOLD**


(Percent of Respondents Among Those Who Made a Downpayment)


	ADULT COMPOSITION OF HOUSEHOLD					
	All Buyers	Married couple	Single female	Single male	Unmarried couple	Other
Savings	60%	59%	52%	74%	72%	58%
Proceeds from sale of primary residence	38	43	34	22	22	27
Gift from relative or friend	13	12	15	8	19	11
401k/pension fund including a loan	8	7	6	9	9	18
Sale of stocks or bonds	8	7	6	9	10	14
Inheritance	5	4	4	6	5	11
Individual Retirement Account (IRA)	4	4	3	5	3	4
Loan from relative or friend	3	3	3	2	6	6
Proceeds from sale of real estate other than primary residence	2	2	3	2	1	7
Equity from primary residence buyer continue to own	2	2	1	3	1	7
Loan or financial assistance from source other than employer	1	1	2	1	2	*
Loan from financial institution other than a mortgage	1	1	1	*	*	5
Loan or financial assistance through employer	*	*	*	1	*	*
Other	5	4	7	3	4	6

\* Less than 1 percent

**EXHIBIT 5-6 LENGTH OF TIME TO SAVE FOR A DOWNPAYMENT, FIRST-TIME AND REPEAT BUYERS**

(Percent of Respondents Among Those Who Made a Downpayment)



**EXHIBIT 5-7****LENGTH OF TIME TO SAVE FOR A DOWNPAYMENT, BY ADULT COMPOSITION OF HOUSEHOLD***(Percent of Respondents Among Those Who Made a Downpayment)***EXHIBIT 5-8****YEARS DEBT DELAYED HOME BUYERS FROM SAVING FOR A DOWNPAYMENT OR BUYING A HOME***(Percentage Distribution)*

	All Buyers	First-time Buyers	Repeat Buyers
One year	16%	17%	15%
Two years	19%	21%	17%
Three years	14%	13%	15%
Four years	7%	8%	7%
Five years	20%	19%	19%
More than five years	24%	22%	27%
Median Years Debt Delayed Home Purchase Among Those Who Had Difficulty Saving	4	3	4

**EXHIBIT 5-9 EXPENSES THAT DELAYED SAVING FOR A DOWNPAYMENT OR SAVING FOR A HOME PURCHASE, BY FIRST-TIME AND REPEAT BUYERS**

*(Percent of Respondents Who Reported Saving for a Down Payment Was Difficult)*

	All Buyers	First-time Buyers	Repeat Buyers
Share Saving for Downpayment was Most Difficult Task in Buying Process:	13%	25%	7%
Debt that Delayed Saving:			
Student Loans	51%	58%	36%
Credit card debt	47	47	46
Car loan	35	37	30
Child care expenses	18	15	23
Health care costs	13	13	13
Other	17	11	29
Median Years Debt Delayed Home Purchase Among Those Who Had Difficulty Saving	3	3	3


**EXHIBIT 5-10 EXPENSES THAT DELAYED SAVING FOR A DOWNPAYMENT OR SAVING FOR A HOME PURCHASE, BY ADULT COMPOSITION OF HOUSEHOLD**

*(Percent of Respondents Who Reported Saving for a Down Payment Was Difficult)*

	ADULT COMPOSITION OF HOUSEHOLD					
	All Buyers	Married couple	Single female	Single male	Unmarried couple	Other
Share Saving for Downpayment was Most Difficult Task in Buying Process:	13%	12%	10%	14%	23%	15%
Debt that Delayed Saving:						
Student Loans	51%	53%	51%	42%	51%	50%
Credit card debt	47	47	56	40	40	63
Car loan	35	35	27	22	53	33
Child care expenses	18	20	11	8	8	56
Health care costs	13	14	11	13	7	27
Other	17	14	25	27	15	25
Median Years Debt Delayed Home Purchase Among Those Who Had Difficulty Saving	3	3	5	4	4	7

**EXHIBIT 5-11 SACRIFICES MADE TO PURCHASE HOME, BY FIRST-TIME AND REPEAT BUYERS**

(Percent of Respondents)




**EXHIBIT 5-12 SACRIFICES MADE TO PURCHASE HOME, BY ADULT COMPOSITION OF HOUSEHOLD**

(Percent of Respondents)

	ADULT COMPOSITION OF HOUSEHOLD					
	All Buyers	Married couple	Single female	Single male	Unmarried couple	Other
Cut spending on luxury items or non-essential items	33%	32%	34%	29%	45%	30%
Cut spending on entertainment	25	23	28	26	36	31
Cut spending on clothes	20	18	27	17	28	25
Canceled vacation plans	15	14	13	16	21	15
Earned extra income through a second job	8	7	9	7	7	2
Sold a vehicle or decided not to purchase a vehicle	7	8	6	8	7	2
Other	3	3	3	3	4	8
Did not need to make any sacrifices	54	56	52	58	43	56


**EXHIBIT 5-13 DIFFICULTY OF MORTGAGE APPLICATION AND APPROVAL PROCESS, BY FIRST-TIME AND REPEAT BUYERS**

(Percentage Distribution Among Those Who Financed Their Home Purchase)



### EXHIBIT 5-14 DIFFICULTY OF MORTGAGE APPLICATION AND APPROVAL PROCESS, BY ADULT COMPOSITION OF HOUSEHOLD

(Percentage Distribution Among Those Who Financed Their Home Purchase)



### EXHIBIT 5-15 BUYERS WHO HAVE STUDENT LOAN DEBT

(Percentage Distribution)

	All Buyers	First-time Buyers	Repeat Buyers
Have student loan debt	25%	41%	17%
Under \$10,000	21	21	22
\$10,000 to \$24,999	28	28	29
\$25,000 to \$49,999	22	21	23
\$50,000 to \$74,999	13	12	13
\$75,000 or more	16	19	13
Median amount of student loan debt	\$25,000	\$25,000	\$25,000


**EXHIBIT 5-16 BUYER PREVIOUSLY SOLD A DISTRESSED PROPERTY (SHORT SALE OR FORECLOSURE)**


(Percentage Distribution, Median)

All Buyers	
Previously had a distressed property sale	9%
Median year of sale	2010

**EXHIBIT 5-17 TYPE OF MORTGAGE, FIRST-TIME AND REPEAT BUYERS**

(Percentage Distribution Among Those Who Financed Their Home Purchase)



**EXHIBIT 5-18 TYPE OF LOAN, FIRST-TIME AND REPEAT BUYERS***(Percentage Distribution Among Those Who Financed Their Home Purchase)***EXHIBIT 5-19 BUYERS' VIEW OF HOMES AS A FINANCIAL INVESTMENT, FIRST-TIME AND REPEAT BUYERS, AND BUYERS OF NEW AND PREVIOUSLY OWNED HOMES***(Percentage Distribution)*

	BUYERS OF				
	All Buyers	First-time Buyers	Repeat Buyers	New Homes	Previously Owned Homes
Good financial investment	80%	84%	78%	82%	80%
Better than stocks	43	48	40	42	43
About as good as stocks	25	25	26	25	26
Not as good as stocks	12	11	12	15	11
Not a good financial investment	6	3	7	6	6
Don't know	14	13	15	13	15

**EXHIBIT 5-20 BUYERS' VIEW OF HOMES AS A FINANCIAL INVESTMENT, BY ADULT COMPOSITION OF HOUSEHOLD***(Percentage Distribution)*

	ADULT COMPOSITION OF HOUSEHOLD					
	All Buyers	Married couple	Single female	Single male	Unmarried couple	Other
Good financial investment	80%	80%	79%	79%	83%	74%
Better than stocks	43	42	47	42	44	50
About as good as stocks	25	26	23	25	28	18
Not as good as stocks	12	12	9	12	11	6
Not a good financial investment	6	6	6	5	5	6
Don't know	14	14	15	16	13	20



# CHAPTER 6:

## Home Sellers and Their Selling Experience

**T**ightened inventory continues to cause prices to increase in many areas of the country. While housing inventory is reduced in many areas, sellers see a favorable market where they receive a median of 98 percent of their asking price and sell their homes typically within four weeks.

Increased home prices have lowered the share of home sellers who report they delayed the sale of their home because their home was worth less than their mortgage. That share of sellers dropped from 17 percent in the 2014 report to 14 percent in the 2015 report. However, sellers who purchased their home eight to 10 years ago continue to report stalling their home sale at higher rates—29 percent of sellers reported delaying their home sale.

The typical seller had \$40,000 in equity in their home when their home sold in comparison to their purchase price of their home.

## Home Seller Characteristics

### Exhibits 6-1 through 6-6

The typical age of home sellers was 54 this year, the same as in 2013 but up from 46 in 2009. The median income in 2014 for the typical household was \$104,100, a jump from \$96,700. Incomes in the Northeast and South were typically higher than the Midwest and West.

Married couples selling their home jumped back up to 77 percent again this year after a slight dip last year at 74 percent, which has been the historical norm. From 2004 to 2010, the share of married couples selling their homes stayed between 71 and 75 percent. Single females who sold their home dropped two percent this year to 12 percent. Of all homes sold on the market, 65 percent did not have children under the age of 18 residing in the home.

For all sellers, 91 percent identified as white or Caucasian and 98 percent of households speak English as their primary language.

## Home Selling Situation

### Exhibits 6-7 and 6-8

For repeat buyers, a third (30 percent) sold their home in 2015, another third (36 percent) sold in 2014, and only six percent have not been able to sell yet. Seven percent, down from nine last year, do not plan to sell their home. Two-thirds (63 percent) were repeat sellers and the share of first-time home sellers was 37 percent.

## Home Sold vs. Home Purchased

### Exhibits 6-9 through 6-20

The majority of homes in the 2015 report were sold in the same state at 70 percent. Seventeen percent of home sellers moved to another region of the country and 13 percent remained in the same region but moved to a nearby state. Half of the homes sold (49 percent) were located in the suburbs or a subdivision. Forty percent of the homes sold this year were located in the South region of the United States.

Detached single-family homes saw the most turnover at eighty-two percent of all homes sold. Apartments or condos in multi-unit buildings sold at 14 percent in urban and city central areas.

Forty-two percent of sellers traded up and purchased a home that was larger in size than what they previously owned, 29 percent bought a home that was similar in size, and 31 percent traded down and purchased a home that was smaller in size. For buyers 65 years in age and older, they purchased a smaller home by 200 square feet. For Millennials 34 years and younger, they purchased a home 600 square feet larger. Buyers age 35 to 44 traded up the most, purchasing homes that were 700 feet larger in square feet. The typical home had three bedrooms and two bathrooms, the same as in the year prior.

Half of all sellers purchased a home that was newer in age than their previous home (54 percent). Those that purchased an older home jumped up from 22 percent last year to 27 percent this year. The share of sellers that purchased a home similar in size went down to 21 percent in this report. Forty-seven percent of sellers traded up to purchase a more expensive home than the home they just sold, 23 percent purchased a home similar in price, and 30 percent traded down for a less expensive home, which was similar to last year. Buyers who are 54 and younger typically bought a more expensive home than the one they just sold. Buyers aged 55 to 64 typically purchased a home that was about the same price, while most buyers over 65 typically bought a less expensive home.

For all sellers, the most commonly cited reason for selling their home was that it was too small (16 percent), followed by a job relocation (14 percent), and the desire to move closer to friends and family (13 percent). For sellers that moved the greatest distances, the primary reason was to relocate for a job. For sellers moving within 10 miles, the home was too small was the most common reason followed by a change in family situation, the home was too big, and the neighborhood became less desirable. For first-time sellers, 29 percent said their home was too small and repeat buyers wanted to be closer to friends and family (16 percent).

## Seller Stalled Home Sale

### ■ Exhibits 6-21 and 6-22

Twelve percent of recent sellers stalled or delayed their home sale because their home was worth less than their mortgage, down from 17 percent in the year prior. Eighty-seven percent were able to sell when they wanted to, indicating a healthy housing market for sellers. Fourteen percent of first-time buyers stalled but lived in the home compared to only 11 percent for repeat buyers. Twenty-six percent of those who purchased their home eight to 10 years ago reported stalling or waiting to sell the home.

## Tenure In Home

### ■ Exhibits 6-23 and 6-24

The median number of years a seller remained in their home was nine, down from 10 years in 2014. That number is still higher than reported in 2001 to 2008 where the tenure in the home was only six years. The highest tenure in a home was for cabins and cottages where sellers typically lived for 14 years. Owners of detached single-family homes, which account for the largest share of homes purchased, sold their homes typically after nine years. Millennial sellers had the shortest tenure in their homes—sellers aged 18 to 34 sold their home within five years, compared to those over 75 years of age who sold their home typically after 18 years.

## Distance Moved

### ■ Exhibits 6-25 and 6-26

The purchasing habits of sellers lead them to buy close to where they previously lived, moving no further than 20 miles away. In the Northeast region, sellers typically moved within 15 miles. This trend varies with age, where younger sellers under the age of 34 only move within five miles. Sellers aged 35 to 54 moved under 10 miles. Sellers of 65 to 74 years moved 101 to 500 miles away 23 percent of the time.

## Method of Sale

### ■ Exhibits 6-27 through 6-30

Eighty-nine percent of home sellers worked with a real estate agent to sell their home. FSBO was low at eight percent this year, which is lower than the historical norm. From 2001 to 2008 the share of FSBO sales ranged from 12 percent to 14 percent. Working with an agent was highest in the West at 93 percent and lowest in the Northeast at 86 percent, which stayed the same from last year. Inversely, FSBO sales were highest in the Northeast at 11 percent and lowest in the West at just six percent.

The method of sale tends to differ in conjunction with the relationship between the buyer and seller. If the buyer and seller know each other, the sale can be either an arms-length transaction consistent with local market conditions or it may involve considerations that would be not be relevant in the absence of a prior relationship.

Of all home sellers, only six percent reported that they knew the buyer of their home. Among those sellers that were assisted by an agent, just three percent knew the buyer. In contrast, 36 percent of FSBO sellers, down from 49, said they knew the buyer of their home before the transaction.

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*The typical age of home sellers was 54 this year, the same as in 2013 but up from 46 in 2009. The median income in 2014 for the typical household was \$104,100, a jump from \$96,700.*

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## Sales Price And Time On The Market

- **Exhibits 6-31 through 6-35**

For recently sold homes, the final sales price was a median 98 percent of the final listing price, one percent higher than the year prior. That figure was the same under seller urgency. In the West, the median final sales price was as high as 99 percent of the listing price. For all sellers, time on market was a median of four weeks. In the Northeast, it was a median of six weeks, four weeks in the Midwest and the South, and just three weeks in the West. Time on the market and the ratio of sales price to listing price are highly correlated; generally, the longer a home is on the market the greater the discount from the listing price upon sale. Homes that were on the market for two weeks or less received a median of 100 percent of their asking price. Homes that were on the market for 17 weeks or more typically received just 93 percent of the sale price compared to the listing price, which is the same as last year. Thirty-six percent of sellers reported that their home was on the market for two weeks or less, down from 39 percent.

Homes which are on the market longer tend to reduce their listing price. Eighty-nine percent of homes that were listed on the market for less than one week did not reduce their asking price. Homes that were listed for three to four weeks, 42 percent reduced their asking price overall and 32 percent of those reduced the asking price only once. For homes on the market for 17 weeks or more, only 13 percent were sold at the initial asking price, which is down from 17 percent the year before.

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*The median number of years a seller remained in their home was nine, down from 10 years in 2014. That number is still higher than reported in 2001 to 2008 where the tenure in the home was only six years.*

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## Incentives To Prospective Buyers

- **Exhibits 6-36 and 6-37**

Thirty-seven percent of all sellers offered incentives to attract buyers. This varies by region where it was the most common in the South and Midwest and less likely in the Northeast and West. Home warranty policies followed by assistance with closing costs were the top two listed incentives when selling a home. As to be expected, the longer a home is on the market, the more likely the seller is to add an incentive. For homes that were listed on the market for over 17 weeks, 55 percent offered some kind of incentive compared to only 15 percent of homes that were listed for less than one week.

## Equity by Tenure

- **Exhibit 6-38**

This year, home sellers cited that they sold their homes for a median of \$40,000 more than they purchased it, up from \$30,100 the year prior. This accounts for a 23 percent price gain up from 17 percent the year before. Generally, the longer a seller is in the home the greater the increase attributable to price appreciation. Sellers who owned their homes for one to seven years, all reported selling their homes for roughly \$30-35,000 more than they purchased it. That number drops drastically to only \$3,000 between eight and 10 years, and then appreciates steadily. Homes sold after 21 years reported a price gain of \$138,000.

## Satisfaction With Sales Process

- **Exhibit 6-39**

Sixty-one percent of sellers were 'very satisfied' with the selling process, up from 58 percent the year prior. Twenty-seven percent were somewhat satisfied, down from 30 percent the year before. Thirteen percent were dissatisfied with the process, which was the same in years past.

**EXHIBIT 6-1 AGE OF HOME SELLERS, BY REGION**

(Percentage Distribution)

	SELLERS WHO SOLD A HOME IN THE				
	All Sellers	Northeast	Midwest	South	West
18 to 34 years	15%	11%	17%	14%	18%
35 to 44 years	17	19	23	18	17
45 to 54 years	15	18	16	15	17
55 to 64 years	20	24	21	22	20
65 to 74 years	21	21	18	26	25
75 years or older	5	7	6	6	4
Median age (years)	54	55	51	55	54


**EXHIBIT 6-2 HOUSEHOLD INCOME OF HOME SELLERS, 2014**

(Percentage Distribution)

	SELLERS WHO SOLD A HOME IN THE				
	All Sellers	Northeast	Midwest	South	West
Less than \$25,000	2%	2%	2%	3%	2%
\$25,000 to \$34,999	4	3	5	3	4
\$35,000 to \$44,999	5	3	5	5	6
\$45,000 to \$54,999	6	7	6	5	6
\$55,000 to \$64,999	6	4	5	6	8
\$65,000 to \$74,999	8	7	10	6	9
\$75,000 to \$84,999	8	8	9	7	9
\$85,000 to \$99,999	10	12	10	10	9
\$100,000 to \$124,999	18	18	17	17	19
\$125,000 to \$149,999	12	12	12	13	11
\$150,000 to \$174,999	7	6	6	9	4
\$175,000 to \$199,999	4	4	2	5	4
\$200,000 or more	11	13	11	11	10
Median income (2014)	\$104,100	\$108,300	\$100,000	\$111,700	\$98,300


**EXHIBIT 6-3 ADULT COMPOSITION OF HOME SELLER HOUSEHOLDS**

(Percentage Distribution)



**EXHIBIT 6-4 NUMBER OF CHILDREN UNDER THE AGE OF 18 RESIDING IN HOME SELLER HOUSEHOLD**

(Percentage Distribution of Home Seller Households)



**EXHIBIT 6-5 RACE/ETHNICITY OF HOME SELLERS, BY REGION**

(Percent of Respondents)

	All Sellers	SELLERS WHO SOLD A HOME IN THE			
		Northeast	Midwest	South	West
White/Caucasian	91%	93%	95%	91%	86%
Asian/Pacific Islander	3	2	2	2	7
Hispanic/Latino/Mexican/Puerto Rican	4	4	2	4	6
Black/African-American	2	1	2	3	1
Other	1	*	1	1	2

Note: Respondents were permitted to select as many races and ethnicities as they felt applicable.

The percentage distribution may therefore sum to more than 100 percent.

\* Less than 1 percent


**EXHIBIT 6-6 PRIMARY LANGUAGE SPOKEN IN HOME SELLER HOUSEHOLD, BY REGION**


(Percentage Distribution)

	All Sellers	SELLERS WHO SOLD A HOME IN THE			
		Northeast	Midwest	South	West
English	98%	99%	99%	99%	97%
Other	2	1	1	1	3

**EXHIBIT 6-7 HOME SELLING SITUATION AMONG REPEAT BUYERS**

(Percentage Distribution)



**EXHIBIT 6-8 FIRST-TIME OR REPEAT SELLER***(Percentage Distribution)***EXHIBIT 6-9 HOMES SOLD AND FOR SALE, BY REGION***(Percentage Distribution)*

	Home sold	Home has not yet sold and is currently vacant	Home has not yet sold, but currently renting to others
Northeast	14%	17%	16%
Midwest	22	27	19
South	40	47	44
West	24	10	22


**EXHIBIT 6-10 LOCATION OF HOME SOLD***(Percentage Distribution)*

	Home sold	Home has not yet sold and is currently vacant	Home has not yet sold, but currently renting to others
Suburb/Subdivision	49%	39%	47%
Small town	19	26	23
Urban area/Central city	16	16	9
Rural area	14	18	18
Resort/Recreation area	3	1	3



**EXHIBIT 6-11 PROXIMITY OF HOME SOLD TO HOME PURCHASED**

(Percentage Distribution)



**EXHIBIT 6-12 TYPE OF HOME SOLD, BY LOCATION**

(Percentage Distribution)

SELLERS WHO SOLD A HOME IN A

	All Sellers	Suburb/ Subdivision	Small town	Urban/ Central city	Rural area	Resort/ Recreation area
Detached single-family home	82%	86%	83%	70%	81%	58%
Townhouse/row house	6	7	4	8	3	12
Apartment/condo in a building with 5 or more units	5	4	3	14	2	12
Duplex/apartment/condo in 2 to 4 unit building	2	1	3	4	*	3
Other	6	3	8	5	15	16

\* Less than 1 percent

**EXHIBIT 6-13 SIZE OF HOME PURCHASED COMPARED TO HOME RECENTLY SOLD**

(Percentage Distribution)

SIZE OF HOME PURCHASED

SIZE OF HOME SOLD	1,000 sq ft or less	1,001 sq ft to 1,500 sq ft	1,501 sq ft to 2,000 sq ft	2,001 sq ft to 2,500 sq ft	2,501 sq ft to 3,000 sq ft	More than 3,000 sq ft
1,000 sq ft or less	*	*	*	*	*	*
1,001 to 1,500 sq ft	*	2	5	4	2	1
1,501 to 2,000 sq ft	*	2	6	6	5	4
2,001 to 2,500 sq ft	*	2	5	8	5	6
2,501 to 3,000 sq ft	*	1	3	6	4	4
More than 3,000 sq ft	*	*	2	6	4	9

\* Less than 1 percent

42% Trading Up  
  29% Remaining at the Same Size Range  
  31% Trading Down

### EXHIBIT 6-14 SIZE OF HOME PURCHASED COMPARED TO HOME RECENTLY SOLD, BY AGE OF SELLER

(Median Square Feet)

	Size of home sold	Size of home purchased	Difference
18 to 34 years	1,600	2,200	600
35 to 44 years	1,900	2,600	700
45 to 54 years	2,200	2,300	100
55 to 64 years	2,000	2,000	0
65 to 74 years	2,200	2,000	-200
75 years or older	2,000	1,800	-200

### EXHIBIT 6-15 NUMBER OF BEDROOMS AND BATHROOMS BY ADULT COMPOSITION OF HOUSEHOLD AND CHILDREN IN HOUSEHOLD

(Percentage Distribution)

	All Sellers	ADULT COMPOSITION OF HOUSEHOLD					CHILDREN IN HOME	
		Married couple	Single female	Single male	Unmarried couple	Other	Children under 18 in home	No children in home
One bedroom	1%	1%	2%	1%	*	*	*	1%
Two bedrooms	12	10	17	21	17	16	8	14
Three bedrooms or more	88	89	81	79	84	84	92	85
Median number of bedrooms	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
One full bathroom	13	12	17	15	18	11	14	13
Two full bathrooms	58	58	58	60	62	59	58	58
Three full bathrooms or more	29	30	25	25	20	30	28	29
Median number of full bathrooms	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2

\* Less than 1 percent

### EXHIBIT 6-16 AGE OF HOME PURCHASED COMPARED TO HOME RECENTLY SOLD

(Percentage Distribution)

#### YEAR PURCHASED HOME WAS BUILT

YEAR HOME SOLD WAS BUILT	2014	2010 through 2013	2006 through 2009	2001 through 2005	1986 through 2000	1960 through 1985	1912 through 1959	1750 through 1911
2014	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
2010 through 2013	2	3	*	*	2	2	*	*
2006 through 2009	5	*	1	1	1	1	*	*
2001 through 2005	5	3	3	3	4	4	1	*
1986 through 2000	4	1	3	4	5	5	4	*
1960 through 1985	5	1	2	3	4	7	2	*
1912 through 1959	1	*	*	1	1	4	2	*
1750 through 1911	*	*	*	*	1	*	1	*

\* Less than 1 percent

54% Purchased a Newer Home  21% Purchased a Home the Same Age  27% Purchased Older Home

**EXHIBIT 6-17 PRICE OF HOME PURCHASED COMPARED TO HOME RECENTLY SOLD**

(Percentage Distribution)

PRICE OF HOME PURCHASED

PRICE OF HOME SOLD	Less than \$100,000	\$100,000 to \$149,999	\$150,000 to \$199,999	\$200,000 to \$249,999	\$250,000 to \$299,999	\$300,000 to \$349,999	\$350,000 to \$399,999	\$400,000 to \$499,999	\$500,000 or more
Less than \$100,000	2%	2%	2%	1%	*	*	*	*	*
\$100,000 to \$149,999	1	3	4	3	2	*	1	*	*
\$150,000 to \$199,999	1	2	3	4	3	2	1	1	*
\$200,000 to \$249,999	*	1	3	3	3	1	2	1	*
\$250,000 to \$299,999	*	*	2	1	2	2	2	2	1
\$300,000 to \$349,999	*	*	1	4	1	1	1	1	1
\$350,000 to \$399,999	*	*	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
\$400,000 to \$499,999	*	*	*	1	1	1	*	1	2
\$500,000 or more	*	*	*	1	1	1	1	2	7

\* Less than 1 percent

47% Trading Up     23% Remaining at the Same Price Range     30% Trading Down

**EXHIBIT 6-18 PRICE OF HOME PURCHASED COMPARED TO HOME RECENTLY SOLD, BY AGE OF SELLER**

(Median)

	Price of home sold	Price of home purchased	Difference
18 to 34 years	\$190,000	\$260,000	\$70,000
35 to 44 years	\$233,000	\$308,000	\$75,000
45 to 54 years	\$265,000	\$289,000	\$24,000
55 to 64 years	\$250,000	\$255,000	\$5,000
65 to 74 years	\$278,000	\$220,000	-\$58,000
75 years or older	\$240,000	\$207,000	-\$33,000

**EXHIBIT 6-19 PRIMARY REASON FOR SELLING PREVIOUS HOME, BY MILES MOVED***(Percentage Distribution)*

	All Sellers	MILES MOVED					
		10 miles or less	11 to 20 miles	21 to 50 miles	51 to 100 miles	101 to 500 miles	501 miles or more
Home is too small	16%	30%	19%	11%	4%	1%	1%
Job relocation	14	3	4	6	19	31	38
Want to move closer to friends or family	13	3	7	13	18	28	24
Neighborhood has become less desirable	10	13	17	19	4	1	3
Change in family situation (e.g., marriage, birth of a child, divorce)	10	15	11	10	4	5	4
Home is too large	9	14	11	7	8	2	2
Moving due to retirement	7	3	2	7	12	11	16
Upkeep of home is too difficult due to health or financial limitations	6	4	8	2	8	17	2
Want to move closer to current job	5	2	11	14	18	2	1
Can not afford the mortgage and other expenses of owning home	2	3	2	3	1	1	2
To avoid possible foreclosure	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Other	8	11	7	7	4	1	7

\* Less than 1 percent


**EXHIBIT 6-20 PRIMARY REASON FOR SELLING PREVIOUS HOME, BY FIRST-TIME AND REPEAT SELLERS***(Percentage Distribution)*

	All Sellers	First-time Seller	Repeat Seller
Home is too small	16%	29%	8%
Job relocation	14	14	15
Want to move closer to friends or family	13	8	16
Neighborhood has become less desirable	10	13	8
Change in family situation (e.g., marriage, birth of a child, divorce)	10	10	10
Home is too large	9	4	11
Moving due to retirement	7	4	9
Upkeep of home is too difficult due to health or financial limitations	6	2	8
Want to move closer to current job	5	6	5
Can not afford the mortgage and other expenses of owning home	2	1	3
To avoid possible foreclosure	*	*	*
Other	8	8	8

\* Less than 1 percent


**EXHIBIT 6-21 SELLER WANTED TO SELL EARLIER BUT WAITED OR STALLED BECAUSE HOME WAS WORTH LESS THAN MORTGAGE, BY FIRST-TIME AND REPEAT SELLERS**

(Percentage Distribution)



## EXHIBIT 6-22 SELLER WANTED TO SELL EARLIER BUT WAITED OR STALLED BECAUSE HOME WAS WORTH LESS THAN MORTGAGE, BY TENURE IN HOME

(Percentage Distribution)



## EXHIBIT 6-23 TENURE IN PREVIOUS HOME

(Percentage Distribution)

All Types		Cabin/cottage	Duplex/ apartment/ condo in 2-4 unit structure	Apartment/condo in building with 5 or more units	Townhouse/ row house	Detached single-family home	Mobile/ manufactured home	Other
1 year or less	4%	*	*	6%	1%	4%	1%	8%
2 to 3 years	10	5	23	11	17	9	13	3
4 to 5 years	13	10	18	22	11	13	9	6
6 to 7 years	14	10	23	16	20	14	10	5
8 to 10 years	15	19	13	20	20	15	13	16
11 to 15 years	19	19	20	16	22	19	27	11
16 to 20 years	9	10	*	1	8	10	17	11
21 years or more	16	29	5	9	3	17	10	40
Median	9	14	6	7	8	9	12	16

\* Less than 1 percent

**EXHIBIT 6-24 TENURE IN PREVIOUS HOME, BY AGE OF SELLER**


(Percentage Distribution)

	AGE OF HOME SELLER						
	All Sellers	18 to 34 years	35 to 44 years	45 to 54 years	55 to 64 years	65 to 74 years	75 years or older
1 year or less	4%	3%	5%	3%	3%	4%	4%
2 to 3 years	10	17	9	11	8	7	8
4 to 5 years	13	36	17	11	6	5	4
6 to 7 years	14	27	17	13	10	13	7
8 to 10 years	15	12	26	18	11	13	13
11 to 15 years	19	4	21	24	23	22	9
16 to 20 years	9	N/A	3	13	16	9	9
21 years or more	16	N/A	1	8	23	28	47
Median	9	5	8	9	13	12	18

N/A- Not Applicable

**EXHIBIT 6-25 DISTANCE BETWEEN HOME PURCHASED AND HOME RECENTLY SOLD, BY REGION**

(Median Miles)



**EXHIBIT 6-26 DISTANCE BETWEEN HOME PURCHASED AND HOME RECENTLY SOLD, BY AGE***(Percentage Distribution)*

## AGE OF HOME SELLER

	All Sellers	18 to 34 years	35 to 44 years	45 to 54 years	55 to 64 years	65 to 74 years	75 years or older
5 miles or less	30%	32%	34%	25%	22%	16%	22%
6 to 10 miles	17	15	15	17	12	10	10
11 to 15 miles	9	9	8	10	11	8	6
16 to 20 miles	7	10	6	5	6	4	6
21 to 50 miles	12	13	12	10	9	10	7
51 to 100 miles	4	3	2	4	7	6	8
101 to 500 miles	9	7	10	11	12	23	12
501 to 1,000 miles	5	6	4	10	8	10	13
1,001 miles or more	8	5	9	10	14	13	16
Median (miles)	20	13	12	15	20	60	35

**EXHIBIT 6-27 METHOD USED TO SELL HOME, BY REGION***(Percentage Distribution)*

## SELLERS WHO SOLD A HOME IN THE

	All Sellers	Northeast	Midwest	South	West
Sold home using an agent or broker	89%	86%	87%	88%	93%
Seller used agent/broker only	85	85	86	87	92
Seller first tried to sell it themselves, but then used an agent	4	1	1	1	1
For-sale-by-owner (FSBO)	8	11	9	8	6
Seller sold home without using a real estate agent or broker	7	10	8	7	5
First listed with an agent, but then sold home themselves	1	1	1	1	1
Sold home to a homebuying company	1	*	1	1	*
Other	2	2	2	2	1

\* Less than 1 percent

**EXHIBIT 6-28 METHOD USED TO SELL HOME, BY SELLER URGENCY***(Percentage Distribution)*

## SELLER NEEDED TO SELL

	All Sellers	Very urgently	Somewhat urgently	Not urgently
Sold home using an agent or broker	89%	86%	92%	87%
Seller used agent/broker only	85	85	91	86
Seller first tried to sell it themselves, but then used an agent	4	1	1	1
For-sale-by-owner (FSBO)	8	7	7	11
Seller sold home without using a real estate agent or broker	7	6	6	10
First listed with an agent, but then sold home themselves	1	1	1	1
Sold home to a homebuying company	1	2	*	*
Other	2	4	1	2

\* Less than 1 percent



**EXHIBIT 6-29 METHOD OF SALE, BY BUYER AND SELLER RELATIONSHIP**

(Percentage Distribution)

Buyer and Seller Relationship	Seller Knew Buyer	Seller did not Know Buyer
All sellers	6%	94%
Sold home using an agent or broker	3	97
Seller used agent/broker only	3	97
Seller first tried to sell it themselves, but then used an agent	4	96
For-sale-by-owner (FSBO)	36	64
Sold home without using a real estate agent or broker	36	64
First listed with an agent, but then sold home themselves	35	65
Other	51	49

**EXHIBIT 6-30 METHOD USED TO SELL HOME, 2001-2015**

(Percentage Distribution)

	2001	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Sold home using an agent or broker	79%	83%	82%	85%	84%	85%	84%	85%	88%	87%	88%	88%	88%	89%
For-sale-by-owner (FSBO)	13	14	14	13	12	12	13	11	9	9	9	9	9	8
Sold to home buying company	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Other	7	3	3	2	3	2	2	3	3	3	2	2	2	2

**EXHIBIT 6-31 SALES PRICE COMPARED WITH LISTING PRICE, BY REGION**

(Percentage Distribution of Sales Price as a Percent of Listing Price)

	All Sellers	SELLERS WHO SOLD A HOME IN THE			
		Northeast	Midwest	South	West
Less than 90%	9%	13%	11%	9%	6%
90% to 94%	15	20	14	15	13
95% to 99%	41	36	46	41	37
100%	24	22	21	27	23
101% to 110%	8	7	5	6	15
More than 110%	3	2	3	2	7
Median (sales price as a percent of listing price)	98%	97%	97%	98%	99%

**EXHIBIT 6-32 SALES PRICE COMPARED WITH LISTING PRICE, BY SELLER URGENCY***(Percentage Distribution of Sales Price as a Percent of Listing Price)*

	SELLER NEEDED TO SELL			
	All Sellers	Very urgently	Somewhat urgently	Not urgently
Less than 90%	9%	13%	10%	6%
90% to 94%	15	16	15	15
95% to 99%	41	31	42	43
100%	24	23	24	25
101% to 110%	8	11	7	9
More than 110%	3	6	3	2
Median (sales price as a percent of listing price)	98%	97%	98%	98%

**EXHIBIT 6-33 NUMBER OF WEEKS RECENTLY SOLD HOME WAS ON THE MARKET, BY REGION***(Percentage Distribution)*

	SELLERS WHO SOLD A HOME IN THE				
	All Sellers	Northeast	Midwest	South	West
Less than 1 week	6%	5%	7%	6%	5%
1 to 2 weeks	36	32	36	33	43
3 to 4 weeks	12	12	11	12	13
5 to 6 weeks	6	6	7	6	5
7 to 8 weeks	7	6	7	8	5
9 to 10 weeks	5	4	3	5	5
11 to 12 weeks	7	5	6	6	8
13 to 16 weeks	4	6	6	4	3
17 to 24 weeks	6	5	6	6	4
25 to 36 weeks	5	7	4	5	4
37 to 52 weeks	5	10	5	4	3
53 or more weeks	3	5	2	4	1
Median weeks	4	6	4	4	3

**EXHIBIT 6-34 SALES PRICE COMPARED WITH LISTING PRICE, BY NUMBER OF WEEKS HOME WAS ON THE MARKET***(Percentage Distribution of Sales Price as a Percent of Listing Price)*

	SELLERS WHOSE HOME WAS ON THE MARKET FOR						
	All Sellers	Less than 1 week	1 to 2 weeks	3 to 4 weeks	5 to 8 weeks	9 to 16 weeks	17 or more weeks
Less than 90%	9%	4%	1%	5%	8%	11%	28%
90% to 94%	15	3	5	15	16	23	31
95% to 99%	41	24	33	55	56	54	30
100%	24	50	39	20	17	9	7
101% to 110%	8	9	17	5	2	2	2
More than 110%	3	10	5	1	1	2	1
Median (sales price as a percent of listing price)	98%	100%	100%	97%	97%	96%	93%

**EXHIBIT 6-35 NUMBER OF TIMES ASKING PRICE WAS REDUCED, BY NUMBER OF WEEKS HOME WAS ON THE MARKET**

(Percentage Distribution)

	All Sellers	SELLERS WHOSE HOME WAS ON THE MARKET FOR					
		Less than 1 week	1 to 2 weeks	3 to 4 weeks	5 to 8 weeks	9 to 16 weeks	17 or more weeks
None, did not reduce the asking price	57%	89%	88%	58%	46%	29%	13%
One	22	10	11	32	31	41	20
Two	12	1	1	9	16	19	30
Three	6	*	*	1	6	9	20
Four or more	4	*	*	*	1	3	16

\* Less than 1 percent

**EXHIBIT 6-36 INCENTIVES OFFERED TO ATTRACT BUYERS, BY REGION**

(Percent of Respondents)

	All Sellers	SELLERS WHO SOLD A HOME IN THE			
		Northeast	Midwest	South	West
None	63%	69%	64%	59%	68%
Home warranty policies	21	7	23	26	20
Assistance with closing costs	16	16	14	18	13
Credit toward remodeling or repairs	7	7	5	7	8
Other incentives, such as a car, flat screen TV, etc.	4	4	4	4	4
Assistance with condo association fees	1	1	1	*	1
Other	3	5	2	3	3

\* Less than 1 percent

**EXHIBIT 6-37 INCENTIVES OFFERED TO ATTRACT BUYERS, BY NUMBER OF WEEKS HOME WAS ON THE MARKET**


(Percent of Respondents)

	All Sellers	SELLERS WHOSE HOME WAS ON THE MARKET FOR					
		Less than 1 week	1 to 2 weeks	3 to 4 weeks	5 to 8 weeks	9 to 16 weeks	17 or more weeks
None	63%	85%	70%	67%	62%	60%	45%
Home warranty policies	21	9	20	19	17	21	31
Assistance with closing costs	16	5	9	16	18	19	29
Credit toward remodeling or repairs	7	4	3	7	7	9	13
Other incentives, such as a car, flat screen TV, etc.	4	*	2	4	4	6	8
Assistance with condo association fees	1	*	1	*	*	*	1
Other	3	1	2	3	2	3	7

\* Less than 1 percent

**EXHIBIT 6-38 EQUITY EARNED IN HOME RECENTLY SOLD, BY TENURE IN HOME***(Median)*

TENURE IN HOME	ALL SELLERS	
	Dollar value	Percent
1 year or less	\$31,000	14%
2 to 3 years	\$30,000	15%
4 to 5 years	\$35,000	19%
6 to 7 years	\$31,000	14%
8 to 10 years	\$3,000	1%
11 to 15 years	\$38,000	23%
16 to 20 years	\$95,000	63%
21 years or more	\$138,000	145%
All Sellers	\$40,000	23%

**EXHIBIT 6-39 SATISFACTION WITH THE SELLING PROCESS***(Percentage Distribution)*

# CHAPTER 7:

## Home Selling and Real Estate Professionals

**W**hile the home search process has shifted toward digital technology, the need for a trusted real estate agent is still paramount. Personal relationships and connections remain the most important feature of the agent-buyer/seller bond. Real estate agents are most commonly referred by a friend, neighbor, or relative. Sellers place a high importance on the reputation of the agent when looking to hire and trustworthiness and honesty are at the top of the list.

Sellers want their agents to perform five tasks when selling their home. Sellers place high priority on the following: marketing the home to potential buyers, selling the home within a specific timeframe, finding a buyer for the home, pricing the home competitively, and helping fix the home to sell better.

Client referrals and repeat business are the predominant sources of business for real estate agents. Most sellers—84 percent—said that they would definitely (67 percent) or probably (17 percent) recommend their agent for future services.

## Finding a Real Estate Agent

### ▪ Exhibits 7-1 through 7-4

Sixty-six percent of recent home sellers used a referral from a friend or family member or used the same real estate agent they had worked with in the past to purchase their second home, which is up from 60 percent last year. Among 50 percent of sellers, they used the same agent to both sell their home and purchase another home. That number jumps to 81 percent for all sellers within 20 miles of their home purchase. If the seller moved out of state or to another region, they typically found a new agent.

Roughly half of first-time sellers worked with an agent that was referred to them by a friend or family to sell their home (47 percent). For repeat buyers, many used an agent they previously worked with (26 percent). Sellers that moved more than 50 miles away increasingly rely on agent referrals from someone they know.

Seven in 10 recent sellers contacted only one agent before finding the right agent they worked with to sell their home, the same as last year.

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*The typical seller has recommended their agent once since selling their home. Thirty-two percent of sellers recommended their agent three or more times since selling their home.*

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## Home Listed on Multiple Listing Service and Level of Service

### ▪ Exhibits 7-5 and 7-6

Consistent with last year, 91 percent of sellers listed their homes on the Multiple Listing Service (MLS), which is the number one source for sellers to list their home. Only four percent opted not to list on a MLS.

Real estate agents provide a wide range of services and conduct the management of most aspects of the home sale. Seventy-nine percent of sellers reported that their agents provided the lion's share of these services, which is the same as in the year prior. Nine percent of sellers note that their agent only provided a limited set of services and 12 percent said their agent listed the home on a MLS but performed few other services. All are consistent with last year's report.

## What Sellers Want Most and Level of Service

### ▪ Exhibits 7-7 and 7-8

Sellers place high priority on the following five tasks: market the home to potential buyers (21 percent), sell the home within a specific timeframe (21 percent), find a buyer for home (17 percent), price the home competitively (16 percent), and help fix the home to sell better (14 percent).

The reputation of the real estate agent was by far the most important factor when sellers selected an agent to sell their home (34 percent). Sellers also place value on the agent's trustworthiness and honesty (18 percent), if the agent is a friend or family member (16 percent), and knowledge of the neighborhood at (15 percent).

## Methods Used to Market the Home

### ■ Exhibit 7-9

Real estate agents list homes on MLSs first and foremost (89 percent). They also create yard signs (69 percent), list the home on their website (51 percent), host an open house (51 percent), list on Realtor.com (50 percent), and list on their company's website (43 percent). Real estate agents also list homes on social media (12 percent), which is up from nine percent last year.

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*Sellers place high priority on the following five tasks: market the home to potential buyers (21 percent), sell the home within a specific timeframe (21 percent), find a buyer for home (17 percent), price the home competitively (16 percent), and help fix the home to sell better (14 percent).*

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## Agent's Performance and Compensation

### ■ Exhibits 7-10 through 7-13

Agents receive their compensation predominantly from sellers at 76 percent, only slightly lower than the previous year at 78 percent. Of that compensation, 72 percent of sellers pay a percent of the sales price. Only a small fraction pay a flat fee (3 percent), and only 10 percent of overall compensation is paid by both the buyer and seller. Seven percent of buyers reported paying as the only means of compensation.

The real estate agent most often initiated the discussion of compensation (46 percent), which is consistent with the year before. The client initiated the discussion and the agent negotiated 20 percent of the time, which was down from 28 percent. In 16 percent of cases, the client did not know that commissions and fees could be negotiated, which was also down from 26 percent.

Client referrals and repeat business are the predominant sources of business for real estate agents. Most sellers — 84 percent — said that they would definitely (67 percent) or probably (17 percent) recommend their agent for future services. Sellers that moved less than 10 miles away were generally (87 percent) inclined to recommend their agent. That figure decreases the further in distance a seller moves. For sellers that moved more than 500 miles, they reported recommending their agent 60 percent of the time. The typical seller has recommended their agent once since selling their home. Thirty-two percent of sellers recommended their agent three or more times since selling their home.

**EXHIBIT 7-1****METHOD USED TO FIND REAL ESTATE AGENT, BY FIRST-TIME OR REPEAT SELLER***(Percentage Distribution)*

	All Sellers	First-time Seller	Repeat Seller
Referred by (or is) a friend, neighbor or relative	42%	47%	39%
Used agent previously to buy or sell a home	24	20	26
Internet website (without a specific reference)	4	6	4
Personal contact by agent (telephone, email, etc.)	4	3	5
Referred by another real estate or broker	4	4	4
Visited an open house and met agent	3	3	3
Saw contact information on For Sale/Open House sign	3	4	2
Referred through employer or relocation company	3	3	3
Direct mail (newsletter, flyer, postcard, etc.)	1	2	1
Walked into or called office and agent was on duty	1	1	1
Newspaper, Yellow pages or home book ad	1	*	1
Advertising specialty (calendar, magnet, etc.)	1	1	1
Crowdsourcing through social media/knew the person through social media	*	*	*
Saw the person's social media page without a connection	*	*	*
Other	9	7	10

\* Less than 1 percent

**EXHIBIT 7-2****METHOD USED TO FIND REAL ESTATE AGENT, BY MILES MOVED***(Percentage Distribution)*


	All Sellers	10 miles or less	11 to 20 miles	21 to 50 miles	51 to 100 miles	101 to 500 miles	501 miles or more
Referred by (or is) a friend, neighbor or relative	42%	45%	43%	36%	43%	49%	37%
Used agent previously to buy or sell a home	24	27	21	26	17	18	21
Internet website (without a specific reference)	4	4	8	6	6	2	3
Personal contact by agent (telephone, email, etc.)	4	3	3	7	6	2	7
Referred by another real estate or broker	4	2	3	6	3	6	4
Visited an open house and met agent	3	4	3	2	*	1	1
Saw contact information on For Sale/Open House sign	3	2	5	4	*	4	2
Referred through employer or relocation company	3	*	1	1	3	7	9
Direct mail (newsletter, flyer, postcard, etc.)	1	1	*	2	3	1	2
Walked into or called office and agent was on duty	1	1	1	*	4	1	1
Newspaper, Yellow pages or home book ad	1	*	1	*	*	2	2
Advertising specialty (calendar, magnet, etc.)	1	*	2	*	5	*	1
Crowdsourcing through social media/knew the person through social media	*	*	*	*	1	*	*
Saw the person's social media page without a connection	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Other	9	10	8	10	10	7	9

\* Less than 1 percent




**EXHIBIT 7-3 NUMBER OF AGENTS CONTACTED BEFORE SELECTING ONE TO ASSIST WITH SALE OF HOME**



(Percentage Distribution)



**EXHIBIT 7-4 SELLER USED SAME REAL ESTATE AGENT FOR THEIR HOME PURCHASE, BY MILES MOVED**

(Percentage Distribution Among Sellers Who Used an Agent to Purchase a Home)



**EXHIBIT 7-5****HOME LISTED ON MULTIPLE LISTING SERVICE***(Percentage Distribution)***EXHIBIT 7-6****LEVEL OF SERVICE PROVIDED BY THE REAL ESTATE AGENT***(Percentage Distribution)***EXHIBIT 7-7****WHAT SELLERS MOST WANT FROM REAL ESTATE AGENTS, BY LEVEL OF SERVICE PROVIDED BY THE AGENT***(Percentage Distribution)*

LEVEL OF SERVICE SOUGHT FROM THE AGENT BY THE SELLER

	All Sellers	A broad range of services and management of most aspects of the home sale	A limited set of services as requested by the seller	The agent listed the home on the MLS and performed few if any additional services
Help seller market home to potential buyers	21%	20%	19%	27%
Help sell the home within specific timeframe	21	21	23	17
Help find a buyer for home	17	18	17	16
Help price home competitively	16	16	24	14
Help seller find ways to fix up home to sell it for more	14	16	9	10
Help with negotiation and dealing with buyers	5	5	5	7
Help with paperwork/inspections/preparing for settlement	3	3	1	3
Help seller see homes available to purchase	2	2	2	3
Help create and post videos to provide tour of my home	*	*	*	1
Other	1	1	1	2

\* Less than 1 percent

**EXHIBIT 7-8**

**MOST IMPORTANT FACTOR IN CHOOSING A REAL ESTATE AGENT TO SELL HOME, BY LEVEL OF SERVICE PROVIDED BY THE AGENT**

(Percentage Distribution)

	All Sellers	LEVEL OF SERVICE SOUGHT FROM THE AGENT BY THE SELLER		
		A broad range of services and management of most aspects of the home sale	A limited set of services as requested by the seller	The agent listed the home on the MLS and performed few if any additional services
Reputation of agent	34%	35%	29%	29%
Agent is honest and trustworthy	18	19	17	13
Agent is friend or family member	16	16	16	10
Agent's knowledge of the neighborhood	15	15	18	13
Agent has caring personality/good listener	4	4	3	3
Agent's association with a particular firm	4	3	6	8
Agent's commission	4	3	3	7
Agent seems 100% accessible because of use of technology like tablet or smartphone	2	2	1	6
Professional designations held by agent	2	2	3	2
Other	3	2	5	9

**EXHIBIT 7-9**

**METHODS REAL ESTATE AGENT USED TO MARKET HOME**

(Percent of Respondents Among Sellers Who Used an Agent)

	All Homes
Multiple Listing (MLS) website	89%
Yard sign	69
Real estate agent website	51
Open house	51
Realtor.com	50
Real estate company website	43
Third party aggregators	40
Social networking websites	12
Print newspaper advertisement	11
Direct mail (flyers, postcards, etc.)	10
Video	9
Newspaper website	9
Real estate magazine	9
Other websites with real estate listings	6
Online Classified Ads	6
Real estate magazine website	6
	2
Television	1
Other	3

**EXHIBIT 7-10 HOW REAL ESTATE AGENT WAS COMPENSATED**


(Percentage Distribution)

Paid by seller	76%
Percent of sales price	72
Flat fee	3
Per task fee	*
Other	*
Don't Know	1
Paid by buyer and seller	10
Paid by buyer only	7
Other	4
Don't Know	3

\* Less than 1 percent

**EXHIBIT 7-11 NEGOTIATING THE COMMISSION RATE OR FEE WITH THE REAL ESTATE AGENT**

(Percentage Distribution)



**EXHIBIT 7-12 WOULD SELLER USE REAL ESTATE AGENT AGAIN OR RECOMMEND TO OTHERS**

(Percentage Distribution)

	All sellers	10 miles or less	11 to 20 miles	21 to 50 miles	51 to 100 miles	101 to 500 miles	501 miles or more
Definitely	67%	69%	67%	67%	68%	71%	60%
Probably	17	18	19	13	12	14	20
Probably Not	7	6	6	9	8	11	9
Definitely Not	7	6	8	9	11	4	9
Don't Know/ Not Sure	1	1	1	2	2	*	2

\* Less than 1 percent

**EXHIBIT 7-13 HOW MANY TIMES SELLER RECOMMENDED AGENT**

(Percentage Distribution)

	All Sellers
None	38%
One time	13
Two times	17
Three times	12
Four or more times	20
Times recommended since buying (median)	1

# CHAPTER 8:

## For-Sale-By-Owner (FSBO) Sellers

**F**or-Sale-By-Owners (FSBOs) accounted for eight percent of total home sales in the 2015 report, down from nine percent the last three years. This is the lowest share since the Profile of Home Buyers and Sellers data collection began. Thirty-eight percent of FSBO sellers knew the buyers for their homes and 62 percent did not know the buyer.

FSBO sellers that knew the buyer predominantly sold to a friend, relative, or neighbor. FSBOs typically sell for less than the selling price of other homes. For FSBO sellers, those who know the buyer tend to be younger and have lower median household incomes compared to those who did not know the buyer.

Where FSBO sellers knew the buyer, the time on market for the home was usually one to less than a week and sellers received 99 percent of the asking price.

## FSBO and Agent Assisted Sales, By Location and Over Time

### ■ Exhibits 8-1 and 8-2

Eighty-nine percent of sellers sold with the assistance of a real estate agent, up slightly from 88 percent the last three years, and only eight percent (down from nine percent) were FSBO sales. The share is the lowest since this data collection started in 1981. In 2004, FSBO sales accounted as much as 14 percent of sales but have steadily decreased over time. This year, only three percent of buyers knew the sellers compared to four percent in the last two years. In five percent of all FSBOs, the buyer and seller had no previous relationship.

## Characteristics of Sellers and Homes Sold

### ■ Exhibit 8-3 through 8-6

The median age for FSBO sellers is 56 years. Seventy-four percent of FSBO sales were by married couples that have a median income of \$84,000. For FSBO sellers, those who knew the buyer tend to be younger and have lower median household incomes compared to those who did not know the buyer. Twenty-four percent of single females reported they knew the buyer, higher than any other demographic group, whereas only nine percent did not know the buyer.

A majority of all homes sold were detached single-family homes at 81 percent. FSBO homes are also predominantly detached single-family homes at 75 percent, yet also are more likely to be mobile or manufactured homes at 10 percent compared to only two percent of agent-assisted sales. Among agent-assisted sales, 82 percent of all homes sold are detached single-family homes, which is consistent with last year. Thirty-eight percent of FSBO sales where the buyer knew the seller were located in rural areas compared to only 13 percent of agent-assisted sales in rural locations. Most agent-assisted sales were located in suburban areas at 51 percent.

FSBOs typically sell for less than the selling price of other homes. FSBO homes sold at a median of \$210,000 last year (up from \$208,700 the year prior), yet lower than the median of all homes at \$245,000. Agent-assisted homes sold for a median of \$249,000. Both FSBOs and agent-assisted sales typically received 98 percent of their asking price, whereas FSBOs received 99 percent of the asking price when the seller knew the buyer. Sellers who began as a FSBO, then ended up working with an agent, only received 93 percent of the asking price.

## The Selling Process for FSBO Sales

### ■ Exhibits 8-7 through 8-10

FSBO sellers price their homes using a number of different sources to determine the asking price. For FSBO sellers who knew their buyers, the most common ways they priced their homes were comparisons to recent home sales in their area (25 percent), agent presentation where seller did not use the agent (22 percent), and online evaluation tools (19 percent). For FSBO sellers who did not know their buyers, the most common ways they determined their home price were comparisons to recent home sales in their area (65 percent), the profit seller needed from sale (20 percent), and to cover what was owed on the home (14 percent).

FSBO homes sold more quickly on the market than agent-assisted homes. All FSBO homes typically sold in less than two weeks. For sellers that knew the buyer, their homes sold in less than a week (28 percent). The median number of weeks FSBOs were on the market was three. Agent-assisted homes generally sold in less than two weeks as well, but the median number of weeks on the market was four. For sellers that started as FSBO and then were agent-assisted, the median number of weeks on the market was 10.

FSBO sellers who did not know the buyer were more likely to not need to sell urgently. FSBO sellers who knew the buyer and those who first listed as a FSBO then used an agent were most likely to need to sell their home at least somewhat urgently. It was not common for FSBOs to use incentives to sell their homes (86 percent of all FSBOs did not offer any incentives). Ninety-three percent of sellers who knew the buyer used no incentives. Agent-assisted sellers offered home warranty policies (23 percent) and assistance with closing costs (17 percent) to help sell their homes.

## Reasons of FSBOs, Marketing, and Sellers Experience

### ■ Exhibits 8-11 through 8-16

For FSBO sellers that knew the buyer, 53 percent sold to a relative, friend, or neighbor and 28 percent did not want to pay a commission or fee. For FSBO sellers that did not know the buyer, 59 percent did not want to pay a commission or fee, and 23 percent of buyers contacted the sellers directly.

Of all sellers, 87 percent sold when they wanted to list on the market. Sellers that started as FSBOs and then received assistance from an agent were the most likely to want to sell but were delayed because their home was worth less than the mortgage, so these sellers rented their home while living elsewhere. Only 13 percent of FSBOs were delayed in selling their home compared to 13 percent of agent-assisted sellers.

Yard signs, word of mouth to friends and family, and third party aggregator were the most common marketing methods for FSBOs. When FSBO sellers knew the buyer, 46 percent did not market their home. Selling within a specific timeframe and understanding the paperwork were the most difficult steps in selling for FSBO sellers.

For FSBO sellers who knew the buyer, 28 percent said they will use an agent to sell their home. Of FSBO sellers who did not know the buyer, 37 percent said they will sell their current home themselves. Seven in ten successful FSBO sellers were satisfied with the process of selling their home.

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*Eighty-nine percent of sellers sold with the assistance of a real estate agent, up slightly from 88 percent the last three years, and only eight percent (down from nine percent) were FSBO sales. The share is the lowest since this data collection started in 1981.*

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**EXHIBIT 8-1 FSBO AND AGENT-ASSISTED SALES, 2003-2015**

(Percentage Distribution)

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
All FSBO (For-sale-by-owner)	14%	14%	13%	12%	12%	13%	11%	9%	10%	9%	9%	9%	8%
Seller knew buyer	5	5	5	5	5	6	5	5	4	3	4	4	3
Seller did not know buyer	9	10	8	7	7	7	6	5	6	6	6	5	5
Agent-assisted	83	82	85	84	85	84	85	88	87	88	88	88	89
Other	4	4	2	3	3	3	4	3	3	2	3	2	3

**EXHIBIT 8-2 FSBO AND AGENT-ASSISTED SALES, BY LOCATION**

(Percentage Distribution)

SELLERS WHO SOLD A HOME IN A

	All Sellers	Suburb/ Subdivision	Small town	Urban/ Central city	Rural area	Resort/ Recreation area
For-sale-by-owner (FSBO)	8%	5%	13%	8%	15%	16%
Seller knew buyer	3	1	5	2	9	2
Seller did not know buyer	5	4	7	7	5	10
Agent-assisted	89	94	85	90	83	84
Other	3	2	3	2	3	*

\* Less than 1 percent

**EXHIBIT 8-3 CHARACTERISTICS OF FSBO AND AGENT-ASSISTED SELLERS**

(Percentage Distribution)

	All Sellers	FSBO			AGENT-ASSISTED		
		All FSBO	Seller Knew Buyer	Seller did not Know Buyer	All Agent-assisted	Agent-assisted only	First FSBO, then Agent-assisted
Median age	54	56	54	57	54	54	54
Median income (2014)	\$104,100	\$84,000	\$75,000	\$92,500	\$105,600	\$107,000	\$89,600
Household composition							
Married couple	77%	74%	63%	81%	79%	78%	86%
Single female	12	14	24	9	11	11	4
Single male	6	7	8	6	5	5	4
Unmarried couple	4	5	5	4	4	4	7
Other	2	1	*	1	2	2	*

\* Less than 1 percent

**EXHIBIT 8-4 TYPE OF HOME SOLD, FSBO AND AGENT-ASSISTED SELLERS***(Percentage Distribution)*

	All Sellers	FSBO			Agent-Assisted
		All FSBO	Seller Knew Buyer	Seller did not Know Buyer	
Detached single-family home	81%	75%	80%	72%	82%
Townhouse/row house	6	2	3	2	6
Duplex/apartment/condo in 2 to 4 unit building	2	1	3	*	2
Apartment/condo in a building with 5 or more units	5	7	3	9	5
Mobile/manufactured home	3	10	9	10	2
Other	3	6	4	6	3

\* Less than 1 percent

**EXHIBIT 8-5 LOCATION OF HOME SOLD, FSBO AND AGENT-ASSISTED SELLERS***(Percentage Distribution)*

	All Sellers	FSBO			Agent-Assisted
		All FSBO	Seller Knew Buyer	Seller did not Know Buyer	
Suburb/Subdivision	49%	28%	23%	32%	51%
Small town	19	18	28	29	18
Urban area/Central city	16	15	9	18	16
Rural area	14	24	38	15	13
Resort/Recreation area	3	5	3	6	3

**EXHIBIT 8-6 SELLING PRICE, FSBO AND AGENT-ASSISTED SELLERS***(Percentage Distribution)*


	All Sellers	FSBO			AGENT-ASSISTED		
		All FSBO	Seller Knew Buyer	Seller did not Know Buyer	All Agent-assisted	Agent-assisted only	First FSBO, then Agent-assisted
Median selling price	\$245,000	\$210,000	\$151,900	\$223,800	\$249,000	\$249,000	\$228,000
Sales price compared with asking price:							
Less than 90%	9%	13%	9%	15%	9%	9%	13%
90% to 94%	15	13	14	12	15	15	46
95% to 99%	41	35	30	37	41	42	33
100%	24	34	45	29	23	23	8
101% to 110%	8	3	*	5	9	9	*
More than 110%	3	2	3	2	3	3	*
Median (sales price as a percent of asking price)	98%	98%	99%	98%	98%	98%	93%
Number of times asking price was reduced:							
None	57%	60%	61%	60%	56%	56%	22%
One	22	31	33	28	22	21	41
Two	12	6	1	8	12	12	33
Three	6	3	5	1	6	6	4
Four or more	4	2	*	2	4	4	*

\* Less than 1 percent

**EXHIBIT 8-7**

**HOW FSBO SELLER DETERMINED ASKING PRICE OF HOME SOLD**

(Percent of Respondents)



**EXHIBIT 8-8 TIME ON THE MARKET, FSBO AND AGENT-ASSISTED SELLERS***(Percentage Distribution)*

	All Sellers	FSBO			AGENT-ASSISTED		
		All FSBO	Seller Knew Buyer	Seller did not Know Buyer	All Agent-assisted	Agent-assisted only	First FSBO, then Agent-assisted
Less than 1 week	6%	18%	28%	12%	4%	4%	7%
1 to 2 weeks	36	32	32	33	36	37	10
3 to 4 weeks	12	10	13	9	12	12	3
5 to 6 weeks	6	5	*	7	6	6	17
7 to 8 weeks	7	7	7	7	7	7	3
9 to 10 weeks	5	6	1	8	5	4	13
11 to 12 weeks	7	8	3	9	7	6	17
13 to 16 weeks	4	6	7	6	4	4	13
17 to 24 weeks	6	1	*	1	6	6	3
25 to 36 weeks	5	1	*	1	5	5	*
37 to 52 weeks	5	4	4	5	5	5	10
53 or more weeks	3	3	6	1	3	3	3
Median weeks	4	3	1	4	4	4	10

\* Less than 1 percent

**EXHIBIT 8-9 SELLER URGENCY, FSBO AND AGENT-ASSISTED SELLERS***(Percentage Distribution)*

Sellers needed to sell:	All Sellers	FSBO			AGENT-ASSISTED		
		All FSBO	Seller Knew Buyer	Seller did not Know Buyer	All Agent-assisted	Agent-assisted only	First FSBO, then Agent-assisted
Very urgently	16%	13%	21%	9%	16%	16%	19%
Somewhat urgently	41	32	33	33	42	42	33
Not urgently	43	54	47	58	42	42	48


**EXHIBIT 8-10 INCENTIVES OFFERED TO ATTRACT BUYERS, FSBO AND AGENT-ASSISTED SELLERS***(Percent of Respondents)*

	All Sellers	FSBO			AGENT-ASSISTED		
		All FSBO	Seller Knew Buyer	Seller did not Know Buyer	All Agent-assisted	Agent-assisted only	First FSBO, then Agent-assisted
None	63%	86%	93%	83%	61%	61%	39%
Home warranty policies	21	5	*	7	23	23	32
Assistance with closing costs	16	4	3	6	17	17	25
Credit toward remodeling or repairs	7	2	1	3	7	7	4
Other incentives, such as a car, flat screen TV, etc.	4	3	*	4	4	4	7
Assistance with condo association fees	1	*	*	*	1	1	*
Other	3	2	4	1	3	3	7

\* Less than 1 percent

**EXHIBIT 8-11 MOST IMPORTANT REASON FOR SELLING HOME AS FSBO**

(Percentage Distribution)



\* Less than 1 percent

## EXHIBIT 8-12 SELLER WANTED TO SELL EARLIER BUT WAITED OR STALLED BECAUSE HOME WAS WORTH LESS THAN MORTGAGE

(Percentage Distribution)

	All Sellers	FSBO			AGENT-ASSISTED		
		All FSBO	Seller Knew Buyer	Seller did not Know Buyer	All Agent-assisted	Agent-assisted only	First FSBO, then Agent-assisted
Yes, and lived in home	12%	10%	8%	10%	12%	12%	7%
Yes, but rented home to others and lived elsewhere	2	3	4	2	1	1	7
No, sold home when I wanted to sell	87	88	89	88	87	87	86

## EXHIBIT 8-13 METHOD USED BY FSBO SELLERS TO MARKET HOME

(Percent of Respondents)

	All FSBO	Seller Knew Buyer	Seller did not Know Buyer
Yard sign	42%	15%	58%
Friends, relatives, or neighbors	32	42	28
Third party aggregator	21	1	31
Social networking websites	15	8	19
For-sale-by-owner website	15	3	22
Online classified ads	14	1	20
Open house	14	8	17
Multiple Listing Service (MLS) website	10	4	13
Newspaper website	6	7	6
Realtor.com	5	3	7
Other websites with real estate listings	4	*	6
Direct mail (flyers, postcards, etc)	3	*	5
Print newspaper advertisement	3	1	5
Video	2	3	2
For-sale-by-owner magazine	2	*	3
Video hosting websites	1	*	2
Television	1	*	2
Other	1	*	2
None - Did not actively market home	25	46	12

\* Less than 1 percent

**EXHIBIT 8-14 MOST DIFFICULT TASK FOR FSBO SELLERS**

(Percentage of Distribution)


	All FSBO	Seller Knew Buyer	Seller did not Know Buyer
Getting the price right	6%	25%	*
Selling within the length of time planned	18	50	8
Preparing or fixing up the home for sale	6	*	8
Understanding and performing paperwork	12	*	15
Having enough time to devote to all aspects of the sale	6	*	8
Helping buyer obtain financing	*	*	*
Attracting potential buyers	*	*	*
Other	*	*	*
None/Nothing	53	25	62

\* Less than 1 percent


**EXHIBIT 8-15 HOW FSBO SELLERS WILL SELL THEIR CURRENT HOME**

(Percentage Distribution)

SELLER KNEW BUYER




SELLER DID NOT KNOW BUYER




**EXHIBIT 8-16 FSBO SELLERS SATISFACTION PROCESS OF SELLING HOME**

*(Percentage Distribution)*

SELLER KNEW BUYER



SELLER DID NOT KNOW BUYER





## Methodology

In July 2015, NAR mailed out a 128-question survey using a random sample weighted to be representative of sales on a geographic basis to 94,971 recent home buyers. The recent home buyers had to have purchased a primary residence home between July of 2014 and June of 2015. A total of 6,406 responses were received from primary residence buyers. After accounting for undeliverable questionnaires, the survey had an adjusted response rate of 6.7 percent.

Respondents had the option to fill out the survey via hard copy or online. The online survey was available in English and Spanish.

Consumer names and addresses were obtained from Experian, a firm that maintains an extensive database of recent home buyers derived from county records. Information about sellers comes from those buyers who also sold a home.

All information in this Profile is characteristic of the 12-month period ending June 2015, with the exception of income data, which are reported for 2014. In some sections comparisons are also given for results obtained in previous surveys. Not all results are directly comparable due to changes in questionnaire design and sample size. Some results are presented for the four U.S. Census regions: Northeast, Midwest, South and West. The median is the primary statistical measure used throughout this report. Due to rounding and omissions for space, percentage distributions may not add to 100 percent.



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#### **NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS®**

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# NAR Issue Brief

## Government-Sponsored Enterprises: Guarantee Fees

### What is a Guarantee Fee (g-fee)?

GSE guarantee fees are charged by Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, to lenders for bundling, selling, and guaranteeing the payment of principal and interest on their Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS). These fees are generally passed on to consumers in the form of higher interest rates. The main component of guarantee fee covers projected credit losses from borrower defaults over the life of the loans, administrative costs, and a return on capital (think of it like MBS insurance). The fees are also used to cover internal expenses for such services as:

- Managing and administering the securitized mortgage pools,
- Selling the MBS to investors,
- Reporting to investors and the SEC, and
- Maintaining the MBS on the open market, and selling, general and administrative expense.

### Recent Congressional Action Related to G-fees

In 2011, Congress enacted the “Temporary Payroll Tax Cut Continuation Act of 2011” (Payroll Tax) to fund a two-month extension of the payroll tax cut, unemployment benefits, and Medicare reimbursements. The extension is paid for by a 10 basis point (bp) increase in the average g-fee charged by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac through 2021.

More recently, on July 30, 2015, the U.S. Senate passed a 6-year highway and transit funding reauthorization bill. The bill included a controversial funding provision that would extend the use of guarantee fees (g-fees) for an additional 4 years. The multi-year bill passed by a vote of 65-34. The U.S. House made clear that the U.S. Senate’s 6-year bill wouldn’t receive a vote in the lower chamber. The Senate then passed a short-term highway and transit bill, which extends the highway program through October 29, 2015, but replenishes the Highway Trust Fund into December 2015 without the g-fee language.

Prior to the Senate vote, NAR, along with other industry stakeholders, sent a letter to lawmakers stating that g-fees should only be used to manage the companies’ credit risk and not be diverted for unrelated spending by Congress.

With little time left in the fall session, there is a risk that the Senate 6-year measure will be the starting point for fall negotiations in the House.

### Impact of the 10 bps G-fee Increase

Lenders who passed the original increase from the Payroll Tax on to borrowers have increased the rate offered to a borrower by at least .1% since April 1, 2012. Several sources have placed the increase in cost at approximately \$4000 - \$5400 over 30 years on a \$200,000 loan. Since passage of the original 10bps in the Payroll Tax legislation, the g-fee has been increased far more than the legislation called for, costing homebuyers and refinancers significantly more money per annum. Since the initial increase, the average g-fee for a fixed, 30-year loan has been raised 32bps, or more than 114%.

### **Cost of Additional G-fee Actions**

The result of any proposed extension of the g-fee increase will maintain the higher cost of a mortgage credit and continue to cause homebuyers to reconsider a potential home purchase or refinance. At a time when the housing market is beginning to show signs of recovery and inventories are beginning to fall, a punitive fee that does not support the safety and soundness of the housing finance sector, will likely exacerbate the problem it was intended to fix. A slowdown in housing means higher unemployment, but more importantly, a slowdown in loan originations which is what is required to fuel the “pay-for” via the g-fee.

### **NAR Position**

The National Association of REALTORS® strongly opposes the use of guarantee fees for any use other than intended purpose. NAR understands the need to bring financial relief to the middle-class and reauthorize highway programs, but effectively imposing a tax on housing is not prudent given the continued need for stability in the housing sector. It makes little sense to tax mortgage originations or refinances of middle class Americans in order to generate the desired revenue to cover unrelated expenditures.



## Stop Congress From Taking Money From Future Homeowners

The House of Representatives Transportation and Infrastructure Committee is considering legislation to reauthorize surface transportation programs.

One proposal would use Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac's credit risk guarantee fees (g-fees) to fund transportation programs.

### What is a Guarantee Fee (G-Fee)?

- GSE guarantee fees are charged by Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae to lenders for bundling, selling, and guaranteeing the payment of principal and interest on their Mortgage Backed Securities. These fees are passed on to mortgage seekers by the lender and add to the cost of obtaining a mortgage.

NAR strongly believes that taking g-fees would also prevent Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac from effectively managing their risk.

Take action now to prevent Congress from placing an unnecessary long-term burden on American homeowners!

- [Read NAR's Letter to the U.S. House of Representatives](#)
- [Read NAR's Letter to the U.S. Senate](#)



### Message

REALTORS oppose use of G Fees to Pay for Highway Bill

Dear [Decision Maker],

As a REALTOR and your constituent, I ask you to oppose any attempt by the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee to use Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac's credit risk guarantee fees (g-fees) to fund the surface transportation reauthorization legislation.

G-fees are a critical risk management tool used by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to protect against losses from faulty loans, and should be used only to manage the companies' credit risks. I am opposed to the use of g-fees for purposes other than risk management.

Additionally, implementing an extension of the g-fee increase that is unrelated to housing needs could also act to hinder the necessary reforms required of the housing finance system for the foreseeable future.

I understand the need to reauthorize the highway programs and help strengthen our country's infrastructure. However, I also strongly believe that use of an extended g-fee to fund transportation programs saddles future homeowners with an unnecessary long-term burden, and prevents Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac from effectively managing their risk.

Please oppose the use of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac's credit risk guarantee fees (g-fees) to fund transportation programs.

Sincerely,

[Your Name]

[Your Address]

[City, State ZIP]

## Contact Recipients

- Your Senators
- Your Representative

**\*Required fields**

\*Your Email:

\*Title:

\*First Name:

\*Last Name:

\*Address 1:

Address 2:

\*City:

\*State / Province:

\*ZIP / Postal Code:

\*Phone Number:

Yes, I would like to receive periodic updates and communications from Realtor Action Center.

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**TAKE ACTION NOW**

[National Association of Realtors \(comments@realtoractioncenter.com\)](mailto:comments@realtoractioncenter.com)



# Congress:

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## Don't Raise the Cost of Homeownership

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As Congress considers the Transportation Reauthorization Bill, we strongly urge that you not use Fannie and Freddie guarantee fees to fund this legislation. These fees will be passed through to borrowers, adding a financial burden on America's future homebuyers.

The decision Congress makes will create an obstacle to future homebuyers. This fee will raise the cost to purchase or refinance a home, and disproportionately impact low and moderate income borrowers, as well as first time homebuyers.

**Congress: Don't Raise the Cost of Homeownership**



American Land  
Title Association  
Protect your property rights

**MBA**  
MORTGAGE BANKERS ASSOCIATION

**NAHB**  
National Association  
of Home Builders



NATIONAL  
ASSOCIATION of  
REALTORS®



November 4, 2015

The Honorable Paul Ryan  
Speaker  
U.S. House of Representatives  
H-232, The Capitol  
Washington, D.C. 20515

The Honorable Nancy Pelosi  
Minority Leader  
U.S. House of Representatives  
H-204, The Capitol  
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Speaker Ryan and Leader Pelosi:

The undersigned organizations urge the House to adopt the Neugebauer-Huizenga amendment to H.R. 22, the DRIVE Act, which would remove two harmful provisions from the Senate version of the bill.

The Neugebauer-Huizenga amendment would remove from H.R. 22 a harmful proposal to reduce the dividend paid on Federal Reserve stock that would have significant negative consequences on banks of all sizes across the country. Member banks of the Federal Reserve are required by law to purchase stock in regional Federal Reserve Banks. This stock may not be sold, transferred or even used as collateral, unlike virtually every other asset a bank holds. These funds represent “dead capital” for the financial institution. The dividend that the Senate is considering reducing reflects the unique structure and constraints of this arrangement that is required by law, as this is money that otherwise would be used by banks for lending and to provide other services to customers.

The Neugebauer-Huizenga amendment would also remove from H.R. 22 an extension of higher Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac guarantee fees. The purpose of these fees is to prospectively guard against credit losses at Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. G-fees should only be used to protect taxpayers from mortgage losses, not to fund unrelated spending. Each time g-fees are extended, increased and diverted for unrelated spending, homeowners are charged more for their mortgages and taxpayers are exposed to additional risk for the long-term. The g-fee increase was originally included in the Senate highway bill as a funding offset, but the Congressional Budget Office has scored the House bill as being budget neutral without this provision. It should be removed to ensure that potential homebuyers are not kept on the sidelines by raising the cost to purchase or refinance a home.

To ensure it is fully offset, the Neugebauer-Huizenga amendment would use the Federal Reserve’s “surplus” account of earnings retained after paying operating expenses and dividends. As a result of recent changes in the way the Federal Reserve operates, these retained earnings are no longer necessary. This amendment would use funds from this account to pay for the extension of the Highway Trust Fund.

We urge the House to pass the Neugebauer-Huizenga amendment to H.R. 22.

**America’s Homeowner Alliance**

**American Escrow Association**

**American Bankers Association**

**American Land Title Association**

**Center for Responsible Lending**

**The Clearing House**

**Community Home Lenders Association**

**Consumer Bankers Association**

**Consumer Mortgage Coalition**

**Credit Union National Association**

**The Financial Services Forum**

**Financial Services Roundtable**

**Habitat for Humanity International**

**Homeownership Preservation Foundation**

**Independent Community Bankers of America**

**Leading Builders of America**

**Mid-size Bank Coalition of America**

**Mortgage Bankers Association**

**National Association of Hispanic Real Estate Professionals**

**National Association of Home Builders**

**National Association of Real Estate Brokers**

**National Association of REALTORS®**

**Real Estate Services Providers Council, Inc.**

**The Realty Alliance**

**Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association**

**U.S. Chamber of Commerce Center for Capital Markets Competitiveness**

**U.S. Mortgage Insurers**

October 30, 2015

The Honorable Pete Sessions  
Chairman  
The Committee on Rules  
U.S. House of Representatives  
2233 Rayburn House Office Building  
Washington, D.C. 20515

The Honorable Louise M. Slaughter  
Ranking Member  
The Committee on Rules  
U.S. House of Representatives  
2469 Rayburn House Office Building  
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Chairman Sessions and Ranking Member Slaughter:

As your committee drafts the rule that will govern House consideration of transportation reauthorization legislation, our members respectfully request that you uphold the Fiscal Year 2016 Budget Resolution, which prohibits the use of guarantee fees (g-fees) charged by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to be scored as an offset.

The purpose of the g-fee is to prospectively guard against credit losses at Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. G-fees should only be used to protect taxpayers from mortgage losses, not to fund unrelated spending. Each time g-fees are extended, increased and diverted for unrelated spending, homeowners are charged more for their mortgages and taxpayers are exposed to additional risk for the long-term.

Using Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as piggybanks in the transportation reauthorization bill will keep potential homebuyers on the sidelines as it will raise the cost to purchase or refinance a home. This action will disproportionately impact low- and moderate-income borrowers, as well as first-time homebuyers. Also, attempts to increase or extend these fees will make it more difficult to reform our housing finance system.

Congress has already explicitly agreed with our position. To ensure that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac g-fees are only used to offset credit risks, Section 3110 of the Fiscal Year Budget Resolution prohibits the inclusion of revenue from g-fees when calculating offsets for legislation.

We are united in our belief that using g-fees as a funding mechanism for transportation funding shifts the burden to homeowners and the housing sector in a manner that prevents Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac from effectively managing their risk. We urge you to uphold the Fiscal Year 2016 Budget Resolution and preserve Members' ability to lodge points of order against the use of g-fees as an offset in the transportation reauthorization bill.

Sincerely,

American Land Title Association

Mortgage Bankers Association

National Association of Home Builders

National Association of REALTORS®

cc: Members of the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Rules

**Congress of the United States**  
**Washington, DC 20515**

**Keep G-Fees Out of the Highway Bill**

Dear Colleague:

We all support a well-designed highway program for America.

We do not support a “home buyers’ tax” to finance a highway program. Neither do the 32 organizations who signed the attached letter on September 15, 2015.

ANDY BARR  
Member of Congress

BRAD SHERMAN  
Member of Congress

---

September 15, 2015

The Honorable John Boehner  
Speaker  
U.S. House of Representatives  
H-232, The Capitol  
Washington, D.C. 20515

The Honorable Nancy Pelosi  
Minority Leader  
U.S. House of Representatives  
H-204, The Capitol  
Washington, D.C. 20515

The Honorable Mitch McConnell  
Majority Leader  
United States Senate  
S-230, The Capitol  
Washington, DC 20510

The Honorable Harry Reid  
Minority Leader  
United States Senate  
S-221, The Capitol  
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Speaker Boehner, Leader Pelosi, Leader McConnell and Leader Reid,

As Congress returns to Washington, and congressional leaders resume their negotiations for a long term transportation reauthorization, our organizations respectfully request that you refrain from utilizing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac's (“the GSEs”) credit risk guarantee fees (“g-fees”) as a source of funding for any extension of highway programs or any other purpose beyond supporting the companies’ safety and soundness.

G-fees are a critical risk management tool used by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to protect against losses from loans that default. Increasing g-fees for other purposes – even just extending the current incremental fee increase added to offset the cost of the payroll tax holiday for four years – imposes an unjustified burden on the housing finance system. It is important to note that g-fees are included within the cost structure for all Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac backed mortgages and are paid by borrowers over the entire life of their loans. Thus any increase imposed now would continue to be paid by borrowers with GSE mortgages for many years beyond the proposed 3-year imposition of the additional fee.

The nation's housing market remains in a precarious state. The unintended impact of this proposed g-fee increase extension will be to keep housing consumers on the sideline, preventing the absorption of our nation's large real-estate owned inventory, as well as curtailing refinance activity that is needed to keep creditworthy borrowers in their homes. Such a fee would be a regressive tax, imposing the largest burden on low- and moderate-income borrowers and borrowers with low wealth who already face serious obstacles in obtaining fair and sustainable credit. Moreover, many of these borrowers struggling to obtain homeownership are disproportionately Latino and African-American. Adding an additional fee to mortgages for unrelated expenses would only increase the hurdles these families already face in achieving the American dream of homeownership.

We understand the critical need to reauthorize highway programs. However, we are united in our belief that using g-fees as a funding mechanism for this purpose shifts the burden to homeowners and the housing sector in a manner that prevents the GSEs from effectively managing their risk and managing their duty to ensure that creditworthy borrowers from underserved communities have access to sustainable credit.

Thank you for your consideration of this very important matter.

**America's Homeowner Alliance  
American Bankers Association American Escrow Association  
American Land Title Association  
Asian Real Estate Association of America  
Center for Responsible Lending  
Community Associations Institute  
Community Home Lenders Association  
Community Mortgage Lenders of America  
Consumer Federation of America  
Consumer Mortgage Coalition  
Credit Union National Association  
Homeownership Preservation Foundation  
Housing Policy Council of the Financial Services Roundtable  
Independent Community Bankers of America  
The Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights  
Leading Builders of America  
Louisiana Bankers Association  
Mortgage Bankers Association  
National Association of Federal Credit Unions  
National Association of Hispanic Real Estate Professionals  
National Association of Home Builders  
National Association of Mortgage Brokers  
National Association of REALTORS®  
National Association of Real Estate Brokers  
National Community Reinvestment Coalition  
National Council of State Housing Agencies  
National Consumer Law Center (on behalf of its low-income clients)  
National Housing Conference  
Real Estate Services Providers Council, Inc.  
The Realty Alliance  
U.S. Mortgage Insurers**

September 15, 2015

The Honorable John Boehner  
Speaker  
U.S. House of Representatives  
H-232, The Capitol  
Washington, D.C. 20515

The Honorable Nancy Pelosi  
Minority Leader  
U.S. House of Representatives  
H-204, The Capitol  
Washington, D.C. 20515

The Honorable Mitch McConnell  
Majority Leader  
United States Senate  
S-230, The Capitol  
Washington, DC 20510

The Honorable Harry Reid  
Minority Leader  
United States Senate  
S-221, The Capitol  
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Speaker Boehner, Leader Pelosi, Leader McConnell and Leader Reid,

As Congress returns to Washington, and congressional leaders resume their negotiations for a long term transportation reauthorization, our organizations respectfully request that you refrain from utilizing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac's ("the GSEs") credit risk guarantee fees ("g-fees") as a source of funding for any extension of highway programs or any other purpose beyond supporting the companies' safety and soundness.

G-fees are a critical risk management tool used by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to protect against losses from loans that default. Increasing g-fees for other purposes – even just extending the current incremental fee increase added to offset the cost of the payroll tax holiday for four years – imposes an unjustified burden on the housing finance system. It is important to note that g-fees are included within the cost structure for all Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac backed mortgages and are paid by borrowers over the entire life of their loans. Thus any increase imposed now would continue to be paid by borrowers with GSE mortgages for many years beyond the proposed 3-year imposition of the additional fee.

The nation's housing market remains in a precarious state. The unintended impact of this proposed g-fee increase extension will be to keep housing consumers on the sideline, preventing the absorption of our nation's large real-estate owned inventory, as well as curtailing refinance activity that is needed to keep creditworthy borrowers in their homes. Such a fee would be a regressive tax, imposing the largest burden on low- and moderate-income borrowers and borrowers with low wealth who already face serious obstacles in obtaining fair and sustainable credit. Moreover, many of these borrowers struggling to obtain homeownership are disproportionately Latino and African-American. Adding an additional fee to mortgages for unrelated expenses would only increase the hurdles these families already face in achieving the American dream of homeownership.

We understand the critical need to reauthorize highway programs. However, we are united in our belief that using g-fees as a funding mechanism for this purpose shifts the burden to homeowners and the housing sector in a manner that prevents the GSEs from effectively managing their risk and managing their duty to ensure that creditworthy borrowers from underserved communities have access to sustainable credit.

Thank you for your consideration of this very important matter.

**America's Homeowner Alliance**

**American Bankers Association**

**American Escrow Association**  
**American Land Title Association**  
**Asian Real Estate Association of America**  
**Center for Responsible Lending**  
**Community Associations Institute**  
**Community Home Lenders Association**  
**Community Mortgage Lenders of America**  
**Consumer Federation of America**  
**Consumer Mortgage Coalition**  
**Credit Union National Association**  
**Homeownership Preservation Foundation**  
**Housing Policy Council of the Financial Services Roundtable**  
**Independent Community Bankers of America**  
**The Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights**  
**Leading Builders of America**  
**Louisiana Bankers Association**  
**Mortgage Bankers Association**  
**National Association of Federal Credit Unions**  
**National Association of Hispanic Real Estate Professionals**  
**National Association of Home Builders**  
**National Association of Mortgage Brokers**  
**National Association of REALTORS®**  
**National Association of Real Estate Brokers**  
**National Community Reinvestment Coalition**

**National Council of State Housing Agencies**

**National Consumer Law Center (on behalf of its low-income clients)**

**National Housing Conference**

**Real Estate Services Providers Council, Inc.**

**The Realty Alliance**

**U.S. Mortgage Insurers**

CC: The Honorable Jeb Hensarling, Chairman of the House Committee on Financial Services  
The Honorable Maxine Waters, Ranking Member of the House Committee on Financial Services  
The Honorable Richard Shelby, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, & Urban Development  
The Honorable Sherrod Brown, Ranking Member of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, & Urban Development  
The Honorable Paul Ryan, Chairman of the House Committee on Ways & Means  
The Honorable Sander Levin, Ranking Member of the House Committee on Ways and Means  
The Honorable Bill Shuster, Chairman of the House Committee on Transportation & Infrastructure  
The Honorable Peter DeFazio, Ranking Member of the House Committee on Transportation & Infrastructure  
The Honorable James Inhofe, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Environment & Public Works  
The Honorable Barbara Boxer, Ranking Member of the Senate Committee on Environment & Public Works  
The Honorable Orrin Hatch, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Finance  
The Honorable Ron Wyden, Ranking Member of the Senate Committee on Finance  
The Honorable John Thune, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Science, Commerce, & Transportation  
The Honorable Bill Nelson, Ranking Member of the Senate Committee on Science, Commerce, & Transportation



Chris Polychron, CIPS, CRS, GRI  
2015 President

Dale A. Stinton  
Chief Executive Officer

**GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS  
DIVISION**

Jerry Giovaniello, Senior Vice President  
Gary Weaver, Vice President  
Joe Ventrone, Vice President  
Scott Reiter, Vice President  
Jamie Gregory, Deputy Chief Lobbyist

500 New Jersey Ave., NW  
Washington, DC 20001-2020  
Ph. 202-383-1194 Fax 202-383-7580  
www.REALTOR.org

September 9, 2015

United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator:

As lawmakers resume their negotiations for a long-term transportation bill, the more than one million members of the National Association of REALTORS® (NAR) respectfully request that you oppose any legislation that utilizes Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac's credit risk guarantee fees (g-fees) to offset costs associated with the extension of highway programs.

G-fees are a critical risk management tool used by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to protect against losses from faulty loans, and should be used only to manage the companies' credit risks. Increasing g-fees for other purposes – even just extending the current fee increase for four years – effectively taxes potential homebuyers and consumers looking to refinance their mortgages.

Our nation's housing sector is still recovering, with some market segments remaining in a delicate state. An increase in g-fees would disturb the housing recovery as it would raise the cost to purchase or refinance a home for many Americans. NAR believes this action will disproportionately impact low and moderate income borrowers, as well as first-time homebuyers who are currently the majority users of FHA loans. Finally, implementing a g-fee increase that is unrelated to housing needs could also act to hinder the necessary reforms required of the housing finance system for the foreseeable future.

NAR understands the need for a long-term reauthorization of highway programs in order to help strengthen our country's infrastructure. However, NAR strongly believes that taxing homeowners as a transportation funding mechanism places an unnecessary long lasting burden on consumers and prevents Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac from effectively managing their risk.

Thank you for your consideration of this very important matter.

Sincerely,



Chris Polychron  
2015 President, National Association of REALTORS®



Chris Polychron, CIPS, CRS, GRI  
2015 President

Dale A. Stinton  
Chief Executive Officer

**GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS  
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Washington, DC 20001-2020  
Ph. 202-383-1194 Fax 202-383-7580  
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September 9, 2015

U.S. House of Representatives  
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Representative:

As lawmakers resume their negotiations for a long-term transportation bill, the more than one million members of the National Association of REALTORS® (NAR) respectfully request that you oppose any legislation that utilizes Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac's credit risk guarantee fees (g-fees) to offset costs associated with the extension of highway programs.

G-fees are a critical risk management tool used by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to protect against losses from faulty loans, and should be used only to manage the companies' credit risks. Increasing g-fees for other purposes – even just extending the current fee increase for four years – effectively taxes potential homebuyers and consumers looking to refinance their mortgages.

Our nation's housing sector is still recovering, with some market segments remaining in a delicate state. An increase in g-fees would disturb the housing recovery as it would raise the cost to purchase or refinance a home. NAR believes this action will disproportionately impact low and moderate income borrowers, as well as first-time homebuyers who are currently the majority users of FHA loans. Finally, implementing a g-fee increase that is unrelated to housing needs could also act to hinder the necessary reforms required of the housing finance system for the foreseeable future.

NAR understands the need to reauthorize highway programs and help strengthen our country's infrastructure. However, NAR strongly believes that taxing homeowners as a transportation funding mechanism places an unnecessary long-term burden on consumers and prevents Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac from effectively managing their risk.

Thank you for your consideration of this very important matter.

Sincerely,



Chris Polychron  
2015 President, National Association of REALTORS®



July 27, 2015

The Honorable Mike Crapo  
U.S. Senate  
239 Dirksen Senate Office Building  
Washington, D.C. 20510

The Honorable Mark Warner  
U.S. Senate  
475 Russell Senate Office Building  
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senators Crapo and Warner:

The undersigned organizations write in support of your amendment, #2399, offered to H.R. 22, the legislative vehicle for a multi-year extension of the highway bill. Your amendment would remove a four-year extension of the 10-year, 10 basis point increase in Fannie Mae's and Freddie Mac's credit risk guarantee fees (g-fees) that originally passed Congress in 2011.

Our members were deeply troubled when the original increase passed in 2011. That increase has harmed homebuyers and consumers – and will continue to do so for the duration of the provision's 10-year lifespan. Since then, whenever Congress has considered using g-fees to cover the cost of programs unrelated to housing, our members have united to emphatically let Congress know that homeownership cannot, and must not, be used as the nation's piggybank. And now we are united again, to make that same statement regarding the use of these fees to pay for the highway bill.

G-fees are a critical risk management tool used by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to protect against losses from faulty loans. Increasing g-fees for other purposes – even just extending the current fee increase for four years – effectively taxes potential homebuyers and consumers looking to refinance their mortgages.

The nation's housing sector remains in a precarious state. Though we are continuing to see signs of improvement, we must avoid taking any steps that may retard that recovery and ultimately send our overall economy into another tailspin. The unintended impact of this proposed g-fee increase would be to keep housing consumers on the sideline, preventing the absorption of our nation's large real-estate owned inventory, as well as curtailing refinance activity that is needed to keep responsible borrowers in their homes. Furthermore, implementing yet another g-fee increase unrelated to housing needs will act to hinder the necessary reforms required of the GSEs in the years ahead.

We understand the need to reauthorize highway programs. However, we are united in our belief that using g-fees as a funding mechanism for this purpose shifts the burden to homeowners and the housing sector in a manner that prevents Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac from effectively managing their risk.

Thank you for your efforts to remove this troublesome provision from H.R. 22.

**American Bankers Association**

**American Land Title Association**

**Community Mortgage Lenders of America**

**Consumer Mortgage Coalition**

**Credit Union National Association**

**Housing Policy Council of the Financial Services Roundtable**

**Independent Community Bankers of America**

**Leading Builders of America**

**Mortgage Bankers Association**

**National Association of Federal Credit Unions**

**National Association of Homebuilders**

**National Association of REALTORS®**

**U.S. Mortgage Insurers**

Cc: The Honorable Mitch McConnell, Majority Leader  
The Honorable Harry Reid, Minority Leader  
The Honorable Richard Shelby, Chairman, Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, &  
Urban Affairs  
The Honorable Sherrod Brown, Ranking Member, Senate Committee on Banking, Housing,  
& Urban Affairs

# United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

July 22, 2015

The Honorable Mitch McConnell  
Majority Leader  
United States Senate  
Washington, DC 20510

The Honorable Harry Reid  
Democratic Leader  
United States Senate  
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Leader McConnell and Leader Reid:

We ask that you uphold the Fiscal Year 2016 Budget Resolution, which prohibits the use of guarantee fees charged by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to be scored as an offset.


The purpose of the guarantee fee is to guard against prospective Fannie and Freddie credit losses from borrower defaults. Using guarantee fees in spending legislation double-counts revenue. Further increases of guarantee fees should be used to protect taxpayers from mortgage losses and as repayment for the bailout, not for unrelated programs.

Each time guarantee fees are extended, increased and diverted for unrelated spending, homeowners are charged more for their mortgages and taxpayers are exposed to additional risk. Attempts to increase or extend these fees makes it more difficult to reform our housing finance system and wind down Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.

To ensure that transfers from Fannie and Freddie to the Treasury Department are not used, Section 3110 of the Fiscal Year 2016 Budget Resolution prohibits the Congressional Budget Office from including guarantee fees when calculating offsets for legislation. As such, any legislation which purports to use guarantee fees to offset a portion of its cost will actually be in direct violation of PAYGO, with the overspending contained in the bill serving to greatly increase the deficit.

It is our collective responsibility to uphold our bipartisan budget scoring rule to protect against overspending that would increase the deficit. We urge you to follow-through on the commitment to not use Fannie and Freddie as a piggybank in the Budget Resolution and remove the extension of guarantee fees from the transportation reauthorization.

Sincerely,



Mike Crapo  
United States Senator



Mark Warner  
United States Senator

July 21, 2015

The Honorable Mitch McConnell  
Majority Leader  
United States Senate  
S-230, The Capitol  
Washington, DC 20510

The Honorable Harry Reid  
Minority Leader  
United States Senate  
S-221, The Capitol  
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senators McConnell and Reid:

Our members respectfully request that you oppose utilizing Fannie Mae's and Freddie Mac's credit risk guarantee fees (g-fees) as a source of funding for the extension of transportation programs.

Our members were deeply troubled when, in 2011, g-fees were raised by 10 basis points for 10 years to fund a two-month extension of payroll tax relief. That increase has harmed homebuyers and consumers – and will continue to do so for the duration of the provision's 10-year lifespan. Since then, whenever Congress has considered using g-fees to cover the cost of programs unrelated to housing, our members have united to emphatically let Congress know that homeownership cannot, and must not, be used as the nation's piggybank. And now we are united again, to make that same statement regarding the use of these fees to pay for the highway bill.

G-fees are a critical risk management tool used by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to protect against losses from faulty loans. Increasing g-fees for other purposes – even just extending the current fee increase for four years – effectively taxes potential homebuyers and consumers looking to refinance their mortgages.

The nation's housing sector remains in a precarious state. Though we are continuing to see signs of improvement, we must avoid taking any steps that may retard that recovery and ultimately send our overall economy into another tailspin. The unintended impact of this proposed g-fee increase would be to keep housing consumers on the sideline, preventing the absorption of our nation's large real-estate owned inventory, as well as curtailing refinance activity that is needed to keep responsible borrowers in their homes. Furthermore, implementing yet another g-fee increase unrelated to housing needs will act to hinder the necessary reforms required of the GSEs in the years ahead. We also object to using the g-fees charged by Ginnie Mae in this manner. We believe this will disproportionately impact the low- and moderate-income borrowers and first-time homebuyers toward which FHA loans are targeted.

We understand the need to reauthorize highway programs. However, we are united in our belief that using g-fees as a funding mechanism for this purpose shifts the burden to homeowners and the housing sector in a manner that prevents Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac from effectively managing their risk.

Thank you for your consideration of this very important matter.

**American Bankers Association**

**American Land Title Association**

**Credit Union National Association**

**Housing Policy Council of the Financial Services Roundtable**

**Leading Builders of America**

**Mortgage Bankers Association**

**National Association of Federal Credit Unions**

**National Association of Homebuilders**

**National Association of REALTORS®**

**United States Mortgage Insurers**

The Honorable Michael Enzi  
Chairman  
Committee on the Budget  
624 Dirksen Senate Office Building  
Washington, DC 20510

The Honorable Bernie Sanders  
Ranking Member  
Committee on the Budget  
624 Dirksen Senate Office Building  
Washington, DC 20510

March 13, 2015

Dear Chairman Enzi and Ranking Member Sanders:

The undersigned organizations wish to express our support for the amendment offered by Senators Crapo, Warner, Corker, and Merkley to ensure Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac credit risk guarantee fees (g-fees) are no longer used to offset the costs associated with unrelated policies that increase the deficit. The Senate adopted similar, bipartisan language during the 113<sup>th</sup> Congress in response to several attempts to use g-fees to offset unrelated expenditures.

G-fees are a critical risk management tool used by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to protect against losses from faulty loans, and should be used only to manage the companies' credit risk. Increasing g-fees for other purposes effectively taxes potential homebuyers and consumers wishing to refinance their mortgages. G-fee increases unrelated to housing could also act to hinder the necessary reforms required of the housing finance system in the years ahead.

We are united in our belief that using g-fees as a funding mechanism places an unnecessary burden on homeowners and prevents Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac from effectively managing their risk, and urge the Budget Committee to pass the amendment offered by Senators Crapo, Warner, Corker, and Merkley.

Sincerely,

American Bankers Association  
American Land Title Association  
Credit Union National Association  
Financial Services Roundtable  
Housing Policy Council  
Mortgage Bankers Association  
National Association of Federal Credit Unions  
National Association of Realtors

Cc: The Honorable Mike Crapo  
The Honorable Mark Warner  
The Honorable Bob Corker  
The Honorable Jeff Merkley



STATE  
of ASIA  
AMERICA

---

**2015**



INTRO

# NO OTHER

The Asian American community is in a no man's land. Since 2000, the Asian American community has been the fastest growing community in the US with a rapidly growing purchasing power. From educational achievements to small business ownership to professional occupations, our community continues to outpace the US population. Despite these achievements and contributions to the US economy, Asian Americans are invisible in many ways. We are viewed as "Others". Despite making up a growing segment of the professional workforce, we face a glass ceiling in the boardroom and upper management. The perception of Asian American in the media is perplexing, and usually represented as a sidekick who talks an octave too high. Despite representing the fast growing segment of the immigrant population in the US and is projected to be so for the foreseeable future, political discussion rarely touches on our community – and when it does, it usually is connected to misinformation and race-baiting comments. Even the US government fails to recognize us independently and we have been lumped in with Native Americans, Native Alaskans, and Native Hawaiian under the "other" category at the US Census Bureau.

When you aren't counted, you can't be heard. This report counts our successes and challenges, and provides a framework for thinking about the Asian American market today and into the future. This report consolidates the latest information about the Asian American community, our economy contribution to the US economy, the housing patterns of our consumers and how we fit into a global economy. Our community has much to celebrate. We outpace the US general population on nearly all major economic attributes. If you look at the pure academic achievements as a proxy for future financial strength of our community, we are certainly on the right track and will represent a highly sought after market. We have gone from a population of low-wage immigrants seeking political freedom and economic opportunities to a group of most educated and highly-skilled immigrants to set foot on the American soil. Today, approximately 50% of all Asian immigrants to the US

have a bachelor's degree or higher. These individuals are moving into the professional ranks quickly and are helping to make the US economy the envy of the world.

Our community's connection into the global market is powerful. With more than half of the world's population and some of the most dynamic economies in the world, the Asian American community will continue serve as a social and economic bridge to Asia. The importance of the Asian market can be underscored by this simple fact in the global market: outside of English, Mandarin is second most useful business language in the world<sup>1</sup>. Technology and social media is making the world smaller, and has made the opportunity for global business even more significant. The importance of global capital for the US real estate market is growing. Without financial backing from Asian central banks and investors, US mortgage market would be more expensive and less liquid today. Beyond the institutional investors from Asia investing in US mortgage backed securities, individual Asian buyers are spending more on residential real estate than ever before. Today, Chinese buyers represent largest overseas purchaser of the US homes.

The perception of Asian Americans as industrious, intelligent, family-oriented and hard-working has served the community well for the most part. Unfortunately, this perception creates the misimpression that all "boats" in our community are raising. In fact, that's not the case. There are certain Asian American communities that are facing high poverty levels and many older Asian Americans are facing severe social and linguistic isolation. We dedicated an important section on some of the special challenges facing our community in this report.

I hope this report shines a needed light on the Asian American market and the tremendous opportunity we represent to real estate firms, financial services industry and home builders. By taking our community out of the shadows of the "other" category, we hope to generate more thoughtful dialogue and business efforts toward serving the Asian American market more effectively.

PEOPLE

# ETHNIC MAKE-UP & POPULATION



**+45%** The AAPI population grew by more than 45% between 2000-2010, making it the fastest growing minority in the US<sup>2</sup>

**+134%** By 2050, the AAPI population is expected to explode by 134% of 2010 Census figures, to **35.6 million**.<sup>3</sup>



**40 countries** are considered Asian or a Pacific Island, but there are far more ethnicities than countries.

**19.4+ million** US Census estimate of 2014 AAPI population<sup>4</sup>



**79%** of those over the age of 18 are foreign born; however, under the age of 18, 79% were born in the US<sup>5</sup>



**The SOUTH & WEST** made the biggest gains in AAPI population between 2000-2010.<sup>6</sup>

**CHINA & INDIA** have replaced Mexico as the largest sources of immigrants.<sup>7</sup>

## ETHNICITIES

% of ALL AAPI and POPULATION

**22%**  
Chinese / 3,794,673

**19%**  
Filipino / 3,416,840


**16%**  
Indian / 3,183,063

**10%**  
Vietnamese / 1,737,433

**9%**  
Korean / 1,706,822

**6%**  
Japanese / 1,304,286

**18%**  
Balance / 3,642,886  
*Includes – Pakistani, Cambodian, Hmong, Thai, Laotian, Taiwanese, Bangladeshi, Burmese, Indonesian, Nepalese, Sri Lankan, Malaysian, Bhutanese*



Source: US Census Bureau, 2010 Census.



## PARTY IDENTIFICATION AMONG ASIAN AMERICAN REGISTERED VOTERS, 2014<sup>10</sup>

**37%**  
Democrat

**45%**  
Non-Identifier

**17%**  
Republican

## LANGUAGE

TOP LANGUAGES SPOKEN (speaker population)

**CHINESE**  
2,380,453

**TAGALOG**  
1,441,799

**VIETNAMESE**  
1,200,709


**KOREAN**  
1,041,030

**HINDI**  
527,481

**JAPANESE**  
457,450

Source: US Census Bureau, 2010 Census.

## POPULATION



### Top States

(% of State Population / #)

**CALIFORNIA**  
15% / 5,556,592

**NEW YORK**  
8% / 1,549,494

**TEXAS**  
4% / 1,110,666

### % Growth

**NEVADA**  
116%

**ARIZONA**  
95%

**NORTH CAROLINA**  
85%

### Top Cities

**LOS ANGELES, CA / 1.8 MILLION**

**NEW YORK, NY / 1.8 MILLION**


**SAN FRANCISCO, CA / 1.0 MILLION**

Source: US Census Bureau, 2010 Census.

4 out of 5 Asian Americans are "in-language" preferred<sup>8</sup>



Asian Americans who speak a language other than English<sup>9</sup>



CFPC Pg. 261

PEOPLE

# ETHNIC MAKE-UP & POPULATION

## AGE

**36.0** YEARS  
Median age


**vs.**

**42.3** YEARS  
for non-Hispanic whites


 **32% are in between 25-44**  
(most likely range that someone purchases a home)

**87.2** YEARS  
Life Expectancy

- + Compared to 78.7 for non-Hispanic whites
- + Longest of any segment of US population



Source: 2013 Nielsen. "Significant, Sophisticated, and Savvy: The Asian American Consumer."




## FAMILY STRUCTURE<sup>11</sup>



 **28%**

**of Asian American households include two or more adult generations**  
Compare to the rate of non-Hispanic whites  
CFPC Pg. 262




PEOPLE


# INCOME & EDUCATION

- + AAPI have the highest per capita income, the highest average household income, and are the most educated minority group in the US<sup>12</sup>
- + However, while many in the AAPI have enjoyed quite a bit of financial and educational success, many more have not.
- + These numbers can be skewed by the great successes of a few. Millions of AAPI live below the poverty line<sup>13</sup>, live in impoverished housing with numerous family members (thus skewing household income data), and do not have a high school diploma.

## EDUCATION



VS.



**21.2%**

of AAPI have an advanced degree (Ph.D, Master's, MD, JD)<sup>15</sup>

Compared to just 10% of US general population



## Wealth Imbalance





**Half of all income for AAPI goes to the top 20% of earners...**



**...while the bottom 40% take home just 13%.<sup>16</sup>**

Many Southeast Asian ethnic groups and elderly AAPI have struggled to succeed. The Hmong ethnic group is among the poorest, least educated of any segment of the US population.<sup>17</sup>

### AAPI with at least a bachelor's degree (% with one)




PEOPLE

# INCOME & EDUCATION

## INCOME


### Household Income<sup>18</sup>

**\$72,472**  
median



- + Highest of any racial group in US
- + **39% higher** than US avg of \$52,250
- + Indian-Americans highest household income at \$100,547
- + Bangladeshi-Americans lowest at \$51,331

### AAPI Median Household Income





Source: 2015 Nielsen. "Asian-Americans: Culturally Connected and Forging the Future."

- + **Household income grew by 97%** between 2000-2013<sup>19</sup>
- + **54% more likely** to have an income over \$100,000 than average US household<sup>20</sup>



### Median Personal Income Levels<sup>21</sup>




**86%** of Asian Americans have a savings account vs. 76% of the general population



**1 in 5** Asian Americans own stock


Source: 2013 Nielsen. "Significant, Sophisticated, and Savvy: The Asian American Consumer."

### Where AAPI Fortune 500 Employees Come From<sup>22</sup>:



# ECONOMIC IMPACT


## SMALL BUSINESS / ENTREPRENEURSHIP



## PURCHASING POWER

- + Expected to top **\$1 TRILLION** by 2018<sup>25</sup>
    - Would make AAPI the **19<sup>th</sup> largest economy in the world**<sup>26</sup>
      - ↳ Larger than Saudi Arabia and Switzerland
    - Would make it **4<sup>th</sup> largest state economy in US** (California, Texas, and New York)<sup>27</sup>
  - + Experienced **180% GROWTH** in Purchasing Power between 2000-2014<sup>28</sup>
    - ↳ Nearly **TRIPLE** non-Hispanic whites (69%)
- CFPC Pg. 265

### Asian American Buying Power – Top States<sup>29</sup>






ECONOMY


# HOUSING & INVESTMENT

## 2014 Homeownership Rates by Race<sup>30</sup>



## Ethnicity is Correlated with Ownership

(% Homeowners)



Source: Census Bureau CPS, 2013



- + The AAPI community applied for, and received, the **largest share of purchase money mortgages** of any minority group in terms of both number and monetary value.<sup>31</sup>
- + From 2000 to 2010, the number of home purchase **loans extended to AAPI increased by 15%**, nearly identical to non-Hispanic whites.<sup>32</sup>
- + In terms of borrower characteristics, AAPI generally have...
  - High credit scores
  - Low Debt-to-Income ratios
  - Low Loan-to-Value ratios
  - Low APRs
- + However, at the lowest income levels AAPI face **higher rates of mortgage application denial** than any other ethnic or racial group.<sup>33</sup>
- + Conversely, at the highest income levels, AAPI denial rates are indistinguishable from non-Hispanic whites.
- + According to research by Freddie Mac, AAPI are...
  - Generally averse to debt
  - More inclined to make large down payments

## National Aggregate: Disposition of Loan Applications 1- To 4-Family and Manufactured Home Dwellings By Race of Applicant, 2014<sup>34</sup>

Race	Conventional Home-Purchase				FHA, FSA/RHS, and VA Home-Purchase				Refinance			
	Applications Received		Loans Originated		Applications Received		Loans Originated		Applications Received		Loans Originated	
	Number	\$000's	Number	\$000's	Number	\$000's	Number	\$000's	Number	\$000's	Number	\$000's
Asian	231,893	\$77,816,363	160,915	\$54,159,574	33,380	\$8,325,652	21,975	\$5,521,635	192,606	\$59,678,468	103,706	\$33,457,144
Black or African American	120,272	\$19,150,992	59,568	\$11,228,157	155,673	\$28,887,357	97,658	\$18,490,579	305,363	\$49,706,211	118,675	\$19,817,481
White	2,409,199	\$549,705,303	1,721,606	\$405,393,136	1,115,483	\$201,485,253	798,416	\$146,459,754	3,143,167	\$641,096,665	1,730,003	\$356,951,622
Hispanic or Latino	211,768	\$37,810,303	123,048	\$24,186,221	211,515	\$38,419,968	139,982	\$25,855,667	349,650	\$62,859,399	158,053	\$29,175,753
TOTAL	3,194,742	\$768,213,351	2,216,030	\$553,603,652	1,467,530	\$273,122,306	1,018,635	\$192,603,593	4,385,649	\$921,179,755	2,301,410	\$495,604,357

CFPC Pg. 266

## Discrimination Against Asian Americans in Housing

Asian renters who contact agents about recently advertised housing units **learn about 10% fewer available units and are shown nearly 7% fewer units** than whites.

Asian homebuyers who contact agents about recently advertised homes for sale **learn about 15% fewer available homes and are shown nearly 19% fewer units** than whites.<sup>35</sup>

## PROJECTED CHANGE IN NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDS 2014-2024

NO CHANGE IN SEX-, AGE-, RACE-SPECIFIC HEADSHIP

	Non-Hispanic White	Black	Asian	Other	Hispanic	TOTAL
<b>18-24</b>	(344,549)	(108,530)	<b>46,790</b>	44,137	209,123	(153,030)
<b>25-29</b>	(293,308)	74,398	<b>91,736</b>	96,942	398,341	<b>368,108</b>
<b>30-34</b>	286,587	405,793	<b>173,500</b>	119,982	480,828	<b>1,466,691</b>
<b>35-39</b>	652,387	290,291	<b>213,105</b>	80,817	412,360	<b>1,648,961</b>
<b>40-44</b>	12,381	108,719	<b>148,426</b>	59,839	463,624	<b>792,990</b>
<b>45-49</b>	(1,079,505)	(46,215)	<b>152,927</b>	29,997	469,935	(472,861)
<b>50-54</b>	(1,858,462)	(112,461)	<b>165,300</b>	5,680	504,805	(1,295,138)
<b>55-59</b>	(1,418,867)	(15,103)	<b>125,012</b>	8,590	558,887	(741,480)
<b>60-64</b>	486,889	329,647	<b>150,272</b>	56,630	627,455	<b>1,650,893</b>
<b>65-70</b>	1,410,995	506,855	<b>169,890</b>	73,416	495,405	<b>2,656,560</b>
<b>70-75</b>	2,075,628	475,198	<b>158,664</b>	63,130	396,549	<b>3,169,169</b>
<b>75-80</b>	2,127,888	282,124	<b>127,795</b>	53,276	259,911	<b>2,850,993</b>
<b>80+</b>	1,335,886	225,741	<b>87,051</b>	40,679	252,149	<b>1,941,506</b>
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>3,393,949</b>	<b>2,416,457</b>	<b>1,810,469</b>	<b>733,115</b>	<b>5,529,371</b>	<b>13,883,363</b>

Source: Housing Demand: Demographics and the Numbers Behind the Coming Multi-Million Increase in Households. Mortgage Bankers Association. July 2015.

## HOUSING TRENDS OF NOTE

By 2024...

- + There will be **1.8 million more Asian households** formed
- + There will be **33% more new minority homebuyers** than non-Hispanic White
- + **88% of all new rental demand** will come from minority communities



CEPC Pg. 267  
Source: Housing Demand: Demographics and the Numbers Behind the Coming Multi-Million Increase in Households"

## INVESTMENT<sup>36</sup>



Asian American households **spent 19% more than the US General Population** in many categories, including Housing.



AAPI are **30% more likely to invest** in Real Estate beyond their primary residence.



**80% more likely** to use both college-advantage tax-savings accounts and trust and estate planning services.

ASIA

# GLOBAL INVESTMENT OUTLOOK

- + Emerging economies in Asia, particularly Southeast Asia, continue to lead overall global economic growth.
- + Though there has been a slight slowdown in growth from 2014, these economies are still projected to lead all global growth for the foreseeable future.
- + Weaker than expected growth in the region has triggered greater levels of capital outflow, particularly to the US.<sup>37</sup>



**Asia and Pacific's GDP is expected to grow by 5.6% in 2015, and accounted for nearly two thirds of global growth last year.**

Source: 2015 International Monetary Fund. "Regional Economic Outlook: Asia and Pacific; Stabilizing and Outperforming Other Regions." April 2015.

CFPC Pg. 268

## THE PAPER TIGER HAS CLAWS




- + Asian investment, particularly from China, in US real estate has skyrocketed in the past few years, representing **nearly 25% of all cross-border capital investment** in the US in 2014.<sup>38</sup>
- + Analysts project that Asian cross-border investment in the US will continue to increase over the next several years.<sup>39</sup>
- + The first quarter of 2015 has already seen **\$2.8B invested**.<sup>40</sup>
- + **Office space still reigns supreme** in foreign investment, with Hotels and Retail rounding out the top three.<sup>41</sup>




**#1 OFFICE SPACE #2 HOTELS #3 RETAIL**


## POPULATIONS IN ASIA IN THOUSANDS 2013<sup>42</sup>



## COUNTRIES<sup>43</sup>



## GROWTH 2012-2013<sup>44</sup>




ASIA

# GLOBAL INVESTMENT OUTLOOK


## INVESTMENT

### Asian Investment by Property Type



Source: 2015 CBRE. "Trans-Pacific Capital Flows: Asia Rises as Major Source of Cross-Border Capital for US Real Estate Investment." April 2015.

### Biggest Sources of Asian Capital to US Q1 2015




Source: 2015 CBRE. "Trans-Pacific Capital Flows: Asia Rises as Major Source of Cross-Border Capital for US Real Estate Investment." April 2015.

### Asian Capital Investment: Top 10 US Geographical Markets by Total Deal Size 2013-2015

US Market	Total Deal Size
1 Manhattan, New York	\$10,793,130,221
2 Hawaii	\$4,191,384,673
3 Los Angeles, California	\$4,101,093,562
4 San Francisco, California	\$1,322,776,752
5 Washington, D.C.	\$1,038,300,000
6 Chicago, Illinois	\$1,021,472,500
7 Houston, Texas	\$835,400,000
8 East Bay, California	\$636,648,924
9 Boston, Massachusetts	\$532,197,000
10 Phoenix, Arizona	\$429,245,788
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>\$24,901,649,420</b>

Source: Zhou, J. (2015). Asian capital investing in US real estate. Cornell Real Estate 13(1), 66-73. Retrieved from <http://scholarship.sha.cornell.edu/crer/vol13/iss1/9>

### Average Home Purchase Price by Foreigners 12 Months Ending March 2015



Source: NAR 2015 Profile of Home Buying Activity of International Clients. June 2015.

SOCIAL

# OBSTACLES & OPPORTUNITIES


## THE BAMBOO CEILING

Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders are well represented with the ranks of America’s Fortune 500 and 1000 companies. However, there is a large disparity between their percentage of employment, and their percentage of executive leadership positions.

**By the Numbers:**

Source: Center for Work-Life Policy


- + AAPI represent just over 6% of the US population
- + 64% of AAPI aspire to top level positions
  - Compared to 51% of Caucasians
- + Only 2% of Executive Leadership positions in Fortune 500 companies despite reportedly asking for raises (37% of AAPI) and promotions (28% of AAPI) at the same rate as Caucasians
- + Wrongly attributed to AAPI being “too quiet” or “blending in”



**AAPI Executive Leadership positions in Fortune 500 companies**




**25% of AAPI respondents say they faced discrimination in the workplace**



**Only 4% of Caucasians said they believe AAPI face discrimination**


Source: Center for Work-Life Policy

CFPC Pg. 271



**48% of AAPI said the biggest obstacle they face is conforming to prevailing Western leadership models**

Source: Center for Work-Life Policy



**30-31% of AAPIs surveyed reported incidents of employment discrimination** the largest of any group, with African Americans constituting the second largest at 26%.

Source: “New Gallup Poll On Employment Discrimination Shows Progress, Problems 40 Years After Founding of EEOC”. U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. December 2005.

## SOCIAL

# OBSTACLES & OPPORTUNITIES

## SOCIOECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS BY RACIAL/ETHNIC AND ASIAN ETHNIC GROUPS

(Numbers are in percentages, except for income)

	Not Proficient in English	Less Than High School	College Degree	Advanced Degree	High Skill Occupation	Married, Spouse Present	Home-owner	Median Personal Income	Median Family Income	Living in Poverty	Public Assistance
<b>Whites</b>	0.7	15.3	25.3	3.0	21.4	64.5	78.2	\$23,640	\$48,500	9.4	1.3
<b>Blacks</b>	0.8	29.1	13.6	1.2	12.3	38.0	54.4	\$16,300	\$33,300	24.9	4.5
<b>Latinos/Hispanics</b>	30.3	48.5	9.9	1.6	9.6	56.3	52.4	\$14,400	\$36,000	21.4	3.5
<b>Native American Indians</b>	2.6	27.4	10.8	0.9	11.9	50.2	64.2	\$14,500	\$32,240	25.1	6.1
<b>Indians</b>	8.4	12.6	64.4	12.5	51.6	74.9	56.8	\$26,000	\$69,470	8.2	0.9
<b>Cambodian, Hmong, or Laotian</b>	<b>44.3</b>	<b>52.7</b>	<b>9.2</b>	<b>0.4</b>	<b>9.8</b>	<b>66.6</b>	<b>53.3</b>	<b>\$16,000</b>	<b>\$43,850</b>	<b>22.5</b>	<b>9.9</b>
<b>Chinese</b>	31.3	23.6	46.3	8.5	41.9	67.1	65.7	\$20,000	\$58,300	13.1	1.8
<b>Filipinos</b>	7.0	13.1	42.8	4.3	29.7	62.7	67.6	\$23,000	\$65,400	6.9	1.6
<b>Japanese</b>	10.0	9.5	40.8	4.6	32.0	60.7	70.8	\$26,000	\$61,630	8.6	0.9
<b>Koreans</b>	32.9	13.8	43.6	5.6	27.0	69.0	51.9	\$16,300	\$48,500	15.5	1.6
<b>Pacific Islanders</b>	7.1	21.7	13.6	1.6	13.8	61.4	48.1	\$19,100	\$50,000	16.7	4.4
<b>Vietnamese</b>	40.4	37.8	13.8	2.5	22.6	61.2	60.0	\$16,000	\$51,500	13.8	4.8

Source: CFPC Pg. 272 "Economic Statistics & Demographics" Asian-Nation: The Landscape of Asian America. <<http://www.asian-nation.org/demographics.shtml>> (July 22, 2015).

## THE MODEL MINORITY MYTH

While it is certainly true that some portions of the AAPI community have enjoyed quite a bit of success, it is important to note that this is simply not the case for a vast number of AAPI. Here are some facts that may help dispel this notion that AAPI are not in need of government assistance or protection.



- + **26% of AAPI** are considered low-income<sup>45</sup>.
- + **AAPI face a 13% poverty rate** – the same as the US general population - according to the American Community Survey by the US Census Department.
- + **15% of AAPI have zero medical insurance** as of 2012 (*This number is sure to have risen as a result of ACA, but at the time of this writing, no such information was available*)
- + Laotians, Cambodians, and Hmongs have been far less successful than their Indian and Chinese counterparts (and that is not to say that *all* Chinese and Indians have been successful, either).

← [SEE DATA](#)

These numbers prove that it can be very difficult, if not impossible, to speak of an “Asian American Experience.” Because of the vast number of countries, languages, and cultures in what is referred to as “Asia”, their experiences can only be expected to vary as much in the US as they do in their nations of origin.

## INVISIBLE CREDIT

- + Many Asian cultures simply do not value traditional Western debt, and as such, have **very little to no credit history**. While many AAPI may be able to easily afford rent, utilities, and other expenses, because they tend to pay for things outright with cash, **it is difficult for them to establish a credit score** good enough to secure an affordable home loan.
- + Alternative credit scoring models would help with this issue by taking examining other data-sets that could predict credit worthiness (namely rent and utility payments). With the adoption of alternative credit models, which takes into account rent and utility payments, **280,000 AAPIs would be able to establish or improve their scores**<sup>46</sup> - allowing them to enter the housing market for the first time.



CFPC Pg. 273

**AAPI have the lowest unemployment rate of any segment of the US population<sup>47</sup>. However, almost half of the AAPI who are unemployed tend to be so for long term (six months or longer)**



**LONG TERM UNEMPLOYMENT IN 2013 PERCENT OF TOTAL UNEMPLOYED**

*By Race and Ethnicity<sup>48</sup>*



<b>Black</b>	<b>43.3%</b>
<b>AAPI</b>	<b>41.7%</b>
<b>Whites</b>	<b>35.8%</b>
<b>Hispanic</b>	<b>34.6%</b>


*percent of total unemployed*

**AAPI born in the US faced a much faster poverty growth rate than those who immigrated here.**



**GROWTH IN POVERTY AMONG AAPIs BY NATIVITY, 2000-2010**

*Average percent growth in poverty in the past 12 months, 10-year estimates<sup>49</sup>*





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# Wells Fargo Announces \$125 Billion Lending Goal to Support NAHREP's Hispanic Wealth Project

**Company also plans increase in Hispanic home mortgage consultants and \$10 million to support financial education and counseling; NAHREP strives to triple Hispanic household wealth over 10 years**

DES MOINES, Iowa, Sept. 15, 2015 – Wells Fargo Home Mortgage announced today, the first day of Hispanic Heritage Month, its support of the goals of the National Association of Hispanic Real Estate Professionals' [Hispanic Wealth Project](#), which seeks to triple Hispanic household wealth over the next decade. Wells Fargo's goals over the next 10 years include a projected \$125 billion in mortgage originations and a goal of \$10 million to support a variety of initiatives that promote financial education and counseling for Hispanic homebuyers. In continued recognition of the importance of hiring and retaining a diverse workforce, Wells Fargo also plans to increase the number of Hispanic home mortgage consultants on its sales team.

"Homeownership is a vehicle through which many people build wealth and financial stability," said Brad Blackwell, head of portfolio lending for [Wells Fargo Home Mortgage](#). "Homebuying and its downstream benefits can help improve neighborhoods, local businesses and the overall economy. As the nation's leading home mortgage lender to racially and ethnically diverse homebuyers, including Hispanics, we support NAHREP in this important mission and want to demonstrate our efforts to do more to increase homeownership to these communities."

The [NAHREP Hispanic Wealth Project Blueprint](#) focuses on three component goals to facilitate Hispanic wealth creation: a 50 percent or greater rate of U.S. Hispanic homeownership, a 50 percent increase in the first-year success rate of Hispanic-owned businesses, and a 25 percent increase in the number of Hispanic households owning non-cash financial assets such as stocks, bonds, mutual funds and 401(k) accounts.

NAHREP is the nation's fastest-growing Hispanic market-focused real estate housing industry trade association with more than 20,000 members across the country. "We are extremely pleased to see Wells Fargo's support of the Hispanic Wealth Project with new and existing programs that align with the project's goals," said Jerry Ascencio, chairman of the NAHREP Foundation. "We look forward to seeing the positive impact on local communities and the continuation of our long standing relationship to advance sustainable homeownership for Hispanic-Americans."

## **Diverse Segments Business Strategies Help Consumers Achieve Homeownership**

Supporting the Hispanic Wealth Project is part of the larger work of Wells Fargo Home Mortgage to drive lending for minorities across the credit spectrum, first-time homebuyers and low- to moderate-income customers. The diverse segments business strategy focuses on four areas to help these groups achieve homeownership: increasing diversity of Wells Fargo team members, including Home Mortgage Consultants; increasing the company's presence in diverse communities; providing products, processes and programs that support diverse

homeownership; and working with referral sources like real estate agents and nonprofit credit counseling agencies. "Wells Fargo Home Mortgage has the resources to support the reach of the Hispanic Wealth Project's goals," said Cerita Battles, head of Diverse Segments for Wells Fargo Home Mortgage. "We want to seize the opportunity to help address challenges in income and credit policies, and provide access to homebuyer education and counseling to increase consumer confidence among minorities regarding the homebuying process."

### **Wells Fargo Support Expands Beyond Home Lending**

The goals of the Hispanic Wealth Project align with many programs and initiatives already offered by Wells Fargo.

For example, as part of [Wells Fargo Works for Small Business<sup>SM</sup>](#), Wells Fargo collaborated with the U.S. Hispanic Chamber of Commerce to develop the Chamber Training Institute that trains leaders of diverse-segment chambers of commerce on key business and leadership topics for their members. It is part of [Wells Fargo's four-point plan](#) to help diverse-owned small businesses become credit-ready and access credit.

According to the *Economics of Higher Education* report, people with a bachelor's degree will have a considerably higher income than those with a high school diploma. Wells Fargo Education Financial Services works with institutions of higher learning to raise awareness about how education can enhance the quality of life for individuals and communities. Initiatives like [CollegeSTEPS](#), [Go College! Now](#), and [Get College Ready](#) provide free financial education resources and tools to help students responsibly pursue their higher education goals.

Wells Fargo also is the leading supporter of Hispanic Scholarship Fund scholarships in the banking industry, having provided more than \$3.6 million in scholarship support to 1,230 scholars since 2003.

"Wells Fargo is committed to helping Latinos build financial wealth and accomplish their dreams for their families and our communities," said Mariela Ure, head of Hispanic Segment Strategy at Wells Fargo. "Working with NAHREP to purposefully build and sustain momentum around this important initiative will further elevate our focus on meeting the financial needs of Latinos and create a path for financial success for generations to come."

### **About Wells Fargo**

Wells Fargo & Company (NYSE: WFC) is a nationwide, diversified, community-based financial services company with \$1.7 trillion in assets. Founded in 1852 and headquartered in San Francisco, Wells Fargo provides banking, insurance, investments, mortgage, and consumer and commercial finance through 8,700 locations, 12,800 ATMs, the internet ([wellsfargo.com](https://www.wellsfargo.com)) and mobile banking, and has offices in 36 countries to support customers who conduct business in the global economy. With approximately 266,000 team members, Wells Fargo serves one in three households in the United States. Wells Fargo & Company was ranked No. 30 on Fortune's 2015 rankings of America's largest corporations. Wells Fargo's vision is to satisfy all our

customers' financial needs and help them succeed financially. Wells Fargo perspectives are also available at [Wells Fargo Blogs](#) and [Wells Fargo Stories](#).

# THE STATE OF THE NATION'S HOUSING 2015



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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY



The US housing recovery lost momentum in 2014 as homeownership rates continued to fall, single-family construction remained near historic lows, and existing home sales cooled. In contrast, the rental market remained a bright spot, fueled by strong growth in renter households. With rents rising and incomes well below pre-recession levels, though, the number of housing cost-burdened renters set another record, far surpassing public efforts to provide affordable housing. And despite the rebound in much of the nation, a number of minority and low-income neighborhoods remain severely distressed.

### HOMEOWNERSHIP AT 20-YEAR LOWS

One telling indicator of the state of the nation's housing is the drop in the homeownership rate to just 64.5 percent last year, erasing nearly all of the increase in the previous two decades (**Figure 1**). The number of homeowners fell for the eighth straight year, signaling persistently weak demand in this key market segment. And the trend does not appear to be abating, with the national homeownership rate down to 63.7 percent in the first quarter of 2015.

The falloff is evident across nearly all age groups (**Figure 2**). In fact, the national homeownership rate remains as high as it is only because the baby boomers (born 1946–64) are now in the 50-plus age groups when homeownership rates are high, and because owners aged 65 and over have sustained historically high rates. In sharp contrast, it was generation X (also known as the baby bust, born 1965–84) that took most of the hit from the housing bust.

Just before the crash, younger gen-Xers were in the prime first-time homebuying years while older members of this generation were at the stage when households tend to trade up or make significant improvements to their existing homes. When prices plummeted, many of these owners had little or no equity to weather the recession. As a result, homeownership rates among gen-Xers—now mostly in the 35–44 and 45–54 year-old age groups—have fallen further than those of any other age group, and stand 4–5 percentage points below rates among same-aged households 20 years ago. Whether these households eventually catch up to the baby boomers in terms of homeownership is unknown.


With the gen-Xers accounting for such a significant share of the first-time and trade-up markets, the drop in their homeownership rates may well be a more critical factor in the ongoing weakness of the owner-occupied segment than the slow transition of the millennial generation (born 1985–2004) into homebuying. This is not to say, however, that the millennials do not face their own financial hurdles to homeownership. Over the span of just 10 years, the share of renters aged 25–34 with cost burdens (paying more than 30 percent of their incomes for housing) increased from 40 percent to 46 percent, while the share with severe



FIGURE 1

### The National Homeownership Rate Has Fallen Back to 1993 Levels...

Homeownership Rate (Percent)




Source: JCHS tabulations of US Census Bureau, Housing Vacancy Surveys.

FIGURE 2

### ...But Rates for Most Age Groups Are Well Below That Point

Change in Homeownership Rate (Percentage points)



Age of Household Head

● 25-34 ● 35-44 ● 45-54 ● 55-64 ● 65 and Over

Source: JCHS tabulations of US Census Bureau, Housing Vacancy Surveys.

burdens (paying more than 50 percent of income) rose from 19 percent to 23 percent. During roughly the same period, the share of renters aged 25–34 with student loan debt jumped from 30 percent in 2004 to 41 percent in 2013, with the average amount of debt up 50 percent, to \$30,700.

Several other factors have also contributed to the substantial decline in homeownership. Steady erosion of household incomes since the start of the recession is one key ingredient, and restricted access to financing is another. Facing heightened costs from delinquent loans, lenders are reluctant to lend to borrowers with less than stellar credit. Indeed, Urban Institute estimates for 2001–13 indicate a 37 percent drop in home purchase loans among borrowers with scores between 660 and 720, compared with a 9 percent decrease among borrowers with higher scores. While some of this stringency may arise from more prudent assessment of borrower creditworthiness, the magnitude of the declines—along with the pristine performance of recently originated loans—suggests that a significant portion reflects undue tightening of credit.

### RENTAL MARKET BOOM

The flip side of falling demand for owner-occupied housing has been exceptionally strong demand for rental units. According to the Housing Vacancy Survey’s count, renter household growth has averaged 770,000 annually since 2004. This makes 2004–14 the best 10-year period for renter growth since the late 1980s. While soaring demand is often attributed to the millennials’ preference to rent, households aged 45–64 in fact accounted for about twice the share of renter growth than households under the age of 35. Similarly, households in the top half of the income distribution, although generally more likely to own, contributed 43 percent of the growth in renters.

To meet the surge in demand, the number of single-family detached homes in the rental market increased by 3.2 million on net between 2004 and 2013. This shift accommodated more than half of the growth in occupied rentals over this period, lifting the single-family share from 31 percent to 35 percent. Developers also responded to soaring demand by steadily expanding the multifamily housing supply, adding 1.2 million apartment starts to the mix since 2010.

Despite this massive expansion of the stock, rental markets continued to tighten in 2014. The national vacancy rate dipped to 7.6 percent, its lowest point in nearly 20 years. As a result, rents rose at a 3.2 percent rate last year—twice the pace of overall inflation (Figure 3). MPF Research estimates that vacancy rates for professionally managed apartments were even lower, at 4.6 percent, and fueled even larger rent increases of 3.8 percent.

Based on these strong fundamentals, apartment building prices rose for the fifth consecutive year in 2014, up 15 percent. As measured by Moody’s/RCA Commercial Property Price Index, last year’s prices were 21 percent above their previous peak. Lending for multifamily properties followed suit, with the total

value of multifamily loan originations also rising 15 percent in 2014. Banks and thrifts accounted for more than half of the increase in multifamily mortgage debt outstanding.

With no signs of a slowdown in renter household growth, rental markets are likely to remain tight in the near term. If strong job growth continues, rental demand could get another lift as increasing numbers of young adults move out of their parents'

homes and into their own. Even so, the supply of new apartments should continue to grow as completions catch up with starts, which would help to moderate future increases in rents.

#### THE LAGGING SINGLE-FAMILY RECOVERY

But the robustness of the multifamily market has not been enough to lift overall construction volumes anywhere near their historic average (Figure 4). A little over one million housing units were started last year—a significant threshold by today's standards. But until the recent downturn, this would have been the lowest total in the past half-century.

Virtually all of the weakness is due to low levels of single-family construction, with starts increasing only 5 percent for the year. In contrast, multifamily starts remained on a strong upward trajectory, rising 16 percent on top of substantial gains each year since 2010. In fact, more multifamily units were started in 2014 than in any year since 1989.


The softness in the owner-occupied market is also evident in the 3 percent drop in existing home sales in 2013–14. The silver lining, however, is a shift in the composition of sales, marked by a slowdown in distress-related sales and a modest uptick in traditional sales. Indeed, Metrostudy data show a 10 percent drop in cash sales and a 15 percent drop in sales of bank-owned properties, along with a 3 percent rise in mortgaged purchases of non-bank-owned homes.

Nevertheless, the lingering effects of the housing crash are clear. Despite the rebound in home prices, many homeowners are still left with negative or limited equity. CoreLogic pegs the number of

FIGURE 3

### With Vacancy Rates on the Decline, Rent Increases Continue to Outpace Inflation

Percent Change




Source: US Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

FIGURE 4

### Despite the Strength of Multifamily Construction, Housing Starts Remain Near Historic Lows

Construction Starts (Thousands of units)



Source: US Census Bureau, New Residential Construction data.

owners with less than 20 percent equity at 15 million. Since these owners would be hard pressed to cover the costs of selling their homes and also come up with a downpayment on another property, they are effectively shut out of the housing market.

And with so many other would-be trade-up buyers constrained by tight credit conditions, it is no surprise that inventories of


existing homes on the market are so limited. April 2015 marked the 32nd straight month that existing homes for sale held below a six-month supply, the traditional measure of a balanced market. And with home price appreciation slowing in 2014, growth in the number of owners that decide to sell may also decelerate. At the same time, though, more modest price appreciation will help to keep homeownership affordable, particularly if interest rates rise as the economy nears full employment. Of course, without more inventory, would-be homebuyers have limited opportunities to take advantage of these conditions. In assessing the state of the housing market recovery, the existing home inventory is a key metric to watch.

The weak single-family market reflects a number of short-term conditions, including harsh winter weather and higher interest rates in the early months of 2014, along with rising home prices over the course of the year. But the long-term decline in household income is a more critical factor. Despite steady job growth since 2010 and a drop in unemployment to less than 6 percent, the labor market recovery has yet to generate meaningful income gains. At last measure in 2013, median household income was \$51,900—still 8 percent below the 2007 level in real terms and equivalent to 1995 levels. Still, there were encouraging signs in early 2015 that wage growth may be picking up, a trend that would clearly help to bolster all segments of the housing market.

FIGURE 5

### Household Growth Appears to Be Picking Up

Annual Household Growth (Millions)



Note: Estimates are four-quarter rolling averages of year-over-year growth.  
Source: JCHS tabulations of US Census Bureau, Housing Vacancy Surveys.


#### HOUSEHOLD GROWTH AND FUTURE HOUSING DEMAND

Despite conflicting reports from the major government surveys, household growth may be reviving. The timeliest of the sources,

FIGURE 6

### The Changing Age Distribution of the Population Is Reshaping Housing Demand

Household Growth (Millions)




● 1990-2010 ● JCHS Projection for 2010-2030

Sources: JCHS tabulations of US Census Bureau, Decennial Censuses; JCHS 2013 Household Projections.

FIGURE 7

### Even Moderate-Income Renters Struggle to Afford Housing in High-Cost Metros

Share of Households with Cost Burdens (Percent)



Notes: Cost burdens are defined as housing costs of more than 30% of household income. Households with zero or negative income are assumed to have burdens, while renters paying no cash rent are assumed to be without burdens. The ten highest-cost metros are ranked by median monthly gross rents.  
Source: Table W-4.

the Housing Vacancy Survey, indicates that after running at about a 500,000 annual pace for much of 2014, a strong fourth quarter brought household growth to about 800,000 for the year (Figure 5). While such a dramatic upturn in one quarter is unlikely, other indicators of strengthening rental demand over the course of the year are consistent with an uptick in household growth.

Moreover, two of the major trends contributing to the recent slowdown in household growth—declines in headship rates among young adults and in net immigration—appear to be reversing. Recent surveys suggest that the share of young adults moving into independent households is stabilizing. In combination with the aging of the millennials into their 20s and early 30s, this sets the stage for stronger household growth. Meanwhile, net immigration was close to the one-million mark in 2014 for the first time since 2007.

With headship rates firming and immigration resuming, the Joint Center for Housing Studies projects that household growth will return to its longer-run average of just under 1.2 million annually in 2015–25. The sheer size of the millennial generation—already larger than the baby-boom generation at the same stage of life—will drive most of this growth. Moreover, these projections assume no increase in today’s lower headship rates for young adults. If rates of living independently among this age group do rebound, household growth will be even stronger in the decade ahead.

The millennials are now adding to the ranks of renters and will eventually spur demand for first-time homeownership. As the oldest members of this generation turn 30 this year and the economy continues to recover, that demand should begin to emerge more strongly. But given the diversity of the millennial generation and the persistently large gaps in white-minority homeownership rates, many of these households may find it difficult to make the transition from renting to owning.

Meanwhile, the baby boomers are moving into their retirement years (Figure 6). A large majority will likely remain in their single-family homes for the time being, implying lower turnover in the housing market and higher spending on remodeling of existing homes. In another decade, though, the oldest members of this generation will be in their late 70s, a time of life when living independently often becomes difficult. By 2025, the large and growing population of seniors is likely to drive up demand for alternative housing arrangements that offer a combination of affordability, accessibility, and supportive services.

#### THE SPREAD OF RENTER COST BURDENS

Even before the Great Recession, both the number and share of US households paying more than 30 percent of income for housing were on the rise. But the cost-burdened share of homeowners began to recede in 2010, not only because many over-leveraged households lost their homes to foreclosure, but also because low interest rates helped to reduce monthly mortgage costs. As a result, the cost-burdened share of homeowners fell 5 percentage points in 2010–13, to about one quarter.

The cost-burdened share of renters, in contrast, held near record highs in the face of stagnating incomes and steadily rising rents. In 2013, almost half of all renters had housing cost burdens, including more than a quarter with severe burdens (paying more than 50 percent of income for housing). Although these shares remained slightly below their peaks in 2013, the total number of renters with housing cost burdens increased over the year because the total number of renters increased.


While long a condition of low-income households, cost burdens are spreading rapidly among moderate-income households (Figure 7). The cost-burdened share of renters with incomes in the \$30,000–45,000 range rose 7 percentage points between 2003 and 2013, to 45 percent. The increase for renters earning \$45,000–75,000 was almost as large at 6 percentage points, affecting one in five of these households. On average, in the ten highest-cost metros—including Boston, Los Angeles, New York, and San Francisco—three-quarters of renters earning \$30,000–45,000 and just under half of those earning \$45,000–75,000 had disproportionately high housing costs.

Much to their detriment, cost-burdened households are forced to cut back on food, healthcare, and other critical expenses. Affordable housing thus means a dramatic improvement in quality of life for households able to obtain it, but federal assis-

FIGURE 8

### Neighborhoods with the Largest Price Declines Are Predominantly Minority and Low Income

Share of Zip Codes (Percent)



Notes: Data include only zip codes with populations of at least 500. Low-income zip codes have a median income of less than 80% of the state median.  
Source: JCHS tabulations of US Census Bureau, 2009-13 Five-Year American Community Survey; Zillow's Home Value Index.

tance lags far behind need. Although funding for housing choice vouchers did increase in recent years, the cost of subsidies also rose, limiting growth in the number of federally assisted households. Meanwhile, severe cuts in the HOME program have hampered the ability of state and local governments to add new assisted units. To make matters worse, the affordability periods of more than 2 million assisted housing units are set to expire over the coming decade, and preserving this critically important resource will require a renewal of federal commitments. The Low Income Housing Tax Credit program—the key tool for both developing and preserving affordable rentals—is under increasing pressure from these competing needs.

#### PERSISTENT NEIGHBORHOOD DISTRESS

By a variety of measures, the national housing market has largely recovered from the worst of the downturn, but pockets of distress remain. For example, Zillow reports that home prices are within 11 percent of their previous peak nationally. In about a tenth of the nation's zip codes, however, prices are still more than 35 percent below peak. This has left 26 percent of homeowners in these neighborhoods underwater on their mortgages, roughly twice the share in the nation as a whole.

Similarly, mortgage delinquency rates nationwide have fallen by half since the foreclosure crisis peaked. But the remaining loans that are seriously delinquent (90 or more days past due or in foreclosure) are concentrated in relatively few neighborhoods. Indeed, the 10 percent of zip codes with the highest

number of seriously delinquent loans accounted for about half of all such loans nationally in 2014. While located in states across the country, many of these communities are concentrated in Florida, New York, New Jersey, and Illinois.

Distressed neighborhoods have disproportionately large shares of minority and low-income residents. In more than half of the areas where house prices were still depressed by more than 35 percent, minorities make up the majority of households (Figure 8). The median poverty rate is also close to 19 percent, or about twice that of all neighborhoods.

In many of these communities, disinvestment was widespread even before the housing crisis hit. Neighborhood revitalization thus requires comprehensive efforts to improve public services and infrastructure related to education, transportation, public safety, and employment. But affordable, good-quality housing must still be the cornerstone of any efforts to stabilize these long-distressed areas.

#### THE OUTLOOK

Despite the slowdown in 2014, the housing market recovery could regain steam in 2015 if continued employment growth helps to lift household incomes. But the lingering effects of the housing crash and Great Recession continue to impede the recovery. Millions of owners still have little or no equity in their homes and/or damaged credit histories, dampening demand in both the first-time buyer and trade-up markets. Although members of the millennial generation are starting to find their footing in the job market and helping to propel rental demand, many of these young adults are saddled with rent burdens and student loan payments that will slow their transition to homeownership.

Looser mortgage lending criteria would help. Given that a substantial majority of US households desire to own homes, the challenge is not whether they have the will to become homeowners but whether they will have the means. In the past year, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, along with the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), have taken a number of steps to expand low-downpayment lending to borrowers with lower credit scores. Whether these changes can spur a meaningful increase in lending is still a question.

Meanwhile, the persistent strength of rental demand has fueled steadily rising rents and a surge in multifamily construction. With renter household growth continuing to climb, the growing supply of new market-rate units is unlikely to outstrip demand in most metros, although some markets may be closer to saturation than others. In contrast, the shortfall in affordable housing remains substantial as the number of cost-burdened low-income renters continues to rise. Reversing this trend will require a firm recommitment of the nation to the goal of secure, decent, and affordable housing for all.



## HOUSING MARKETS



Although the news was mixed in 2014, housing markets made some advances that set the stage for moderate growth. Single-family construction continued to languish, but multifamily construction remained on a strong upward trajectory. New home sales were sluggish, but distress-related sales of existing homes fell sharply. In addition, rising home prices helped to reduce the share of underwater borrowers, and foreclosures were on the decline. Many homeowners with low-value houses, however, still faced the problem of negative equity.

### HOUSING CONSTRUCTION TRENDS

Homebuilding activity continued to increase in 2014, with housing starts up 8.5 percent (**Figure 9**). But because growth was from such a low base, this gain amounted to fewer than 80,000 additional units. And despite surpassing the one-million unit mark, residential construction for the year still lagged below any level posted from 1959 through 2007.

The weakness centered once again on the single-family side. Starts increased by just 30,300 units in 2013–14, to 647,900—which, up until 2008, would have been the lowest annual level in the postwar era. By comparison, multifamily starts continued their run, rising by 48,100 units to 355,400. Indeed, growth in construction of multifamily units last year was a little under 16 percent.

Reflecting the low level of residential construction in general, and of single-family homes in particular, the housing sector contributed only modestly to the economy in 2014. Residential fixed investment (RFI)—which includes homebuilding as well as homeowner spending on improvements—accounted for just 3.2 percent of GDP, significantly less than the 4.5 percent averaged in records dating back to 1969.

Despite its relatively small share of the economy, residential fixed investment has at times generated 15–20 percent of annual GDP growth. Last year, however, housing’s contribution decreased steadily as overall economic growth accelerated. For 2014 as a whole, RFI accounted for a negligible 0.05 percentage point of the 2.4 percent increase in GDP (about 2 percent), a significant drop from its 0.33 percentage point shares (about 14–15 percent) in 2012 and 2013.

With the weakness in construction, homeowner improvements continued to prop up residential spending. While government estimates vary, the Census Bureau and Bureau of Economic Analysis both report that homeowner outlays for improvements accounted for about a third of residential construction spending last year—down from nearly half at the 2011 peak, but still above the quarter averaged in 1993–2006.

FIGURE 9

## After a Surge in 2013, Nearly All Major Housing Indicators Slowed in 2014

	2012	2013	2014	Percent Change	
				2012-13	2013-14
<b>Residential Construction (Thousands of units)</b>					
Total Starts	781	925	1,003	18.5	8.5
Single-Family	535	618	648	15.4	4.9
Multifamily	245	307	355	25.3	15.7
Total Completions	649	764	884	17.7	15.6
Single-Family	483	569	620	17.8	8.9
Multifamily	166	195	264	17.4	35.3
<b>Construction Spending (Billions of dollars)</b>					
Residential Fixed Investment	447	519	550	16.1	5.9
<b>Home Sales</b>					
New (Thousands)	368	429	437	16.6	1.9
Existing (Millions)	4.7	5.1	4.9	9.2	-2.9
<b>Median Sales Price (Thousands of dollars)</b>					
New	252.8	273.3	282.8	8.1	3.5
Existing	182.3	200.3	208.3	9.9	4.0

Notes: Components may not add to total due to rounding. Dollar values are adjusted for inflation by the CPI-U for All Items.

Sources: US Census Bureau, New Residential Construction and New Residential Sales data; National Association of REALTORS®; Existing Home Sales; Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts.

### FALTERING HOME SALES

Behind the lackluster performance of single-family construction is the persistent weakness in new home sales. Sales of new single-family homes increased just 2 percent last year, a sharp slowdown from the 17 percent pace of 2013. At just 437,000 units, new home sales were still up more than 40 percent from the cyclical low in 2011, but roughly 30 percent below the annual averages in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s.

While not nearly as depressed as new home sales, existing home sales also lost momentum in 2014, falling to 4.9 million units. Indeed, the National Association of Realtors (NAR) reports a 2.9 percent drop for the year. Although significantly slower than in 2012 and 2013, the pace of existing home sales in 2014 was still almost 20 percent above the recessionary low in 2008.

The good news is that the softness in existing home sales largely reflects a decline in distress-related sales, suggesting that markets are stabilizing. Metrostudy data show dramatic declines in investor purchases as well as in all-cash sales and sales of bank-owned properties (**Figure 10**). At the same time, mortgaged home sales and regular (non-REO) re-sales to owner-occupants—the traditional foundation of the home sales market—were both up for the year.

Other sources confirm this trend. CoreLogic, for example, reports that the share of cash sales fell again in February 2015, marking 26 consecutive months of year-over-year declines. At 38 percent of home sales, cash sales were 9 percentage points below the 2011 peak, but still well above the 25 percent annual average before the housing boom and bust.

### THE DRAG OF LOW INVENTORIES


While the average number of homes for sale edged up 3.8 percent in 2014, the increase was apparently driven by the slowdown in sales rather than growth in the number of homes put on the market. Even so, the average supply increased to 5.2 months for the year, up from 4.9 months in 2013 but still under the 6.0 month level indicating market balance. Estimates through April, however, show that the for-sale inventory in early 2015 was back below year-earlier levels.

Several trends have combined to shrink the pool of homes available for sale. For one, many owners are unable to put their homes on the market because the price drop during the housing crash left them with little or no equity. According to CoreLogic, 10.8 percent of homeowners with mortgages were still underwater on their loans in the fourth quarter of 2014, and another 2.8 percent had less than 5 percent equity.

FIGURE 10

### A Steep Drop in Distress-Related Sales Drove the Slowdown in Overall Home Sales Last Year

Percent Change 2013–14




Note: REO sales are of real estate owned by lenders.  
Source: JCHS tabulations of Metrostudy data.

FIGURE 11

### The Aging of the Gen-X Population Has Reduced the Number of Homeowners Most Likely to Trade Up

Percent Change 2003–13



Source: JCHS tabulations of US Census Bureau, Current Population Surveys.

In addition, many homes remain stuck in the foreclosure process or held off market. The Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA) estimates that the number of homes in foreclosure nationwide exceeds 920,000 units. The Housing Vacancy Survey also shows no improvement in the share of vacant homes held off market in total or held off for “other reasons,” including foreclosure.

The lack of homes for sale also reflects decade-long trends. In particular, the aging of the population and declines in age-specific homeownership rates have drastically reduced the number of homeowners in their 30s and 40s—the age groups that traditionally account for more than half of all participants in the home-buying market. The replacement of the larger baby-boom generation by the smaller gen-X population in these key age groups has thus reduced the pool of owners most likely to put their homes on the market and to buy other properties. Indeed, the number of homeowners aged 35–39 (prime ages for new-home and trade-up buying) is down 23 percent from a decade ago (Figure 11).


At the same time, the changing age structure of the population implies lower residential mobility. Older households move less often than younger households, which means that fewer buy and sell homes. And while residential mobility rates have been falling for decades, the Great Recession accelerated the pace of decline, especially among homeowners. This trend extends to young adults, the age group with the highest propensity to move from one home to another.

Looking ahead, inventories of homes for sale could build as owners become more confident about the market. As it is, survey data from Fannie Mae indicate that 41 percent of respondents felt it was a good time to sell in the fourth quarter of 2014—a big improvement from the 11 percent share in the fourth quarter of 2011. In addition, many borrowers who lost their homes to foreclosure have had that blemish wiped from their credit reports, making them again eligible for FHA and other mortgages. This could provide a tailwind for the market. According to NAR estimates, up to 1.0 million such households have already restored their credit standing, and 1.5 million more could do so shortly. Still, several



FIGURE 12

### The Strength of New Home Prices Is Largely Due to the Weakness in Low-End Sales



Source: JCHS tabulations of US Census Bureau, New Residential Sales data.

factors—such as rising interest rates, low equity, or ongoing credit impairment—could have a contrary effect, leaving owners stuck in their current homes and keeping for-sale inventories tight.


#### PRICES ON THE RISE

While the volume of new homes built is near record lows, the prices of those homes have hit a record high. Even with the slowdown in appreciation from 8.1 percent in 2013 to 3.5 percent in 2014, the median sales price of new homes stood at \$283,000 last year—some 35 percent above the median sales price of existing single-family homes.

Rather than signaling a broadly healthy market, however, this record-setting price is largely due to changes in the size, quality, type, and location of new homes. Although the median price of new single-family homes sold last year was 31 percent above the 2009 cyclical low in nominal terms, the constant-quality price index for new homes was up only 14 percent. An increase in size appears to be the cause, with the typical new home 12.5 percent larger in 2013 than in 2009. This trend is especially evident in the Midwest, where the size of the typical new home increased nearly 25 percent in 2009–13, helping to give median prices a 43 percent lift over this period. Indeed, the rise in the median new home price reflects weak sales of moderately priced homes, which normally account for the majority of purchases (Figure 12). As a result, the median price of new homes could dip when sales of lower-end homes pick up again.

FIGURE 13

### While Existing Home Prices Continued to Rise in 2014, the Pace of Appreciation Slowed



Source: JCHS tabulations of CoreLogic Case-Shiller Home Price Indexes.

According to the National Association of Realtors, median prices for existing homes sold were up for the third consecutive year in 2014, rising 4.0 percent from 2013, to \$208,300. As in the new home market, existing home prices benefited not only from low inventories but also from strong demand for higher-quality units. MBA survey data indicate that the average loan size for home purchase applications increased even faster than house prices in 2012–14, and hit a record high in March 2015. Meanwhile, the jumbo mortgage segment largely drove the increases in the MBA Mortgage Credit Availability Index last year.


House price indexes that are less affected by changes in the mix of existing homes sold than the NAR measure also point to a slowdown in price appreciation in 2014. The CoreLogic Home Price Index, for example, shows a steady year-over-year cooling from 11.4 percent in January to 4.7 percent in December (Figure 13). Zillow reports a slightly smaller decline from 7.8 percent to 4.5 percent.

The relative easing of home price appreciation was apparent across the 20 metros tracked by the CoreLogic Case-Shiller indexes. At the high end, San Francisco posted a healthy 9 percent rise in prices for the year, albeit significantly below the 23 percent jump in 2013. Price increases in Las Vegas also slowed from 26 percent to 7 percent in 2014. Meanwhile, Chicago and Washington, DC, were at the bottom of the list for home price appreciation, joined by formerly high-flying Phoenix.

FIGURE 14

### Although the Number of Underwater Homeowners Is Shrinking, Many Borrowers Still Have Little Equity

Households (Millions)



Equity Level ● 5-20 Percent ● Less than 5 Percent ● Negative

Note: Annual household counts are as of the fourth quarter.  
Source: JCHS tabulations of CoreLogic data.

Price appreciation within the bottom tier of homes generally outpaced the rest of the market, in some cases significantly. For example, prices for the lowest tier of existing homes in Chicago were up 12 percent in 2014, compared with just 1 percent in the metro area as a whole. Similarly, bottom-tier home prices in Atlanta climbed 15 percent last year, three times the rate of the metro-wide increase. The high appreciation rate in this tier of the market likely reflects the decline in distress-related sales, as well as the widespread shortage of low-priced homes for sale.

#### NEGATIVE EQUITY PRESSURES

But despite their recent upturn, prices of low-tier homes remain far below their mid-2000s peaks, leaving many owners with negative equity. According to CoreLogic data, 16 percent of homeowners with mortgaged units valued at less than \$200,000 were underwater on their loans at the end of 2014, compared with just 6 percent of owners of higher-valued homes. Zillow noted a similar pattern at year-end, finding that 27 percent of households with mortgages owning bottom-tier homes had negative equity, compared with 15 percent of those owning middle-tier homes and 9 percent of those owning top-tier homes.

Negative equity remains widespread in states where house prices fell the most during the downturn. Shares of underwater loans are predictably highest in states such as Nevada (24 percent), Florida (23 percent), and Arizona (19 percent), although they are also high (16 percent) in Illinois and Rhode Island. These five states alone account for more than a third of underwater mortgages. At the metro level, Tampa and Phoenix have the largest shares of negative equity loans, followed by Chicago.

Within metro areas, negative equity problems are highly concentrated in minority and low-income neighborhoods. In the 10 percent of zip codes with the highest rates of negative equity, the average minority share of the population is 51 percent and the typical household income averages just 83 percent of the state median. And at the household level, the 2013 American Housing Survey indicates that 29 percent of black and 25 percent of Hispanic homeowners were upside down on their mortgages, compared with 16 percent of white and Asian/other owners. Shares of negative equity loans are highest among homeowners aged 25-44 (19 percent), but also significant among homeowners aged 65 and over (a little over 11 percent).

Nationally, however, consistent increases in existing home prices have reduced the share of underwater owners from a peak of more than 25 percent in 2011 to 10.8 percent in the fourth quarter of 2014. This represents a drop from over 12 million homeowners to 5.4 million (Figure 14).

The number of homeowners with near-negative equity (less than 5 percent) also improved from 2.4 million in 2011 to 1.4 million in 2014. Like underwater homeowners, these households are stuck in place because they are unable to cover the costs of selling their homes. Indeed, even homeowners with low equity (5-20 percent) may not be able to afford to sell or qualify for additional financing to make home improvements or cover other needs. Troublingly, the number of households in this category has held between 8 million and 9 million since 2011. At the end of 2014, the total number of households with low, near-negative, and negative equity still exceeded 15 million.

#### REDUCTION IN DISTRESSED BORROWERS


On the positive side, the share of loans entering the foreclosure process in 2014 was at its lowest level since 2006. In addition, the share of severely delinquent loans (90 or more days past due) or in foreclosure dropped 1 percentage point in the fourth quarter, to 4.5 percent. For the year overall, the number of severely delinquent loans was down 11 percent and the number of homes in foreclosure was down 20 percent, bringing the year-end total below two million for the first time since 2007.

Some of the states hardest hit by the foreclosure crisis led the drop (Figure 15). In Florida, the foreclosure inventory fell by 37 percent in 2014 and now stands 68 percent below the peak in 2010. The numbers of homes in foreclosure were also off 23 percent in Arizona and 17 percent in California, leaving inventories in both states more than 80 percent below peaks.

In contrast, progress in certain northern states has been slow, in part because of protracted foreclosure processes. In New York, the number of foreclosed homes shrank by 10 percent in 2014 but remained just 16 percent below peak levels. In New Jersey, the inventory of foreclosed homes was unchanged last year, stuck just 14 percent below the peak. As a result, New Jersey overtook Florida as the state with the largest share of mortgaged

FIGURE 15

**Foreclosure Inventories Have Dropped Sharply, Especially in the Hardest-Hit States**



Source: JCHS tabulations of Mortgage Bankers Association, National Delinquency Surveys.

homes in foreclosure. It should be noted, however, that New York and New Jersey have also posted below-average improvement in 60- and 90-day delinquencies and above-average rates of 30-day delinquencies, implying that high delinquency rates are a factor on their own.

**THE OUTLOOK**

Given how far housing markets have to go to regain even pre-boom levels, the slowdown in construction, sales, and price appreciation in 2014 set off some alarms. Indeed, the housing supply expanded less in the previous 10 years than in any decade since the 1940s, while existing home sales were running at late-1990s rates.

Even so, a deceleration from the robust house price appreciation of 2013 could be a sign that markets are returning to balance as a result of stable interest rates and fewer sales of distressed homes. With foreclosures and delinquency rates on the decline and steady job growth holding promise of wage gains, housing markets thus appear poised for a new phase of growth mirroring that of the overall economy. But like that of the economy, the recovery is likely to continue at only a moderate pace until income growth picks up and rising home prices help to reduce the number of underwater and distressed homeowners.



## DEMOGRAPHIC DRIVERS



As the US population becomes both older and more diverse in the coming decades, the demand for alternative types of housing will increase. Although the baby boomers will continue to drive much of this shift, the millennial generation will play an increasingly large role in the rental and first-time buyer markets. In fact, household growth—the key driver of housing demand—among this younger generation finally appears to be picking up. Many of these new households, however, face stagnant incomes and high student debt that limit their opportunities to make the transition from renting to owning.

### LONG-TERM TRENDS

Two long-term demographic trends have wide-ranging implications for housing demand: the overall aging of the US population and growth in the minority share of households. The median age of the population already stands at 37.8 years and is projected to reach 41.0 years in 2035 as the baby-boom generation (born 1946–64) replaces the much smaller silent generation in the older age groups (**Figure 16**). Over the next two decades, the number of adults aged 70 and over will thus increase by 91 percent.

The existing housing stock is unprepared to meet the needs of a large and growing senior population. Many older adults live alone, have at least one type of disability, and have limited resources to pay for suitable housing. As a result, the demand for units that are affordable, accessible, and provide social connection as well as supportive services will grow increasingly acute over the next two decades.


At the other end of the age spectrum, the large millennial generation (born 1985–2004) will have its own impact on housing markets. At more than 86 million, the number of people in this age group—already exceeding that of the baby boomers at similar ages—will increase over the next 20 years as immigration (typically of young adults) continues to pick up. Although they are only now beginning to live on their own, millennials will likely form even more households than the gen-Xers and even the baby boomers (**Figure 17**).

Since renting is usually the first step in independent living, the millennials have already contributed to the robust growth in renter households over the past few years. Indeed, with their lower homeownership rates and slower transitions to marriage and childrearing, members of this generation will continue to have a profound impact on rental demand. But like generations before them, the millennials are likely to participate more fully in the first-time buyer and trade-up markets as they move into their 30s and 40s. Over the next two decades, the aging of the millennials will increase the population in the key 30–49 year-old age group by 17 percent.

Millennials are also driving the increase in racial and ethnic diversity. The minority share of this generation is already

FIGURE 16

### The US Population Will Continue to Shift into Older Age Groups Over the Next Two Decades



Source: JCHS tabulations of US Census Bureau, Population Projections.

at 45 percent, significantly higher than the 40 percent share among gen-Xers and 28 percent share among baby boomers. Hispanics alone make up 22 percent of the millennial generation, compared with 19 percent of gen-X and 10 percent of the baby boom. Hispanic millennials also outnumber Hispanic baby boomers by more than two to one. And given that most of the households lost to death and other life events in the decades ahead are white, minorities are expected to drive 76 percent of net household growth over the next 10 years and fully 85 percent over the next 20.

The growing diversity of US households highlights the need for alternative types of housing that address a broad range of cultural preferences. For example, minority households are more likely to be multigenerational, suggesting increased demand for larger homes that accommodate these family groupings. In addition, if minorities continue to have lower incomes and wealth than white households, their growing presence in the market will increase the need for more affordable housing options as well as for mortgage products suited to their financial circumstances.

#### UPTURN IN IMMIGRATION

Much of the growing diversity of the US population reflects the wave of immigration that began in the 1970s and continues to this day. The foreign born represent a significant source of housing demand, accounting for about 40 percent of household growth in the second half of the 1990s and nearly a third of household growth in the 2000s.

Following a severe slowdown after the Great Recession, net international immigration revived from just 704,000 in 2011 to 996,000 in 2014. With this rebound, Asians now make up the largest share of immigrants while Hispanics—particularly from Mexico—continue to lose share. Although still below the 1.2 million annual average in 2000-07, the pace of immigration is projected to pick up in the decades ahead and add significantly to the growth in housing demand (Figure 18).

#### SIGNS OF STRONGER HOUSEHOLD GROWTH


While the three major Census Bureau surveys disagree on the exact number, household growth has held in the 600,000-800,000 range since 2008—far below the 1.2-1.4 million annual average of previous decades. Measures of household growth continued to show only modest increases for much of 2014. As the year came to a close, however, the Housing Vacancy Survey reported a marked pickup that brought the pace of growth closer to its long-run potential. While the magnitude of the sudden increase is suspect, other data—such as the increase in rental unit absorptions over the past year—also suggest that household growth is beginning to revive.

Among the demographic trends that should help to sustain stronger growth in households is the aging of the millennials into young adulthood, the phase when individuals are most likely to move out of their parents' homes into their own. Indeed, with the millennial population maturing and displacing the smaller gen-X population, the number of adults in the 20-29 year-old age group rose by 4.7 million between 2003


FIGURE 17

### The Large, Diverse Millennial Generation Is Only Now Beginning to Form Households

Population in 2013 (Millions)



Households in 2013 (Millions)




Note: White, black, and Asian/other households are non-Hispanic. Hispanic households may be of any race.  
Sources: JCHS tabulations of US Census Bureau, 2013 American Community Survey.

FIGURE 18

### Growth in the Foreign-Born Population Is Approaching the Latest Census Bureau Projections

Annual Net International Immigration (Millions)



Source: JCHS tabulations of US Census Bureau, Population Projections.

and 2013. Assuming these young adults had formed independent households at the same rate as their predecessors in 2003, this increase would imply the addition of 1.8 million households. Instead, the housing crash and Great Recession reduced household growth among this age group to just 550,000—fully 1.2 million fewer than population growth alone would suggest.

But with the economy recovering and the labor market making steady gains, employment of younger adults is on the rise. In the first quarter of 2015, the unemployment rate for adults in their late 20s and early 30s was a full percentage point lower than a year earlier, and the number of employed adults in this age group was 1 million higher. This is good news for housing demand, given that employed younger adults are 50 percent more likely than unemployed younger adults to head independent households.

Income, of course, is also a critical factor. More than half of adults aged 25–34 taking home at least \$45,000 a year head their own households, compared with just over a third of those earning less than \$15,000. The pickup in wage growth among younger adults from 0.2 percent in 2013 to 2.4 percent in 2014 should thus continue to lift household formation rates among this key age group.


#### HOUSEHOLD INCOME INCHING UP

Six years after the recession’s official end, households are just starting to see modest income growth. The latest estimates indi-

FIGURE 19

## Median Household Income Has Receded to 1995 Levels in Real Terms

2013 Dollars



Note: Incomes are adjusted for inflation using the CPI-U for All Items.  
Source: JCHS tabulations of US Census Bureau, Current Population Surveys.

cate that real median household income rose 2 percent between 2012 and 2013, to \$51,900. More recently, average hourly earnings and the employment cost index both edged up in the first quarter of 2015. While many workers are still under-employed or have left the labor force, the drop in unemployment to less than 6 percent could help to put upward pressure on wages.

Full recovery in incomes, however, remains a long way off. At last measure in 2013, the real median household income was 8 percent below the 2007 peak and equivalent to inflation-adjusted levels in 1995 (Figure 19). And given that recent income growth has not been shared equally, the setbacks for some age groups have been larger than for others. For example, real incomes for households aged 25–34 are back to mid-1990s levels, while those for households aged 35–44 are at mid-1980s levels. Worse still, real incomes for households aged 45–54 are at their lowest level since the late 1960s.

And although households aged 55–64 did not experience the largest declines, they are the only age group that did not see income growth in 2013. Instead, their median income fell 3 percent last year to stand 7 percent below the 2003 level. Weak income growth among this age group is particularly concerning because these adults are at the stage in life when they should be saving for retirement.

Median incomes for each major racial/ethnic group have also fallen significantly. Although recovering the most (1 percent) in 2010–13, incomes of black households were still nearly 8 percent below their level in 2003. Incomes for Asian and other minority households were down just 1 percent over

this period, leaving their incomes 6 percent below a decade earlier. In contrast, the incomes for whites (up less than 1 percent) and Hispanics (down 1 percent) both stand 4 percent below decade-earlier levels. Overall, the median household income of minorities in 2013 was \$17,600 (30 percent) below that of whites.

The depressed incomes of households in general and of racial/ethnic minorities in particular reflect a shift in the income distribution. Even after accounting for inflation, the number of households earning under \$25,000 rose 18 percent over the decade while the number earning \$75,000 or more was up only 4 percent.

Part of the increase in the number of lower-income households reflects the 14 percent rise in the number of people living alone between 2004 and 2014. Last year, single persons accounted for just 6 percent of households in the top income decile, but fully 58 percent of those in the bottom decile. In contrast, nearly three-quarters of households in the top income decile included two or more earners. Of these top-income households, over 80 percent were married couples.

The trend toward longer work lives should help to lift incomes. More and more older adults are working past the traditional retirement age. As a result, the real median income of households aged 65 and over jumped 18 percent between 2004 and 2013, largely due to increased labor force participation. Some 18 percent of older households were headed by a working adult in 2014, an increase of 5 percentage points since the 1990s.

### HOUSING EQUITY AND HOUSEHOLD WEALTH

With house prices on the upswing, home equity is again contributing to household net wealth. According to Federal Reserve Board flow of funds data and taking inflation into account, aggregate home equity was up 8 percent in 2014 and a whopping 60 percent since 2010. By comparison, household net wealth rose 3 percent in 2014 and 22 percent since 2010.

Like income growth, the increases in net wealth have not been equally shared. The Survey of Consumer Finances reports that median household wealth actually fell 1 percent from 2010 to 2013, suggesting that growth was concentrated among households at the top of the distribution. At just \$81,400, median net household wealth is down 40 percent from the 2007 peak in real terms and at its lowest level in more than two decades.

This decline is largely due to the housing market crash. Median home equity in 2013 was 32 percent below the 2007 peak and back to levels in the late 1990s. Hispanics were hit hardest with a 48 percent drop in housing wealth in 2007–13—significantly worse than the 28–30 percent decline among black and white owners. As a result, the real median housing wealth of Hispanic homeowners in 2013 stood 5 percent below the level in 1992.

This drop clearly demonstrates how outsized dependence on home equity as a financial cushion can leave owners—particularly low-income and minority owners—vulnerable to falling prices. Indeed, home equity contributes a disproportionate share (81 percent) of net wealth among the typical owner in the lowest income quartile, compared with just under a quarter (24 percent) among those in the highest income quartile. Housing wealth also represents a much larger share of the net worth of the typical black or Hispanic homeowner (58 percent) than of the typical white homeowner (37 percent).

Even so, home equity remains a key source of household wealth, accounting for \$80,000 of the \$195,500 median net wealth of homeowners in 2013. By comparison, the median net wealth of renters was just \$5,400. The difference in net wealth between owners and renters is particularly stark among low-income and minority households (Figure 20).

### DECLINING MORTGAGE DEBT

Homeowners continued to pare down their mortgage debt in 2014. The Federal Reserve Board’s flow of funds data show that real aggregate mortgage debt totaled about \$9.4 trillion last year, a 2 percent decline from 2013 and a 13 percent drop from 2010. While reflecting in part the ongoing decline in homeownership, the outstanding mortgage balance of the typical owner also fell in 2013, down to \$115,000, or 4 percent below the recent peak.

Older homeowners are one group for which high mortgage debt is still a concern because they are entering their retirement years with declining incomes. More than a third (38 percent) of owners aged 65 and over had mortgages in 2013, up from a little over a quarter in 2001. Moreover, the median amount of debt they carried doubled over this period in real terms. At the same time, the real median equity of older owners in 2013 was down to \$125,000—lower than in any year since 1998. Having less equity and large mortgage payments late in life is a troubling prospect for households on fixed incomes.

### STUDENT DEBT ON THE RISE

Even as households shed mortgage debt, consumer debt balances continued to climb last year. According to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, non-housing debt climbed 6 percent to \$3.0 trillion in 2014—a 12 percent increase from 2004 in real terms.


Student loans account for virtually all of this growth. Fully 20 percent of all US households carried student loan debt in 2013, more than double the 9 percent share in 1989. Most of the growth, however, was among younger adults. In 2001, 22 percent of households aged 20–39 carried an outstanding student loan balance. In 2013, that share was 39 percent (Figure 21). While nearly two-thirds (64 percent) of younger adults with student loan debt owed less than \$25,000 in 2013, a fifth (19 percent) had balances of at least \$50,000—more than three times the share in 2001.

FIGURE 20


## Despite the Downturn, Housing Remains the Primary Form of Wealth for Low-Income and Minority Households

Median Net Wealth (Thousands of 2013 dollars)

### Low-Income Households



### Minority Households




● Homeowner Housing Wealth ● Homeowner Non-Housing Wealth ● Renter Total Wealth

Notes: Non-housing wealth includes cash savings, savings in retirement accounts, and stocks and bonds. Low-income households are in the bottom income quartile based on equal fourths of all households. Values are adjusted for inflation using the CPI-U for All Items. Source: JCHS tabulations of Federal Reserve Board, Surveys of Consumer Finances.



FIGURE 21

### Growing Shares of Young Households Are Carrying Higher Levels of Student Loan Debt



Notes: Student debt is reported for the entire household. Average outstanding student loan balances exclude households without debt. Source: JCHS tabulations of Federal Reserve Board, Surveys of Consumer Finances.

Student loan payments often take a significant bite out of household finances. In 2013, 8 percent of all households repaying their student loans had high debt burdens (payments exceeding 14 percent of monthly income). The share of renters aged 20–39 with these debt burdens was especially high at 19 percent. Given that renters already have very modest cash reserves, the growth in student debt burdens further undermines their ability to build savings for emergencies, retirement, or downpayments on homes.

Another concern is the substantial growth in the number of young households with student debt but lacking a degree. Over half of households in their 20s and 30s with student loan debt in 2013 did not have four-year college degrees, and fully 15 percent were in the highly burdened category. Moreover, households are more likely to carry student loan debt later in life. Between 2001 and 2013, the share of households in their 40s still saddled with student loans increased from 11 percent to 23 percent, while the share in their 50s increased from 4 to 9 percent.

#### THE OUTLOOK

Even if the low household formation rates of 2011–13 persist, changes in the size and age distribution of the adult population imply growth of about 1.2 million households per year in 2015–25. Over this period, the median millennial will move from the 20–24 year-old age group (where just one in every four persons has formed an independent household) to the 30–34 year-old age group (where half of the population lives independently). By 2035, given headship rates similar to those of previous generations, the millennials are expected to form more than 30 million new households. In the near term, though, high student loan debt loads and weak income growth will constrain the ability of these younger households to afford housing, whether they choose to rent or buy.

Meanwhile, the aging baby boomers will lift the number of older households aged 65 and over 42 percent by 2025, and double the number aged 80 and over by 2035. This unprecedented growth in the number of senior households will test the ability of the nation’s housing stock to address the spiraling need for affordable, accessible, and supportive units. For those seniors that choose to age in place, rising debt and wealth constraints may leave many retired homeowners struggling to meet their mortgage payments.



# HOMEOWNERSHIP



The downtrend in homeownership stretched to a decade in 2014. Rates fell across nearly all age groups, incomes, household types, and markets despite the affordability of first-time homebuying. Recent trends point to continued declines in the share of households owning homes, although signs of a turnaround in household income growth and some easing of lending constraints may mean that the pace of decline is set to slow.

## HOMEOWNERSHIP TRENDS

The national homeownership rate slid for the 10th consecutive year in 2014, off 0.6 percentage point to 64.5 percent (**Figure 22**). The downtrend continued in early 2015 with a first-quarter reading of just 63.7 percent—the lowest quarterly rate since early 1993. The 233,000 drop in homeowner households last year brought the total decline since the 2006 peak to 1.7 million.

The weakness in homeownership extends across all regions of the country and nearly all metropolitan areas, including inner cities, suburbs, and non-metro areas. And while recent estimates suggest that homeownership rates may be firming in some areas, there is no evidence so far of a significant rebound.

With the exception of Detroit, major metros with the largest declines in homeownership are all within the Sunbelt states, where high foreclosure rates amplified the impacts of the Great Recession. At the top of the list are Las Vegas and New Orleans (both with an 8.5 percentage-point drop in homeownership), and Bakersfield (with an 8.3 percentage-point drop). The worst-hit markets generally experienced a much sharper cycle in home prices and incomes than metros that were more sheltered from the housing boom and bust.

## NEIGHBORHOOD LOSSES


Of the nearly 50,000 census tracts for which consistent data are available, roughly one-tenth saw at least a 10 percentage-point drop in homeownership between 2009 and 2013, with the average neighborhood in this category posting a 14 percentage-point decline. Although starting out slightly above the national average, homeownership rates in these neighborhoods ended the period at just 54 percent. As a result, these 5,000 or so communities accounted for nearly 95 percent of the decline in homeowner households in 2009–13.

While found across the country, more than a quarter of the communities with outsized homeownership declines are located in the populous states of California, Texas, and New York. The states with the highest shares, however, are those hardest hit by the foreclosure crisis, including Nevada, Arizona, and Georgia (**Figure 23**).

FIGURE 22

### The Recent Homeownership Rate Decline Has Erased the Increases in the 1990s and 2000s

US Homeownership Rate (Percent)




Source: JCHS tabulations of US Census Bureau, Housing Vacancy Surveys.

FIGURE 23

### Nevada and Arizona Had the Highest Concentration of Neighborhoods with Severe Homeownership Rate Declines

Share of Tracts with Homeownership Rate Declines of at Least 10 Percent (Percent)



Note: Data include only census tracts with consistent geographic boundaries and at least 500 people in both survey periods.  
Source: JCHS tabulations of US Census Bureau, 2005-9 and 2009-13 Five-Year American Community Surveys.

Communities with the largest losses of homeowners were formerly similar to the typical US neighborhood. For example, the high-distress areas had only slightly higher average vacancy rates (12.2 percent vs. 10.9 percent), slightly lower median household incomes (\$54,000 vs. \$59,000), slightly lower median home values (\$238,000 vs. \$254,000), and identical shares of single-family homes (69 percent). The biggest difference, however, is that these neighborhoods had a significantly higher share of minority residents. Given the concentration of risky lending and foreclosures in these neighborhoods, it is no surprise that minority communities suffered the most severe losses in homeownership after the downturn.

A large decline in homeowner households in any community is clearly cause for concern. Not only does it reflect the uprooting of a substantial share of existing residents, but the financial stresses that both produced and resulted from the foreclosure crisis further undermine neighborhood stability. Indeed, with the sharp falloff in owning, these communities have experienced the greatest declines in incomes and increases in poverty since the crash. Coupled with large losses of household wealth, these neighborhoods have also seen a great reduction in buying power to support local businesses and invest in the housing stock. In consequence, there is a continued need for policy responses to mitigate the lingering effects of the housing crisis at both the household and community levels.

#### DECLINES AMONG KEY HOUSEHOLD GROUPS

While the national homeownership rate is now back to its 1993 level, rates for key household groups have receded even further (Figure 24). Indeed, the rate for 35-44 year olds is down 5.4 percentage points from the 1993 level and back to a level not seen since the 1960s. These households were in the prime first-time homebuying years just before the housing crisis hit, and therefore particularly vulnerable to the drop in home values. With household incomes falling as the recession began, many homeowners in this age group were unable to keep up with their mortgage payments. For those who had not yet bought homes, the ensuing decade was a challenging time to enter the market.


In contrast, homeownership rates among older households have held nearly steady and remain above levels from the mid-1990s. In combination with their growing numbers, consistently high homeownership rates among households aged 65 and over have helped to prop up the national rate. Indeed, if not for the aging of the population, the overall homeownership rate would have dropped even further than it has.

Meanwhile, the growing minority share of the population is exerting a downward pull on the US homeownership rate because of their lower rates of owning. In addition, homeownership rates among minority households fell much more sharply after the housing market crash, reversing some of the modest progress made toward closing the white-minority homeownership gap since the early 1990s. As of 2014, the homeownership rate for minorities as a group remains 25.5 percentage points

FIGURE 24

### The Drop in Homeownership Among 35–44 Year Olds Has Been Especially Severe

Change in Homeownership Rate 1993–2014 (Percentage points)




Source: JCHS tabulations of US Census Bureau, Housing Vacancy Surveys.

FIGURE 25

### Today’s Younger Households Are Increasingly Likely to Have Characteristics Associated with Lower Homeownership Rates

Change in Share of 25–34 Year-Old Households 2003–13 (Percentage points)



Source: JCHS tabulations of US Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), American Housing Surveys.

lower than that of whites. Nonetheless, despite falling homeownership rates in recent years, the numbers of Hispanic and Asian/other households owning homes have continued to rise as their shares of all households have climbed.

Homeownership losses even extend to married couples with children, one of the household types most likely to own homes. Indeed, the rate among these households fell some 6.1 percentage points from its mid-2000s peak, outrunning the decline for any other household type and pushing homeownership rates back to early 1990s levels as well.

#### THE SLOWDOWN IN FIRST-TIME HOMEBUYING

Homeownership rates among households aged 25–34 have plunged by more than 9 percentage points since 2004, and now stand 3 percentage points below the 1993 level. Since members of this age group typically make up just over half of all first-time homebuyers, the market remains particularly weak. Indeed, the National Association of Realtors reports that the first-time buyer share of home purchases fell from 38 percent in 2013 to 33 percent in 2014—near historic lows and well below the 40 percent share typical before the bust. This decline is particularly striking given the movement of the large millennial generation into this age group and the relative affordability of homebuying.


But many young adults are under severe financial pressure. The real median household income of 25–34 year olds in 2013 was down 5 percent from 2004. At the same time, nearly half of renters in this age group face housing cost burdens and almost as large a share are saddled with student loan debt, making it next to impossible to save for even a modest downpayment.

Other long-term demographic trends are part of the explanation (Figure 25). In particular, age at first marriage and childbearing has been on the rise, especially since the recession. Given that first-time homeownership often follows these life events, these delays have helped to depress homebuying overall. In addition, the millennials are the most racially and ethnically diverse generation in history, with minorities making up 45 percent of individuals aged 10–29. The lower homeownership rates of minorities, combined with their growing presence in the housing market, have thus contributed to the lower share of today’s young adults owning homes.

Now that the millennials are adding to the populations of several cities, there is some evidence that more young adults will continue to prefer urban settings and be less likely to buy single-family homes than members of previous generations. The higher rentership rates among young adults and more rapid growth of core counties in metropolitan areas relative to rates from a decade ago are consistent with this view. But no distinct trend toward urban or higher-density living is evident among households buying homes for the first time. In fact, recent buying patterns are roughly consistent with those of a decade ago, with nearly half of first-time buyers purchasing homes in

FIGURE 26

### Low Interest Rates Continue to Hold Down the Costs of Homeownership



Note: Prices are adjusted to constant 2013 dollars using the CPI-U for All Items.  
Sources: JCHS tabulations of NAR Affordability Index and NAR Single-Family Median House Price, annualized by Moody's Analytics; US Census Bureau, Current Population Surveys; Freddie Mac Primary Mortgage Market Surveys.

suburban areas and 31 percent buying homes in center cities. Moreover, the vast majority (91 percent) of first-time buyer households purchased single-family homes.

#### CHANGES IN AFFORDABILITY

Despite rising prices, homebuying in most parts of the country remained more affordable in 2014 than at any time in the previous two decades except right after the housing crash (Figure 26). In 110 of the 113 largest metros for which at least 20 years of price data are available, payment-to-income ratios for the median-priced home were still below long-run averages. And in nearly a third of these metros, ratios were 20 percent or more below those averages.

Based on the NAR standard that mortgage payments cannot exceed 25 percent of income, the median household could afford the median home in all but 10 metros in 2014. Moreover, as of the end of the year, Trulia estimates indicate that the cost of owning was cheaper than renting in all of the 100 largest metro areas.

But conventional measures of affordability may underestimate the challenges of first-time homebuying and overestimate the pool of qualified homebuyers. Under the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau's qualified mortgage rule, the maximum debt-to-income ratio (including payments for property taxes,

insurance, and non-housing debt) is 43 percent. By this measure, only 36 percent of renters in the 168 large metros with 2014 price data could afford a 30-year fixed-rate mortgage on a median-priced home in their areas, assuming a 5 percent downpayment. Among the key 25–34 year-old age group, the share was somewhat higher at 42 percent. Nevertheless, given that their median net wealth was less than \$5,000, typical renters in this age group would be able to meet the 5 percent downpayment requirement in only 5 of the 168 metros.

#### MISSED REFINANCING OPPORTUNITIES

Many homeowners have taken advantage of currently low interest rates to refinance their mortgages. As of the 2013 American Housing Survey, nearly 41 percent of owners with mortgages report having refinanced, and the majority of those who did had refinanced within the previous five years.

With the help of these refinancings, the average mortgage interest rate reported by owners declined from 6.0 percent in 2009 to 4.7 percent in 2013. According to Freddie Mac's Refinance Report, the average refinancing in the fourth quarter of 2014 meant a 1.3 percentage point reduction in the mortgage interest rate, cutting the borrower's monthly interest by 23 percent or \$104 for every \$100,000 borrowed.

But even though the interest rate on a 30-year fixed-rate mortgage was below 4 percent throughout 2012 and into the first five months of 2013, about a third of owners with mortgages in 2013 still paid rates above 5 percent. Many of these households would benefit from refinancing. Indeed, 38 percent of owners with mortgages that have moderate housing cost burdens, as well as 43 percent of those that have severe burdens, pay relatively high interest rates. And despite the availability of assistance through the Home Affordable Refinance Program (HARP), 40 percent of owners with negative equity also pay more than 5 percent interest on their mortgages.

Minority and lower-income homeowners are more likely to pay these high rates. More than 40 percent of Hispanic and black households with mortgages report paying interest rates above 5 percent, compared with less than a third of white and Asian/other minority households (Figure 27). Higher interest rates are partly due to the fact that these owners are the most likely to be highly leveraged and unable to refinance outside of HARP, with 25 percent of Hispanic borrowers and 29 percent of black borrowers in negative equity positions. Lower-income households, along with owners of lower-value homes, are also much more likely to have high-rate mortgages.


#### CONTINUING CREDIT CONSTRAINTS

To capitalize on today's low interest rates, households need access to credit. But for current owners and potential first-time buyers alike, tight underwriting standards have made mortgage credit hard to come by. After taking record losses in the mort-

FIGURE 27

### Many Minority and Low-Income Homeowners Are Missing Out on the Opportunity to Refinance

Share of Owners Paying More than 5% Interest on Their Mortgages (Percent)




Notes: White, black, and Asian/other households are non-Hispanic. Hispanic households may be of any race. Moderate (severe) cost burdens are defined as housing costs of 30–50% (more than 50%) of household income.  
Source: JCHS tabulations of HUD, 2013 American Housing Survey.

FIGURE 28

### Lending to Borrowers with Even Moderate Credit Scores Has Dropped Below Pre-Boom Levels

Number of Purchase Loans Originated (Millions)



Source: Urban Institute.

gauge market meltdown, lenders now face greater risk of having to buy back loans that default and of paying much higher servicing costs for delinquent borrowers. As a result, they have overlaid their own more stringent credit requirements with even stricter standards for borrowers.

Indeed, purchase lending to applicants with low and even moderate credit scores is lower than in 2001 (Figure 28). Since lending to borrowers with top scores declined much less, the share of loans going to this segment increased from 44 percent in 2001 to nearly 62 percent in 2013. Of course, the fallout from the recession—declining incomes, impaired credit, and mounting student loan debt—has also served to dampen demand for home loans over this period.

In an effort to expand credit access, the Federal Housing Finance Agency took steps in 2014 to change the conditions under which lenders are liable for defaulted loans sold to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. In addition, the government sponsored enterprises extended the availability of guarantees for loans with 97 percent loan-to-value ratios. State housing finance agencies have also expanded their programs providing low- and no-downpayment loans to low-income, minority, and younger borrowers. Finally, FHA substantially reduced the upfront mortgage insurance premium on loans it insures. So far, though, continuing concerns about being hit with penalties for defaulted loans may be dampening lender willingness to offer these loans, which are a key source of financing for the first-time buyer market.

In the wake of these changes and the ongoing recovery in home prices, credit constraints may be loosening modestly. Although the majority of institutions polled by Fannie Mae suggest that credit standards remained relatively steady in 2014, a Federal Reserve Board survey indicates that more bank officers reported easing than tightening credit in the second half of 2014 and the first quarter of 2015.

A variety of measures have been developed in recent years to more precisely gauge the availability of mortgage credit. For example, the MBA's Mortgage Credit Availability Index, which essentially weighs lender guidelines on acceptable loans with different loan terms and purposes, suggests that credit standards have eased since early 2012. Even so, the index remains well below levels in the early 2000s.

Alternatively, an Urban Institute index relies on the estimated probability of default for newly originated loans, which indicates the degree of risk that lenders are willing to tolerate. By this measure, loans originated in the first three quarters of 2014 posed about a 5 percent risk of default—well below the level evident in 2001–03 before the riskiest lending practices took hold in the market. In fact, the degree of risk in 2014 was even lower than in 2010–13, suggesting that credit by this measure continued to tighten last year.

Yet another yardstick of mortgage credit availability is the denial rate on loan applications reported under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA). Although denial rates reflect borrowers' willingness to attempt to obtain loans as well as lender underwriting, they do provide some indication of which borrowers have a more difficult time securing financing. According to 2013 HMDA data, 12 percent of applicants for home purchase loans were denied financing. The rate was especially high (20 percent) for African-American applicants—nearly twice that for white borrowers. Hispanics fared slightly better, with a 17 percent denial rate. Meanwhile, low-income borrowers were denied purchase loans 2.5 times more often than upper-income borrowers.

The geographic concentration of minority loan applicants has meant that many communities have been disproportionately affected by tight credit. Although purchase loan originations rose across all types of census tracts in 2012–13, the growth rate in majority-minority areas was just 8 percent—half that in areas with mixed or predominantly white populations.

#### THE OUTLOOK

As troubled as the market has been in the last few years, most households—regardless of race/ethnicity, age, and lifestyle—still consider homeownership a positive goal. According to Fannie Mae's National Housing Survey for the fourth quarter of 2014, 82 percent of respondents thought that owning made more financial sense than renting. Even among renters, 67 percent agreed with this statement. Both shares have changed little from results in the fourth quarter of 2010.

Although most want to own a home someday, younger renter households perceived a variety of financial barriers ahead. Among those aged 18–39, 92 percent expected to buy homes eventually, but 62 percent thought it would be difficult to get a mortgage. The main obstacles they anticipated to obtaining home loans include insufficient savings to make a downpayment and pay for closing costs (42 percent) and an insufficient credit history (47 percent).

Given the consistently strong preference for owning, future trends in the national homeownership rate will depend on whether households have the means to achieve this goal. Demand for homeownership should pick up as the economic recovery continues, but whether mortgage credit will be widely available to satisfy stronger demand remains to be seen. And as long as homeownership remains the primary vehicle for low-income and minority households to build wealth, it will be vital to provide opportunities to keep homebuying within reach of those with both the desire and ability to succeed at this goal.



## RENTAL HOUSING



The share of US households that rent their housing now stands at a 20-year high. While most of the recent increase in the stock has come from conversion of owner-occupied single-family homes to rentals, multifamily construction has also picked up pace. Meanwhile, falling vacancy rates have lifted rents, improving the financial performance of rental properties but straining the budgets of millions of households unable to find units they can afford.

### RECORD GROWTH IN DEMAND

Although estimates vary, the major Census Bureau surveys agree that 2014 marked the 10th consecutive year of robust renter household growth. By the Housing Vacancy Survey's count, the pace of growth accelerated to an average of 900,000 annually in 2010–14. This puts the 2010s on track to be the strongest decade for renter growth in history (**Figure 29**).

Part of the extraordinary growth in rental demand has come from households in certain age, income, and family groups that are traditionally more likely to own. While younger adults are most likely to rent their housing, the number and share of older renters have risen significantly over the last decade with the changing age distribution of the population. Although making up just 25 percent of renters in 2014, households aged 55 and over contributed fully 42 percent of renter household growth over the preceding decade (**Figure 30**). Within the 55–64 year-old age group, population growth drove more than half of the increase in renters while declines in homeownership were responsible for the remainder. Within the 65-and-over age group, however, population growth alone accounted for all of the growth in renter households.

The income distribution among renter households is also shifting. After a net decline in 1994–2004, households in the highest income quartile accounted for almost one in five net new renters in 2004–14, and nearly one in three net new renters in 2011–14. While some of these upper-income renters may have faced economic challenges that prevented them from attaining or maintaining homeownership, more were simply opting to rent rather than own their housing. Even so, only 11 percent of renters were in the top income quartile in 2014, and nearly 40 percent were in the bottom income quartile.


While single persons still make up the largest share of renter households, the numbers of renters of all family types rose over the decade. The reasons for these increases differ, however. For example, growth in the number of single-person renters primarily reflects growth in the overall number of single-person households. In contrast, growth in the number of married-couple renters—particularly those with children—is due primarily to higher rentership rates. Regardless of the reasons, though, all



FIGURE 29

### So Far in the 2010s, Annual Renter Household Growth Has Outstripped the Pace in Any Previous Decade

Average Annual Change in Renter Households (Thousands)




Source: JCHS tabulations of US Census Bureau, Decennial Censuses and Housing Vacancy Surveys.

FIGURE 30

### Older and Higher-Income Households Have Increasingly Turned to Renting

Percent



Note: Low/middle/high household incomes are in the bottom/middle/top quartiles based on equal fourths of all households.  
Source: JCHS tabulations of US Census Bureau, Current Population Surveys.

of these changes in the characteristics of renters have served to increase the diversity of an already diverse set of households.

#### CONTINUED STRENGTH OF MULTIFAMILY CONSTRUCTION

With rental housing demand still on the rise, construction of multifamily units continued to ramp up last year. From a historic low of just under 110,000 in 2009, the number of multifamily starts rose steadily to nearly 360,000 units in 2014—more than in any year in the 1990s or 2000s. And in a marked shift, more than 90 percent of multifamily units started last year were intended for the rental market, up from less than 60 percent in the mid-2000s. Indeed, starts of multifamily rentals in 2014 hit their highest level since 1987 (Figure 31).

Meanwhile, the number of rental units completed last year was well below the number of starts, at just 280,000. With the long lag between starts and completions, the pipeline of new rental housing will continue to fill over the next few years. As a result, the number of new rental units brought to market will continue to rise even if starts level off.

Although the growing supply of multifamily housing will help to meet soaring demand, new units are primarily built for the high end of the market. In 2013, the median asking rent for newly constructed multifamily units was \$1,290, equivalent to about half of the median renter’s monthly household income. At that rent level, over two-thirds of today’s renter households could not afford this new unit at the traditional 30-percent-of-income standard.

The rebound in multifamily construction activity is evident in markets across the country. Over the past year, 18 of the top 25 metros issued more multifamily permits than in an average year in the 2000s. The increases in Chicago, Houston, and Phoenix were particularly large, with permitting of at least 50 percent more multifamily units than in 2013. Over the past five years, however, Austin, San Jose, and Nashville have led the list of metros for growth, with annual permitting of at least 30 percent more units than the 2000s average.


#### EXPANDED ROLE OF SINGLE-FAMILY RENTALS

Single-family rentals have absorbed an increasingly large share of renter household growth since the mid-2000s. Indeed, after averaging just 73,000 units annually in the 1990s, growth in the number of occupied single-family rentals accelerated to 138,000 units per year in the early 2000s. But by the end of the decade, the number of single-family rentals was increasing at an average annual rate of some 513,000 units (Figure 32). According to the American Community Survey, the number of renters in single-family detached homes increased by 3.2 million on net between the homeownership rate peak in 2004 and 2013, accounting for nearly half of the gain in rentals. In contrast, large multifamily buildings (with five or more units) housed about one-third of net new renters over this period, while attached single-family

FIGURE 31

### Multifamily Construction Has Recovered to Pre-Crisis Levels, Driven Almost Entirely by Rentals

Multifamily Starts (Thousands of units)




Source: JCHS tabulations of US Census Bureau, Surveys of Construction.

FIGURE 32

### The Recent Growth of Single-Family Rentals Is Unprecedented

Average Annual Change in Occupied Rental Units (Thousands)



Note: Data exclude mobile homes.

Source: JCHS tabulations of US Census Bureau, Decennial Censuses and American Community Surveys.

units and small multifamily structures (with two to four units) accounted for another 13 percent.

A major factor behind the recent growth of single-family rentals is the surge in single-family development in the 1990s and 2000s. More than 12 million single-family homes were added in the 2000s alone, the highest level in any decade since the 1970s. When rental demand began to climb after the housing bust,

conversions of owner-occupied single-family homes to rentals accommodated much of this growth. These shifts also helped to stabilize for-sale markets, especially in the Sunbelt metros with the largest inventories of distressed and vacant single-family homes.

While the single-family sector has traditionally housed about 30 percent of the nation's renters, its share of the market now stands at 35 percent. This increase brings the number of households living in single-family rentals to 14.8 million. Including mobile homes, single-family housing makes up nearly 40 percent of the overall rental stock and provides homes for 16.7 million households. At the state level, the single-family share of rentals ranges widely from nearly half in Oklahoma, Kansas, and Idaho to less than a fifth in New York, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Washington, DC.


In general, the single-family rental stock differs from the owner-occupied inventory in age, size, and location. The typical single-family rental unit is 10 years older and 26 percent smaller than the typical owner-occupied home. Single-family rentals are also more likely to be found in urban neighborhoods, with more than 30 percent located in center cities, compared with about 20 percent of owner-occupied single-family homes.

The renters of single-family homes are much like renters everywhere, although they are more apt to be middle-aged. They are also more likely to be married couples with children, as well as married couples without children and single-parent families. Persons living alone, however, do make up a sizable share (21 percent) of single-family renters. Finally, white households are more apt to rent single-family homes than minority households. Indeed, 38 percent of white renters live in single-family units,

FIGURE 33

### Apartment Supply and Demand Continue to Rise in Tandem

Annual Change (Thousands)




Note: Data are for investment-grade multifamily properties.  
Source: JCHS tabulations of MPF Research data.

FIGURE 34

### Rental Properties Have Generated Solid Returns Since Mid-2010

Annual Rate (Percent)



Notes: Data are for investment-grade multifamily properties. Net operating income is defined as gross rental income plus any other income less operating expenses.  
Source: JCHS tabulations of National Council of Real Estate Investment Fiduciaries (NCREIF) data.

compared with 33 percent of Hispanic renters, 32 percent of black renters, and 28 percent of Asian/other renters.

#### TIGHTENING MARKETS

Rental markets tightened again in 2014 as the national vacancy rate fell by nearly a full percentage point to 7.6 percent—its lowest point in two decades. Data from MPF Research show that the vacancy rate for professionally managed properties with five or more apartments was even lower, averaging 4.6 percent for the year and running at a rate not seen since before the housing market downturn.

Rental markets are particularly tight at the low end. According to JCHS tabulations of Housing Vacancy Survey data, the number of vacant units with rents under \$800 per month dropped some 12 percent between 2013 and 2014—contributing more than 90 percent of the decline in rental vacancies.

Meanwhile, new construction of professionally managed apartments has not quite kept up with demand (Figure 33). At the end of 2013, new apartments were coming on line at an annual rate of 170,000 units, essentially matching the pace of growth in tenants. By the end of 2014, though, new apartment additions increased to 232,000 units a year while net growth in tenants hit 252,000.

With demand rising and vacancies declining, rents came under increasing pressure last year. The consumer price index for contract rents climbed 3.2 percent in 2014, the largest increase since 2008 and double the overall inflation rate of 1.6 percent. Rents for professionally managed properties were up even more sharply, with the annual increase rising from 3.0 percent in 2013 to 3.8 percent in 2014. Indeed, rent increases picked up pace in the fourth quarter, hitting a 4.6 percent year-over-year rate even as overall inflation cooled.

All but 2 of the 93 metro areas tracked by MPF Research saw rents rise last year. Increases were at least 4 percent in more than a third of metros and at least 3 percent in just under half. At the high end, rents in San Jose, Honolulu, San Francisco, and Denver rose 10 percent or more in 2014.

The 20 hottest rental markets (where rents rose more than 5 percent last year) were all located in the West or South. Rent increases in metros of the Northeast and Midwest were more modest, with only a few major areas—including Boston and Chicago—registering a rise of more than 3 percent.

Occupancy rates were high in the majority of markets where rents were increasing the fastest. At year end, the rental occupancy rate in 2014 exceeded 95 percent in well over half of the 20 hottest markets. Occupancies edged up slightly in the already tight New York and Portland markets, to the 97–98 percent range, but jumped by more than a percentage point in Indianapolis, Cleveland, Phoenix, and Sacramento. In contrast,

rental occupancy rates in Charlotte, Austin, and Miami fell slightly despite a solid increase in rents.

#### **STRONG PERFORMANCE OF APARTMENT PROPERTIES**

Apartment properties performed well again in 2014. The National Council of Real Estate Investment Fiduciaries reports that the net operating income of commercial-grade apartment buildings rose an impressive 9 percent last year, far exceeding the 6 percent annual average over the preceding decade (**Figure 34**).

Apartment prices, as measured by Moody's/RCA Commercial Property Price Index, also rose 15 percent in 2014—the fifth consecutive year of strong growth. These consistent price gains make 2011–14 comparable in strength to 2004–05, the height of the last real estate cycle. Based on changes in net operating incomes as well as property values, the annual rate of return for commercial-grade properties came in at 10 percent last year, much the same as in 2013.

Strong market fundamentals and low interest rates helped to drive growth in multifamily lending, pushing the Mortgage Bankers Originations Index up 15 percent for 2014 as a whole and 39 percent in the fourth quarter alone. Total loans outstanding (including both originations and repayment/writeoffs of existing loans) rose by \$60 billion, led by a \$35 billion jump in loans held by banks and thrifts. While this increase brought the bank and thrift share back to its pre-crisis average of 30 percent, federal sources still hold or guarantee fully 44 percent of mortgage debt outstanding.

Meanwhile, multifamily loan delinquencies continue their decline. In the fourth quarter of 2014, the share of seriously delinquent multifamily loans (at least 90 days past due) at FDIC-insured institutions dipped below 0.5 percent, approaching average levels before the mortgage crisis. The delinquency rate for commercial/multifamily loans held by life insurance companies was even lower, at less than 0.1 percent.

The share of multifamily loans held in commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) that were at least 60 days past due, in foreclosure, or REO also fell in 2014. But even after four consecutive years of declines, the share still stood at 8.6 percent—well above the pre-crisis average of less than 1.0 percent. Similarly, delinquency rates for multifamily loans backed by Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae also declined last year, but to levels that were even below average in the early 2000s.

#### **THE OUTLOOK**

Rental markets continue to adapt to the unprecedented surge in demand that began in the mid-2000s. Although initially ignited by the bust in housing and mortgage markets, rental growth is likely to remain strong as members of the huge millennial population enter the housing market. According to the latest JCHS projections, individuals that are currently under age 30 will form over 20 million new households between 2015 and 2025, and most of these households will be renters. There will also be a large increase in renters over age 65 as more members of the large baby-boom generation cross this threshold over the coming decade.

To keep rents from rising even more sharply, it will be essential to ensure that an adequate supply of rental housing is available to accommodate this upcoming wave of demand. To that end, the growing pipeline of new multifamily rentals is a positive trend. Of course, some markets could face an oversupply of rental units if the ramp-up in multifamily construction goes on for too long. So far, though, there is no evidence that this is an imminent threat.

The rental market plays a critical role in meeting the housing needs of an expanding mix of households. Even so, rental housing continues to be home to a large majority of the nation's low-income households, challenging the market's ability to provide good-quality units that are within financial reach of renters of modest means. Closing the gap between what it costs to produce this housing and what economically disadvantaged households can afford to pay requires the persistent efforts of both the public and private sectors.

# 6

## HOUSING CHALLENGES



Six years after the official end of the recession, the number of renters living in housing they cannot afford continues to set new records. Federal assistance efforts have struggled to keep up with need, while funding cuts limit new construction of affordable housing as well as preservation of existing subsidized units. Aside from affordability, the nation also faces the challenge of revitalizing the many distressed neighborhoods where the housing recovery has failed to take hold. Reducing energy costs and the large carbon footprint of the residential sector are also important priorities.

### PERVASIVE COST BURDENS

According to the most recent American Community Survey, the overall number of households paying more than 30 percent of income for housing declined for the third consecutive year, receding from 40.9 million in 2012 to 39.6 million in 2013. The share of cost-burdened households also fell from 35.3 percent to 34.1 percent.

Almost all of this improvement came on the homeowner side, where income gains and interest-rate-driven reductions in mortgage costs—along with foreclosures among some of the most distressed—pushed the shares of both moderately and severely burdened owners to the lowest levels in a decade. Even so, more than one in four homeowners still paid over 30 percent of income for housing and about one in ten paid over 50 percent.

The number of cost-burdened renters, in contrast, set a new high in 2013 of 20.8 million, totaling just under half of all renter households. Although the number of severely burdened renters edged down slightly, the number of moderately burdened renters climbed by a larger amount.

Regardless of tenure, over 80 percent of households with incomes under \$15,000 (equivalent to full-time pay at the federal minimum wage) were cost burdened in 2013 (**Figure 35**). Just over half of homeowners and three-quarters of renters with incomes between \$15,000 and \$29,999 were also housing cost burdened. Even those earning \$30,000–44,999 commonly face cost burdens, including 37 percent of owners and 45 percent of renters.


Minorities and certain types of households are especially likely to have severe housing cost burdens. Indeed, 26 percent of black households, 23 percent of Hispanic households, and 20 percent of Asian and other minority households were severely burdened in 2013, compared with just 14 percent of white households. Nearly a third of single-parent families also had severe burdens, compared with a tenth of married couples with children. Finally, more than half of households headed by an unemployed individual in 2013 were severely housing cost burdened.

The cost-burdened share of households is particularly high in expensive coastal markets, including Los Angeles, New York,


FIGURE 35

### While Homeowners Have Had Some Relief, More and More Renters Are Cost Burdened

Share of Homeowners with Cost Burdens (Percent)



Share of Renters with Cost Burdens (Percent)




Notes: Cost burdens are defined as housing costs of more than 30% of household income. Incomes are adjusted to 2013 dollars using the CPI-U for All Items. Source: JCHS tabulations of US Census Bureau, American Community Surveys.

FIGURE 36

### When Low-Income Households Have to Dedicate Most of Their Income to Housing, They Cut Back on Other Vital Needs

Average Monthly Expenditures of Low-Income Households (Dollars)



Notes: Low-income households are in the bottom quartile of all households ranked by total spending. Moderate (severe) burdens are defined as housing costs of 30-50% (more than 50%) of household incomes. Source: JCHS tabulations of US Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2013 Consumer Expenditure Survey.

and Honolulu. In 2013, 41 percent of households living in the 10 highest-cost major metros had cost burdens, far exceeding the 34 percent in the nation as a whole. Nevertheless, even in lower-cost metros like Miami, Las Vegas, and Orlando, 40 percent or more of households had cost burdens. Moreover, affordability pressures in the 10 most expensive markets reach further up the income scale. In fact, nearly half (48 percent) of households with incomes of \$45,000-74,999 were housing cost burdened in these metros—more than twice the share (22 percent) nationally. As a result, the nearly 20 million households living in the 10 highest-cost metros must earn well above the national median income of \$51,900 to live in housing they can afford.

Meanwhile, the affordable options for lower-income households are extremely limited in all market areas. In 98 of the 100 largest metros, more than three-quarters of households with incomes below \$15,000, and more than half of those with incomes between \$15,000 and \$29,999, were housing cost burdened in 2013.

#### CONSEQUENCES OF HIGH-COST HOUSING

On average, severely cost-burdened households in the bottom expenditure quartile (a proxy for low income) spent almost three times as much on housing in 2013 as those living in affordable housing. When paying for housing takes at least half of household income, families have little left over for other vital needs. For example, severely cost-burdened households in the bottom expenditure quartile spent 70 percent less on healthcare and 40 percent less on food than their counterparts with housing they could afford (Figure 36). In addition to diminished quality of life for a particular household, such significant cutbacks reduce spending in the economy as a whole.

Where households make the biggest spending cuts depends on their stage in life, with both short- and long-term implications for health and well-being. Severely cost-burdened households under age 65 in the bottom expenditure quartile contributed 52 percent less to their retirement savings than those in affordable housing. Same-aged households in the next highest expenditure quartile contributed 41 percent less. In contrast, severely cost-burdened households aged 65 and over in the lowest expenditure quartile spent 60 percent less on healthcare and 41 percent less on food than otherwise similar households with affordable housing.

Paying large shares of income for housing does not guarantee the units will be adequate or safe. Housing deficiencies related to plumbing, electrical, and heating systems or to structural integrity affect a much larger share of renters (9 percent) than owners (3 percent). Moreover, the incidence of such problems among owners declined over the past 20 years, but remained unchanged among renters. The share of households earning less than \$15,000 that live in inadequate housing is especially high at 10 percent.

Inadequate housing is found primarily in urban areas, accounting for 7.5 percent of central city units. But inadequacy is also a significant concern in many rural areas, where 5.3 percent of units are inadequate. These problems are particularly evident in Native American lands in the Southwest, *colonias* along the Mexican border, and locations throughout Appalachia. According to an analysis by the Housing Assistance Council, the share of housing units that lack complete plumbing is only 0.5

percent nationwide, but 5.3 percent on Native American lands, 1.1 percent along the Mexican border, and 0.8 percent in rural areas of central Appalachia.

### SUPPLY AND DEMAND FOR AFFORDABLE UNITS

Extremely low-income households (earning up to 30 percent of area median) have increasingly few housing choices. In 2013, 11.2 million renters with incomes this low competed for 7.3 million affordable units, leaving a shortfall of 3.9 million (Figure 37). Excluding units that were structurally inadequate or occupied by higher-income households, there were only 34 affordable units for every 100 extremely low-income renters. Despite a slight improvement in recent years, the gap between the number of extremely low-income renters and the supply of units they can afford nearly doubled from 2003 to 2013.

When considering all very low-income households (earning up to 50 percent of area median), the absolute shortage of affordable units is smaller, but a large share of these households still have to live in units they cannot afford. Overall, 18.5 million very low-income renters competed for 18.0 million affordable units in 2013. But given that a third of those units were occupied by higher-income households and another 7 percent were inadequate, only 58 affordable units were left to serve every 100 very low-income renters.

### URGENT NEED FOR HOUSING ASSISTANCE


Since the private sector cannot profitably supply very low-cost units, the government must play a critical role in ensuring that the nation's most disadvantaged families and individuals have good-quality, affordable housing. Very low-income households qualify for a variety of federal rental assistance programs supported primarily by the US Department of Housing and Urban Development. As of 2013, HUD programs accounted for 4.8 million assisted renters, with just under half supported through housing choice vouchers, 1.1 million in public housing developments, and 1.6 million in privately owned developments. US Department of Agriculture (USDA) programs subsidize an additional 406,000 rentals.

The Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) program—administered by state agencies, often with financing from mortgage revenue bonds—provides the primary support for construction and preservation of affordable rentals. Since its inception in 1986, the program has financed construction or rehabilitation of 2.1 million units affordable to lower-income households (Figure 38). While LIHTC subsidies alone cannot bring rents within reach for extremely low-income households, affordable housing developers often combine the tax credits with assistance from the housing voucher and project-based programs to serve these renters.

Federal housing assistance supports the nation's most vulnerable families and individuals. As of 2013, the average annual income of a HUD-assisted household was about \$12,900, while that of a USDA-assisted household was \$12,000. These pro-

FIGURE 37

### Low-Income Renters Far Outnumber the Supply of Available Units They Can Afford




Notes: Extremely (very) low-income households earn no more than 30% (50%) of area median income. Affordable is defined as housing costs of no more than 30% of household income on a unit size-adjusted basis.  
Source: JCHS tabulations of HUD, *Worst Case Housing Needs: 2015 Report to Congress*.

FIGURE 38

### The LIHTC Program Remains the Primary Source of Financing for Both the Construction and Preservation of Affordable Housing

Cumulative Low-Income Units Placed in Service (Millions)




Note: Data include only units financed with 9% and 4% credits by year placed in service.  
Source: JCHS tabulations of HUD, Low Income Housing Tax Credit Database.

FIGURE 39

### Millions of Units Subsidized with Project-Based Rental Assistance or Tax Credits Are at Risk of Loss

Cumulative Number of Units with Expiring Affordability Periods (Millions)



Notes: Data include properties with active subsidies as of February 20, 2015. Other units are funded by HOME Rental Assistance, FHA insurance, Section 202 Direct Loans, and USDA Section 515 Rural Rental Housing Loans.  
Source: JCHS tabulations of National Housing Preservation Database.

grams also serve large shares of older adults, especially those with disabilities. Indeed, a third of HUD-assisted households in 2013 were headed by an adult aged 62 and over, while another third were working-age households that included a person with disabilities. More than 60 percent of USDA-assisted renters were seniors or people with disabilities.

The growing need for housing aid continues to overwhelm the capacity of federal, state, and local governments. According to HUD estimates, the number of very low-income renters qualifying for subsidies increased by 18 percent between 2003 and 2013, from 15.7 million to 18.5 million. At last measure in 2013, however, just over a quarter (26 percent) of eligible very low-income households received rental assistance.

Unmet need has continued to grow despite real increases in federal appropriations for two of HUD’s largest programs—housing choice vouchers and project-based rental assistance—between FY2005 and FY2015. But instead of serving more households, most of the increased funding was offset by the higher costs of assistance due to rising market rents.

Meanwhile, appropriations for programs subsidizing construction of affordable housing have fallen well below levels a decade ago. For example, funding for USDA’s Section 515 program was down 77 percent in real terms between FY2005 and FY2015. After adding 533,500 rental units to the affordable rural stock between 1963 and 2011, the program has supported no new construction since. Appropriations for HUD’s Section 202 program, which over its lifetime funded production of 400,000 supportive housing units for older adults, were also cut 55 percent over this period, and included no funds for new construction in recent years.

Federal budget cuts due to limits on non-defense discretionary spending established by the 2011 Budget Control Act have also taken a toll on other key supports for affordable housing. Funding for the HOME program, an important source of gap financing for affordable housing developments as well as other housing programs, dropped 62 percent between FY2005 and FY2015. In addition, funding for the CDBG program, which provides funds for a wide range of local community development activities, also fell by half over this period.

#### PRESERVING THE AFFORDABLE STOCK

Amid declining subsidies and rising development costs, preservation of the existing stock of affordable housing has taken on new urgency. As it is, nearly 2.2 million assisted units are at risk of removal over the coming decade (Figure 39).

More than 1.2 million of these at-risk rental units are in LIHTC developments whose compliance periods are set to end. At that point, developers may find it difficult to keep the units affordable if they lack the funds to make necessary upgrades. Their options are to refinance their loans, apply for another round of tax credits, or sell their stake in the property or partnership.



Of the remaining at-risk units, 530,000 are in privately owned developments with rents subsidized under federal contracts. Once those contracts expire, property owners can opt out of the program and raise their rents. Owners with properties in high-rent neighborhoods earning below-market rents for their assisted units have the most incentive to opt out. Half of the stock with expiring project-based subsidy contracts are in this category.

In other cases, affordability is tied to the mortgage backing the property. These units may be lost from the affordable stock when the mortgage comes to term, the property owner prepays the loan, or if refinancing is not paired with additional project-based subsidies to protect tenants against large rent increases. These conditions affect more than 200,000 affordable units financed through HUD’s Section 202 program, USDA’s Section 515 program, and FHA mortgage insurance programs.

A number of preservation initiatives are under way. In 2010, HUD received authorization to provide rental assistance contracts for Section 202-financed senior housing projects that are refinanced or recapitalized, thus preventing displacement of income-eligible tenants. In 2012, HUD implemented a pilot program that expedites approvals for the purchase or refinance of LIHTC properties through FHA’s Section 223 program.

In addition, Congress recently approved expansion of HUD’s Rental Assistance Demonstration (RAD) program from 60,000 units to 185,000 units. The RAD program, which converts existing financial support of HUD-assisted properties into long-term

contracts for rent subsidies to expand access to private financing, primarily aims to foster reinvestment in the public housing stock, but is also open to three legacy programs for privately owned subsidized housing. Meanwhile, USDA’s Multifamily Housing Preservation and Revitalization demonstration program offers a variety of assistance to owners or buyers of Section 515 properties, although the scale of these efforts is small relative to need.

In almost all of these cases, however, the LIHTC program is a critical source of investment capital that will be necessary to keep the units affordable. These competing demands—for new construction as well as for preservation—have put the tax credit program under extreme pressure and raised the question of whether it ought to be expanded.

### PROGRESS IN REDUCING HOMELESSNESS

The lack of affordable housing in the United States continues to leave nearly 600,000 people homeless. More than a third are people in families, including 130,000 children under the age of 18. By comparison, chronically homeless individuals (those who have been without a place to live for at least a year or have had repeated episodes of homelessness over the past few years) account for a much smaller share (15 percent) of the homeless population.

Recent increases in federal funding have aided progress in reducing both homelessness overall and among the most vulnerable groups. Indeed, the number of beds in permanent supportive housing expanded 60 percent between 2007 and 2014, to over 300,000. Beds for the chronically homeless accounted for just over half of this increase. As a result, total homelessness fell 11 percent in 2007–14, the number of homeless veterans dropped 19 percent, and the number of chronically homeless individuals was down by 30 percent. At the same time, however, the number of homeless people in families declined by only 8 percent.

But the national reduction in homelessness is not apparent in all markets. Rising rents and a dwindling supply of affordable rentals continue to put people at risk, especially in high-cost locations. Indeed, total homelessness jumped by 29 percent in New York and 40 percent in Massachusetts between 2007 and 2014. The increase in the District of Columbia was even larger, at 46 percent. Family homelessness is particularly acute in major cities, which were home to 45 percent of this population in 2014. New York City headed the list with 41,600 homeless people in families, or nearly 20 percent of the national total.


### REVITALIZING DISTRESSED NEIGHBORHOODS

By many measures, the US housing market has made a substantial recovery from the crash. According to Zillow, national home prices rebounded in 2014 to within 10.4 percent of their previous peak, reducing the share of owners with mortgages that have negative equity from 31.4 percent in early 2012 to

FIGURE 40

### Neighborhoods with the Highest Loan Delinquencies Are Typically Minority and Low Income

Share of Zip Codes (Percent)



Notes: Data include only zip codes with populations of at least 500. Low-income zip codes have median incomes of less than 80% of the state median. Delinquent loans are 90 or more days past due.  
Sources: JCHS tabulations of CoreLogic delinquency data; US Census Bureau, 2009–13 Five-Year American Community Survey.

16.9 percent. Meanwhile, CoreLogic reports that the share of seriously delinquent loans fell to 3.9 percent in early 2015, the lowest level since 2008.

But the degree of recovery varies widely across locations. Indeed, housing market distress remains extremely high in certain communities, particularly those where risky lending was rampant during the housing boom. Among the more than 10,000 zip codes for which data are available, house prices in the bottom tenth of neighborhoods were still 34 percent below their 2006 levels in 2014 and the share of underwater homeowners remained at 26 percent. Although accounting for less than one in five zip codes, majority-minority communities make up half of the neighborhoods where house prices and home equity remain furthest behind.

The pattern is similar when looking at loan delinquencies. According to CoreLogic data on more than 25,000 zip codes, 3.7 percent of loans in the median community were 90 or more days past due or in foreclosure last year. But the share of troubled loans was at least 9 percent in about a tenth of these neighborhoods. Again, four out of ten neighborhoods were majority-minority and more than half had household incomes below 80 percent of the statewide median (**Figure 40**).

The extent of persistent housing market distress makes it clear that public efforts to remediate the effects of the housing crash must continue. The Treasury Department's recent decision to extend its homeowner relief programs through 2016 is a step in the right direction. But the country's most highly stressed communities face a host of economic and social challenges that no single strategy can address. Indeed, reducing blight and enhancing economic opportunity in these areas require comprehensive, integrated efforts to engage residents and link resources. To this end, HUD is working to improve collaboration with other federal agencies and to encourage local partnerships through such initiatives as the Choice Neighborhoods program.

#### FOSTERING GREENER HOUSING

Improving the efficiency of the residential stock would help to make housing more affordable for lower-income households. As it is, the typical household earning less than \$15,000 spent 18 percent of that income on residential energy needs in 2013—more than twice the 8 percent share among households earning \$15,000–29,999 and more than three times the 5 percent share among those earning \$30,000–44,999.

With residential buildings generating about 20 percent of US carbon emissions, efficiency improvements would also go a long way to reducing greenhouse gases. Retrofits of older homes have in fact yielded steady efficiency gains over the past several decades, with the typical pre-1970 house using nearly 30

percent less energy per square foot in 2009 than a similar-aged home in 1980. Newer homes are also more efficient thanks to improvements in space heating, air conditioning, insulation, and major appliances. Indeed, homes built in the 2000s consume almost 18 percent less energy per square foot than those built previously.

Encouragingly, Harvard's Center for Green Buildings and Cities finds that support for green building is gaining traction at the local level. Based on information from the US Green Building Council, the American Institute of Architects, and the websites of local governments, 185 of the 715 US cities with populations above 50,000 have green building programs. Of this group, 124 cities have programs specifically for residential construction. Most green building programs take the form of ordinances that set standards for newly constructed or renovated structures, although some include incentives, zoning codes, tax abatements, or action plans to encourage high-performance building practices.

Most of the cities that have adopted green policies for residential buildings are on the coasts. California leads with 45 programs, while Florida has 22. Given that these two states are home to much of the nation's population and account for a large share of new residential construction, their adoption of green standards may help pave the way for broader implementation by other states and by the homebuilding industry.

#### THE OUTLOOK

While the past year brought some relief, fallout from the housing crash and Great Recession lingers on. Large shares of low-income households—and renters in particular—continue to spend unreasonable shares of their income on housing. With income growth failing to keep pace with rents, affordability pressures are unlikely to ease noticeably in the near future.

And with such large shares of households struggling with housing cost burdens, fewer are able to save adequately for emergencies, retirement, or to buy homes, thereby limiting their wealth-building potential as well as shrinking the first-time homebuyer market. Meanwhile, the number of affordable units for lowest-income households falls far short of need, and preserving the stock that does exist must take priority.

The long-delayed capitalization of the National Housing Trust Fund would be an important step in addressing these intractable housing challenges. Indeed, this trust fund would support the first production program to target extremely low-income households since the launch of the Section 8 program in 1974. And unlike current rental assistance programs, the trust fund would not be subject to annual appropriations but instead have a predictable stream of funding.



## APPENDIX TABLES



**Table A-1** ..... Housing Cost-Burdened Households by Tenure and Income: 2003, 2008, 2012, and 2013

**Table A-2** ..... Housing Market Indicators: 1980–2014

**Table A-3** ..... Monthly Housing and Non-Housing Expenditures by Households: 2013

The following tables can be downloaded in Microsoft Excel format from the Joint Center’s website at [www.jchs.harvard.edu](http://www.jchs.harvard.edu).

**Table W-1** ..... Homeownership Rates by Age, Race/Ethnicity, and Region: 1994–2014

**Table W-2** ..... Median Household Net Worth, Home Equity, and Non-Housing Wealth for Owners and Renters by Age and Race: 2013

**Table W-3** ..... Severely Cost-Burdened Households by Demographic Characteristics: 2013

**Table W-4** ..... Metro Area Housing Cost-Burden Rates by Household Income: 2013

**Table W-5** ..... Cost-Burdened Households and Median Household Income, Monthly Housing Costs, and Cost-to-Income Ratio by Metro Area: 2013

**Table W-6** ..... Metro Area Monthly Mortgage Payment on Median Priced Home: 1990–2014

**Table W-7** ..... Metro Area Median Payment-to-Income Ratio: 1990–2014

**Table W-8** ..... Metro Area Median Price-to-Income Ratio: 1990–2014

**Table W-9** ..... Housing Cost-Burdened Households by State and Income: 2013

TABLE A-1

## Housing Cost-Burdened Households by Tenure and Income: 2003, 2008, 2012, and 2013

Thousands

Tenure and Income	2003			2008			2012			2013		
	Moderate Burden	Severe Burden	Total	Moderate Burden	Severe Burden	Total	Moderate Burden	Severe Burden	Total	Moderate Burden	Severe Burden	Total
<b>Owners</b>												
Under \$15,000	911	2,848	4,683	876	3,122	4,847	943	3,425	5,351	902	3,464	5,317
\$15,000–29,999	2,024	2,044	8,458	2,081	2,489	8,481	2,278	2,486	9,189	2,237	2,316	8,954
\$30,000–44,999	2,385	1,136	9,457	2,462	1,628	9,504	2,572	1,330	9,929	2,412	1,195	9,730
\$45,000–74,999	3,419	777	17,308	4,036	1,433	17,727	3,413	923	17,385	3,081	807	17,244
\$75,000 and Over	2,516	312	32,518	4,041	706	34,783	2,541	348	32,373	2,164	300	32,689
Total	11,254	7,117	72,424	13,496	9,378	75,342	11,748	8,512	74,227	10,797	8,082	73,933
<b>Renters</b>												
Under \$15,000	952	5,202	7,679	1,047	5,806	8,350	1,163	7,144	9,993	1,118	7,017	9,769
\$15,000–29,999	3,280	2,456	8,117	3,431	2,787	8,494	3,935	3,280	9,566	3,947	3,326	9,576
\$30,000–44,999	2,163	397	6,699	2,351	554	6,817	2,581	654	7,268	2,669	670	7,353
\$45,000–74,999	933	112	7,622	1,250	162	7,788	1,394	172	8,165	1,480	193	8,463
\$75,000 and Over	186	11	5,886	271	14	6,310	298	10	6,750	334	09	7,196
Total	7,514	8,178	36,004	8,349	9,323	37,760	9,371	11,261	41,742	9,549	11,216	42,358
<b>All Households</b>												
Under \$15,000	1,863	8,050	12,362	1,924	8,928	13,197	2,106	10,569	15,344	2,021	10,481	15,086
\$15,000–29,999	5,304	4,500	16,575	5,511	5,277	16,975	6,213	5,766	18,755	6,184	5,642	18,530
\$30,000–44,999	4,548	1,533	16,157	4,812	2,182	16,322	5,153	1,984	17,197	5,081	1,865	17,083
\$45,000–74,999	4,351	890	24,930	5,286	1,595	25,515	4,808	1,096	25,550	4,562	1,000	25,707
\$75,000 and Over	2,702	323	38,404	4,312	719	41,093	2,840	359	39,123	2,498	309	39,885
Total	18,768	15,295	108,428	21,846	18,701	113,101	21,119	19,773	115,970	20,345	19,297	116,291

Notes: Moderate (severe) burdens are defined as housing costs of 30–50% (more than 50%) of household income. Households with zero or negative income are assumed to be severely burdened, while renters paying no cash rent are assumed to be unburdened. Income cutoffs are adjusted to 2013 dollars by the CPI-U for All Items.

Source: JCHS tabulations of US Census Bureau, American Community Surveys.

TABLE A-2

## Housing Market Indicators: 1980–2014

Year	Permits <sup>1</sup> (Thousands)		Starts <sup>2</sup> (Thousands)			Size <sup>3</sup> (Median sq. ft.)		Sales Price of Single-Family Homes (2013 dollars)	
	Single-Family	Multifamily	Single-Family	Multifamily	Manufactured	Single-Family	Multifamily	New <sup>4</sup>	Existing <sup>5</sup>
1980	710	480	852	440	222	1,595	915	185,596	178,270
1981	564	421	705	379	241	1,550	930	179,440	172,213
1982	546	454	663	400	240	1,520	925	170,008	166,083
1983	901	704	1,068	636	296	1,565	893	178,978	165,965
1984	922	759	1,084	665	295	1,605	871	182,052	164,735
1985	957	777	1,072	670	284	1,605	882	185,473	165,800
1986	1,078	692	1,179	626	244	1,660	876	198,720	173,358
1987	1,024	510	1,146	474	233	1,755	920	217,772	178,333
1988	994	462	1,081	407	218	1,810	940	225,129	178,503
1989	932	407	1,003	373	198	1,850	940	229,099	180,050
1990	794	317	895	298	188	1,905	955	222,608	175,394
1991	754	195	840	174	171	1,890	980	208,578	177,335
1992	911	184	1,030	170	211	1,920	985	205,014	177,257
1993	987	213	1,126	162	254	1,945	1,005	207,246	177,347
1994	1,068	303	1,198	259	304	1,940	1,015	207,663	180,068
1995	997	335	1,076	278	340	1,920	1,040	207,998	179,934
1996	1,069	356	1,161	316	363	1,950	1,030	211,237	183,902
1997	1,062	379	1,134	340	354	1,975	1,050	215,349	188,860
1998	1,188	425	1,271	346	373	2,000	1,020	221,486	196,021
1999	1,247	417	1,302	339	348	2,028	1,041	228,778	199,293
2000	1,198	394	1,231	338	250	2,057	1,039	232,337	200,728
2001	1,236	401	1,273	329	193	2,103	1,104	234,196	206,537
2002	1,333	415	1,359	346	169	2,114	1,070	246,869	218,697
2003	1,461	428	1,499	349	131	2,137	1,092	250,889	229,424
2004	1,613	457	1,611	345	131	2,140	1,105	276,965	241,634
2005	1,682	473	1,716	353	147	2,227	1,143	292,011	263,636
2006	1,378	461	1,465	336	117	2,259	1,192	289,461	260,554
2007	980	419	1,046	309	96	2,230	1,134	283,044	246,070
2008	576	330	622	284	82	2,174	1,089	255,205	215,264
2009	441	142	445	109	50	2,103	1,124	239,123	190,340
2010	447	157	471	116	50	2,151	1,137	240,801	187,540
2011	418	206	431	178	52	2,267	1,093	239,116	173,583
2012	519	311	535	245	55	2,310	1,051	252,827	181,251
2013	621	370	618	307	60	2,460	1,099	273,262	199,112
2014	640	412	647	356	64	2,414	1,080	282,800	207,125

Notes: All value series are adjusted to 2014 dollars by the CPI-U for All Items. All links are as of April 2015. na indicates data not available.

(a) 2014 permits from new 2014 universe.

Sources:

1. US Census Bureau, New Privately Owned Housing Units Authorized by Building Permits, [http://www.census.gov/construction/hrc/xls/permits\\_cust.xls](http://www.census.gov/construction/hrc/xls/permits_cust.xls).

2. US Census Bureau, New Privately Owned Housing Units Started in the United States by Purpose and Design, [http://www.census.gov/construction/hrc/xls/quarterly\\_starts\\_completions\\_cust.xls](http://www.census.gov/construction/hrc/xls/quarterly_starts_completions_cust.xls); Shipments of New Manufactured Homes, <http://www.census.gov/construction/mhs/xls/shiphist.xls> & <http://www.census.gov/construction/mhs/xls/shipmentstostate11-15.xls>. Data from 1980-2010 retrieved from JCHS historical tables. Manufactured housing starts are defined as shipments of new manufactured homes.

3. US Census Bureau, New Privately Owned Housing Units Started in the United States by Purpose and Design, [http://www.census.gov/construction/hrc/xls/quarterly\\_starts\\_completions\\_cust.xls](http://www.census.gov/construction/hrc/xls/quarterly_starts_completions_cust.xls) and JCHS historical tables.

Vacancy Rates <sup>6</sup> (Percent)		Value Put in Place <sup>7</sup> (Millions of 2014 dollars)			Home Sales (Thousands)	
For Sale	For Rent	Single-Family	Multifamily	Owner Improvements	New <sup>8</sup>	Existing <sup>9</sup>
1.4	5.4	152,043	48,002	na	545	2,973
1.4	5.0	135,335	45,472	na	436	2,419
1.5	5.3	101,716	38,118	na	412	1,990
1.5	5.7	172,356	53,354	na	623	2,697
1.7	5.9	196,851	64,302	na	639	2,829
1.7	6.5	192,183	62,790	na	688	3,134
1.6	7.3	224,923	67,042	na	750	3,474
1.7	7.7	244,272	53,041	na	671	3,436
1.6	7.7	240,324	44,622	na	676	3,513
1.8	7.4	230,873	42,582	na	650	3,010
1.7	7.2	204,470	34,867	na	534	2,917
1.7	7.4	172,819	26,329	na	509	2,886
1.5	7.4	205,817	22,094	na	610	3,155
1.4	7.3	229,565	17,674	93,824	666	3,429
1.5	7.4	259,274	22,493	103,261	670	3,542
1.5	7.6	238,468	27,789	88,103	667	3,523
1.6	7.8	257,694	30,666	100,158	757	3,795
1.6	7.7	258,387	33,752	98,285	804	3,963
1.7	7.9	289,615	35,690	105,093	886	4,496
1.7	8.1	318,069	38,983	106,618	880	4,650
1.6	8.0	325,530	38,850	111,482	877	4,602
1.8	8.4	332,962	40,510	113,653	908	4,732
1.7	8.9	349,892	43,363	128,770	973	4,974
1.8	9.8	399,588	45,181	129,103	1,086	5,444
1.7	10.2	473,167	50,059	144,622	1,203	5,958
1.9	9.8	525,486	57,332	158,905	1,283	6,180
2.4	9.7	488,499	62,006	170,190	1,051	5,677
2.7	9.7	348,449	55,900	158,823	776	4,398
2.8	10.0	204,270	48,752	132,104	485	3,665
2.6	10.6	116,236	31,491	123,631	375	3,870
2.6	10.2	122,212	15,944	121,121	323	3,708
2.5	9.5	113,851	15,826	127,260	306	3,786
2.0	8.7	136,122	23,210	129,971	368	4,128
2.0	8.3	173,538	32,854	135,270	429	4,484
1.9	7.6	191,644	43,602	113,771	437	4,344

4. New home price is the median price from US Census Bureau, Median and Average Sales Price of New One-Family Houses Sold, [www.census.gov/construction/nrs/xls/usprice\\_cust.xls](http://www.census.gov/construction/nrs/xls/usprice_cust.xls)  
5. Existing home price is the median sales price of existing single-family homes determined by the National Association of Realtors®, obtained from and annualized by Moody's Analytics.  
6. US Census Bureau, Housing Vacancy Survey, <http://www.census.gov/housing/hws/data/ann13ind.html>.  
7. US Census Bureau, Annual Value of Private Construction Put in Place, [http://www.census.gov/construction/c30/historical\\_data.html](http://www.census.gov/construction/c30/historical_data.html); data 1980-1993 retrieved from past JCHS reports. Single-family and multifamily are new construction. Owner improvements do not include expenditures on rental, seasonal, and vacant properties.  
8. US Census Bureau, Houses Sold by Region, [http://www.census.gov/construction/nrs/xls/sold\\_cust.xls](http://www.census.gov/construction/nrs/xls/sold_cust.xls).  
9. National Association of Realtors®, Existing Single-Family Home Sales obtained from and annualized by Moody's Analytics, and JCHS historical tables.

TABLE A-3

## Monthly Housing and Non-Housing Expenditures by Households: 2013

Dollars

Share of Expenditures on Housing	Housing Expenditures	Non-Housing Expenditures							
		Total	Transportation	Food	Clothes	Healthcare	Personal Insurance and Pensions	Entertainment	Other
<b>Quartile 1 (Lowest)</b>									
Less than 30%	251	1,061	178	361	22	140	73	60	227
30-50%	528	819	133	298	21	88	68	50	161
Over 50%	742	489	60	216	14	43	37	33	86
All	448	863	139	310	20	102	64	51	176
<b>Quartile 2</b>									
Less than 30%	489	2,022	363	527	47	254	238	114	478
30-50%	947	1,526	270	476	39	135	224	90	291
Over 50%	1,416	1,018	169	366	25	82	144	62	171
All	754	1,735	308	492	42	192	224	100	377
<b>Quartile 3</b>									
Less than 30%	748	3,194	546	694	83	374	484	187	827
30-50%	1,459	2,427	417	628	68	217	425	145	526
Over 50%	2,360	1,540	239	467	36	179	233	87	298
All	1,042	2,881	492	663	76	318	453	169	711
<b>Quartile 4 (Highest)</b>									
Less than 30%	1,294	7,480	2,090	1,013	165	574	1,029	431	2,178
30-50%	2,772	4,597	650	923	143	406	905	293	1,277
Over 50%	4,487	3,114	422	742	87	283	618	208	754
All	1,699	6,758	1,748	985	158	531	990	396	1,950

Notes: Quartiles are equal fourths of households ranked by total expenditures. Housing expenditures include mortgage principal and interest, insurance, taxes, maintenance, rents, and utilities.  
Source: JCHS tabulations of the US Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2013 Consumer Expenditure Survey.

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






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Committee (please print clearly): \_\_\_\_\_

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2. Please suggest any other ways the chair and vice chair could better direct the committee's programs and agenda.

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3. Please suggest methods of getting member input on committee issues other than a committee meeting (such as surveys, focus groups, forums, or feedback from other committees):

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4. Can you suggest ways to make the committee experience more productive?

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On a scale of 1 to 10, 10 being the highest rating:

- |   |                      |
|---|----------------------|
| 1. How well did the meeting accomplish its objectives?                | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 |
| 2. How well was the meeting organized?                                | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 |
| 3. How valuable did you find the prepared materials?                  | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 |
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